Eritreans caught in a dilemma by the Tigray conflict



[ad_1]

Many Eritreans, including those opposed to the government of President Isaias Afwerki, find themselves in a quandary over the conflict in Tigray. Most Eritreans agree that he is the mastermind and they oppose any involvement by his country. There are also a few staunch ones who believe that he is doing this in the interest of Eritrea.

This article is published in association with Ethiopia Insight

A dilemma arises from the historical experience Eritrean elites had with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), especially during their dominance of Ethiopian politics from 1991 to 2018. Lack of trust persists and many Eritreans blame it in part. of their misery.

Members of various Eritrean opposition groups that were based in Ethiopia also accuse the TPLF of interfering in their affairs and enforcing ethnic divisions and other divide and rule tactics.

Those who accuse the TPLF as the main force behind the ‘Agazian’ or ‘Greater Tigray Movement’ also fall into this category. The Movement is a reincarnation of the 1940s idea of ​​establishing a Tigray-Tigringni Nation that includes Eritrea and Tigray. These opposition groups see the weakening of the TPLF as an advantage and appear to quietly support attacks against it or remain indifferent.

READ MORE Will the Tigray conflict in Ethiopia spread to Eritrea, Egypt and Sudan?

Another dilemma arises from the lack of clarity in the relationship between President Isaías and Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed.

This claim is reinforced by the comments and assertions of the leaders and their supporters regarding the sovereignty of Eritrea. Some pro-justice Eritreans believe that Abiy, like the president of Eritrea, is a Machiavellian who would not hesitate to liquidate anyone who stands in his way for the sake of power. They believe that he will not stop at Tigray and that Eritrea will be his next target once Tigray is in the fold of his Prosperity Party.

Proponents of this view see Tigray as a potential ally against Abiy-Isaiah’s sinister agenda of undermining Eritrea’s sovereignty under the guise of regional integration and a buffer against nostalgic Ethiopian imperialists. This group is staunchly opposed to the war, with some expressing open support for the TPLF.

The Tigrayan missile attacks around Asmara, however, were a major setback and probably lost the TPLF some of the sympathy it was receiving from the Eritreans.

Eritrean refugees: from crisis to crisis

Of the half a million Eritreans in Ethiopia, 270,000 have arrived in the past two years, following the signing of the peace agreement between Isaiah and Abiy in 2018.

According to the UN refugee agency, more than 100,000 of them are in refugee camps in Tigray and, in particular, in western Tigray, where heavy fighting has recently taken place. UN staff members have fled the refugee camps and the refugees have been left alone. As monthly supplies of food and other essential goods are running out, their destitution is expected to worsen.

Many of them have already joined the thousands of Tigrayans who travel to Sudan or have moved to the main cities. Currently, the Mai Aini refugee camp is at the highest risk and the fighting is concentrated in that area.

READ MORE Young Eritreans explain why they are fleeing the country

The latest reports from the Eritrea Hub indicate that some of the camps have been stormed by Eritrean troops who detained some of the refugees and transported them back to Eritrea. In response to UNHCR’s statement on the matter, Yemane Gebremeskel, Eritrea’s Information Minister, accused the organization of being a “main conduit” in the “depopulation” of Eritrea.

If confirmed, the action of the Eritrean troops would constitute a serious crime against international law. It would be a double jeopardy for the refugees if they had to face the Eritrean forces they fled to avoid in the first place.

Many of the refugees were in Eritrean national service or fled the country to avoid compulsory military service. Their lives could be in danger as they are considered deserters.

Attacks on Asmara

In a previous article, this author indicated that President Isaías’ main priority in the Ethiopia-Eritrea relationship was to seek revenge against the TPLF for the 1998-2000 border conflict with Eritrea and to oppose its regional integration plan.

Although Isaiah had made it clear that he would not be a bystander in Ethiopia’s internal affairs, he would have had to do much more to convince the war-weary Eritreans to get into another conflict. He did not get the help he needed from anyone other than the TPLF itself after it failed to support the peace agreement.

Isaiah was at his most vulnerable in 2018 when Abiy it suddenly accepted the Algiers Agreement, as it had held the Eritreans hostage on the pretext that the TPLF was the main obstacle to the implementation of the decision. Isaiah’s acceptance of the border ruling meant the end of the no-war, no-peace situation between Ethiopia and Eritrea, thus removing Isaiah’s main justification for keeping Eritrea on a war footing and suspending constitutional rule.

The TPLF was quick to denounce Abiy’s decision and organized protests in Irob, Badme and Adigrat. Although belatedly, acceptance of the peace agreement and calls by TPLF leaders to negotiate a comprehensive peace plan appear to have swayed some Eritreans. Still, it was probably too late, as it could be said that Abiy had already become dependent on Isaias after initial opposition from Mekelle.

At the beginning of the conflict, the majority of Eritreans appeared to be opposed to any involvement in the conflict between the TPLF and the Ethiopian federal government. Many of them had openly expressed their position against the war and called on world leaders to intervene.

They also asked the Government of Eritrea did not send troops to Tigray and appealed to Ethiopia to withdraw its forces from Eritrea, which they had been using as a launching pad to attack Tigray from the north.

Sending rockets to Asmara was the perfect gift for Isaiah of the TPLF. Not only did he lose to the latter some of the support he received from the Eritreans, but he also won the condemnations of the world. Instead, Isaías was congratulated for not retaliating. There has yet been no response from the Eritrean government on the rocket attacks.

READ MORE Eritrean refugees: still caught in a game of “political football”

Tigray leaders have also accused the United Arab Emirates of supplying drones to federal forces, which have denied the allegations. Nonetheless, the use of drones may have been instrumental in weakening the TPLF’s mechanized units and forcing it to change its military tactics.

Active engagement

It is difficult to verify Eritrea’s involvement in the conflict between the TPLF and the Ethiopian central government, and indeed both governments deny the allegations, but evidence is accumulating that Eritrea has been directly and indirectly involved.

Humera, just a few kilometers from the border with western Eritrea, was heavily shelled by artillery in Eritrea, forcing residents to flee to Sudan and facilitating control of western Tigray by the Amhara militia, the force regional and federal army.

Tigray leaders have alleged that Eritrean forces participated in battles in the center-west (from Badme to Adwa) and north of Tigray (Zalambesa, Adigrat and Rama). BBC Tigrinya has confirmed engagement between Eritrean and Tigrayan forces along the borders in northern Tigray that involved heavy artillery bombardment. There have also been sightings of wounded Ethiopian soldiers in Eritrean cities, as well as many receiving treatment in Eritrean hospitals.

In addition to the members of the Northern Command Units that fled Tigray after the initial attack by the Tigray units that sparked the conflict, Ethiopian army divisions have been transported to the northern front through Eritrean territories. Initially, according to a local source, the Eritrean border communities who are also poor were forced to feed the Ethiopian army until government supplies arrived.

With Mekelle, the capital of Tigray, and other major cities in the region now in the hands of federal forces, it is difficult to predict what would become of Tigray, Ethiopia, and the Horn of Africa in general.

Tigray’s leader, Debretsion Gebremichael, had promised that the Tigrayans would fight “the enemy” anywhere and by all means, suggesting a tactical shift toward an insurgent-type engagement.

You see how this strategy would work with all borders closed and the conflict preventing farmers from harvesting what little harvest is left from the invasion of desert locusts.

A successful insurgency would require the opening of supply corridors to Eritrea, Sudan, or both, steps that would have huge implications for Eritrea and the wider region.



[ad_2]