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There is little reason to think that Ethiopia’s political classes can now redirect the transition in a more democratic direction.
METEREdia’s coverage of the postponement of the elections in Ethiopia and the state of emergency precipitated by COVID-19 has been extensive. Much of it pursues the legal angle: what is the constitutional path to take now that parliament’s mandate will expire long before the elections and only elected lawmakers can appoint a Prime Minister? At bottom is the possible political impact: is the pandemic plus a disaster or an opportunity?
Commentators at International Crisis Group, Addis Standard and Addis Fortune have emphasized the latter. They argue that while it is an additional disruption to the so-called “transition to democracy” that already seemed shaky, it also offers an exceptional opportunity to get it back on track. How? First, creating a common front against the virus through “inclusive dialogue” with the opposition and civil society and, after this new dynamic is established, intensifying it to reach an agreement on a legitimate form of government until the next elections and the procedures to make them “free and fair”.
This perspective is based on a presupposition that this “transition to democracy” is the priority objective of the majority of the political class. Some events and statements make this questionable. For example, the Prime Minister’s Tweets reveal that their most frequently mentioned goal is by far “prosperity”. Then comes “measure“And then” growth. “You must go back to the beginning of December to find the first mention of” democracy “and” democratic transition. “
Furthermore, the personalization of power is increasingly evident. Will it lead to autocratic government? Privately, as I have detailed before, Abiy Ahmed has made no secret that he aspires to become the new “Great Man”, at any cost, even operating outside the legal framework if necessary. Oromo’s two main parties, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC), have stated that “Contrary to the early days when the current leadership took office and promised to open up political space, it has Measures taken, in recent months, that has reversed those first positive changes. Intimidation, the massive incarceration of party leaders and members, all point to a return to the old authoritarian days. “Amnesty International said:” The return of the arrests Massive opposition activists and supporters are a worrying signal in Ethiopia. “A” dirty war “has hit Wellega. Tigray experiences hidden isolation.
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Historian Shiferaw Bekele recently wrote to me: “The defining dichotomy is not between ethno-federalist and Ethiopian forces, but between those who are committed to democratic competition, who are very few and distant, and those who wish to take power for good or the hard way. … The main political forces are profoundly undemocratic in nature … They know that they do not want to participate in open political competition by the rules. “Opposition leaders such as Daud Ibsa, Merera Gudina, Beyene Petros, Berhanu Nega or the “Old Guard” of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), they are the heirs of the student protest movements of the 1960s and 1970s, except at the margins, they did not operate democratically.
Currently, most parties see democracy as their exclusive domain, rather than as a process that involves the entire society. The policy is reserved for an educated elite who will do “big business” to share the power and resources it brings. However, they have so far failed to reach consensus, even within this small inner circle. “In the past two years, rival regional, ethnic, and political factions have clashed over ideology, power, and resources.” Crisis Group wrote.
The commentators’ underlying reasoning for optimism is that the health emergency would override these political blockages by acting as a catalyst. It would put the political forces on a road to Damascus where they would overcome their fundamental differences to relaunch the transition. This assumes that they would do so through some kind of moral awakening. However, politics is above all the result of the balance of power. So the question is: how and why would this postponement and proclamation push political actors to get this transition to democracy back on track? Or is it, in fact, an unlikely outcome?
At the moment, according to official figures, the pandemic is progressing remarkably slowly. Ethiopia has some assets to help contain it, including the experience of other countries; a young population; a solid majority of farmers who can live for a few weeks on food stored in the home; and the fact that, as more than three-quarters of Ethiopians reside in the countryside, many people live in scattered homes. But Ethiopia also suffers from serious weaknesses, in particular the health service and the difficulties of “social distancing”, mainly due to the obligation that perhaps 40 million Ethiopians employed informally earn their daily bread.
No one can predict the impact of the pandemic when it reaches its peak, which authorities expect next month. On the other hand, officials already foresee a devastating effect on the economy and employment. “According to Fitsum Assefa, National Commissioner for Planning and Development,” the total number of people who will need emergency aid, net security cash transfers, food for work reaches up to 30 million people, “or almost a third of the population.
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In addition to promised debt relief, existing budget support, and regular annual inflows of up to $ 4 billion, Ethiopia has it requested $ 415 million from the International Monetary Fund and $ 1.6 billion from emergency funds from the Development Assistance Group (DAG). He plans to acquire two million tons of wheat and rice, which is almost double the usual amount. And as if one bad thing should lead to many others, the locust invasion is the worst in the past quarter century, adding another million people to the number needing emergency food aid.
These figures could be inflated to capture the attention of donors, but regardless, will Ethiopia attract the support it has requested? “To date (April 19), only 10.5 percent of this requirement has been secured with international assistance,” Addis Fortune reported. In terms of finance and food, the global nature of the pandemic means that it is often each nation for itself.
Faced with these increasing challenges, the authorities decided to focus on the humanitarian crisis instead of the health crisis. “Food security will be the key challenge” tweeted Abiy This approach has logic on its side, as the former risks more victims than the latter. “There is also a real danger that more people could potentially die from the economic impact of Covid-19 than from the virus itself,” WFP said. However, the election also has political implications.
“We can only pray to God for his mercy”, some inhabitants of a rural area kebele in North Shoa he told me on the phone. Most added something like: “Complaining about the government is useless because it is totally powerless: even rich countries have not been able to stop the pandemic.”[1] This opinion seems to be common: there is little anger against the government regarding the pandemic, at least so far. For some, it is considered supernatural, even divine. For others, the government is doing the best it can. But opinion would turn against the authorities if they proved incapable or deficient in responding to the humanitarian crisis. We are no longer in the same situation as a few decades ago, when many people, at least in the country, considered famine as divine punishment.
The government is now better equipped to deal with a humanitarian crisis, as long as international partners lend a strong hand. As social scientist Alula Pankhurst correctly wrote: “The Ethiopian state is known for its organizational capacity that has increased in regimes and its organizational capacity zemecha bells,[2] mobilizing people and resources quickly and efficiently ”. Already in “normal” times, it administers the Productive Safety Net Program that supports around 8 million Ethiopians.
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By René Lefort and Kjetil Tronvoll. Despite Ethiopia’s momentous challenges, there is little sign of corresponding action by the political classes.
The mobilization of international humanitarian aid, including health care, and its transportation to regional department stores will be primarily the responsibility of the federal government and will have to transit primarily through Addis Ababa. There is no other operational network to distribute it at the base level than the local authorities. However, they continue to belong almost exclusively to the Prosperity Party. Despised by the public, this is a golden opportunity to redeem yourself. They will be able to demonstrate to the assisted populations that they have no other option but to trust the mengist to survive. They can say and repeat, “Look, the opposition can’t do anything for you.” The “belly policy” will take precedence.
In this scenario, the holder will emerge stronger, assuming two conditions.
First, that they do not transform humanitarian aid into a weapon, as was customary in the past. Two new factors could counteract this historical bias. The impunity enjoyed by local authorities has been greatly reduced. Authorities know they are under the watchful eye of new personalities who emerged during the wave of protests, including the Qeerroo and Fano watchers. To formalize this role, The Reporter He proposed “to train compatriots recognized for their outstanding character and their ability to give their best shot.” This could be done through “oversight” committees derived from civil society. It would give a strong signal of transparency and responsibility.
Regarding the second condition, John Nkengasong, director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Africa, warned that the pandemic could be a “national security crisis first, an economic crisis second, and a health crisis in third place”. In Ethiopia, where ethnic tensions are alarming, and with so many uncontrolled armed groups, a humanitarian crisis could lead to confrontations along ethnic lines unleashed by radicals, both in the regions, against those who do not belong to the dominant group, and between regions. .
Still, if the conditions are met and an orderly and efficient scenario is produced, it could well restore Abiy’s faltering legitimacy. Furthermore, the postponement of the elections means that time works in his favor, every day that he remains as prime minister strengthens his power. Let us remember the Abyssinian proverb: “the king who reigns is my king”.
It is difficult to see what role the opposition could play in overcoming this double crisis. For example, in their joint statement, the two Oromo parties agreed to put the policy on hold for the health emergency. “We must all unite and prioritize the defeat of the coronavirus. To this end, no political activity or decision should hinder the collective fight against the pandemic. ” Still, protests and road blocks, the main opposition tool so far, are out of the question during the health crisis. The parties implored the government that emergency conditions “should not be used as a pretext to further reduce the fragile political space.” They added that “decisions on the new election date and related matters should be made after … consensus,” while the interim period “should be decided on the basis of the constitution and in consultation with all political parties and concerned parties”.
On the first point, the opposition could not really act differently in the face of the COVID-19 threat, and the two parties rightly ask that the state of emergency not be abused to further marginalize opponents. On the postponement and the modalities of the elections, they want a consensus. But regarding the transitional mode of government, they only ask for “consultations.” So it’s more a call than a warning; the words “requires” or “requires” never appear.
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What influence does the opposition have to compel Abiy to respond to his pleas? Events so far offer a useful indicator. The two parties criticized the electoral board for announcing the postponement as fait accompli before the consultations took their course. However, they have obtained no guarantees that any of their requests will be honored. The proclamation of the state of emergency gave the government White card take any action that you consider useful; An approach that the headline said was necessary due to the uncertain trajectory of the pandemic in Ethiopia. The State of Emergency Investigative Board, made up of fully obedient parliamentarians from the ruling party, is unlikely to offer real scrutiny.
More broadly, the opposition appears to have left the political arena since the violence in October. Figures like Merera Gudina, Daud Ibsa, Bekele Gerba, Jawar Mohammed and Berhanu Nega have lost their usual places on media platforms. The opposition has rarely been proactive, either through its proposals or in its organization. So what would convince Abiy to do more than keep up appearances by letting the opposition board a few carriages of a train of which he will be the sole driver and conductor?
Inevitably, the epidemic period will entail the marginalization of many public policy debates. But that does not mean that tensions over power and resources, and in particular ethnic rivalries, which have jeopardized the democratic transition, will magically dissipate. They will re-emerge when this period ends. But at that point, if the scenario described above occurs, the humanitarian and political situation would have propelled Abiy and his Prosperity Party and weakened the formal opposition.
The Prime Minister certainly runs a risk if he goes too far in exploiting the state of emergency and postponing the elections. The main threat, eventually, will come from the popular movements, which were largely responsible for bringing him into power, even if they now seem more dispersed, disorganized, without a clear purpose, and neglected by formal opposition leaders. Youth activism is the main force the formal opposition could rely on and they have considered trying to re-mobilize protesters to counter the growing harassment. That has not happened, either because the opposition was incapable or because the coronavirus took it by surprise.
For Ethiopia’s political future, the big question, unanswered for now, is whether the opposition will still be able to push its agenda forward by mobilizing the youth masses after the initial impact of the pandemic lessens. There are reasons to think that young people will remain strongly opposed to the Abiy government, but it is much less certain that they will see uniting with the opposition elite as part of the solution.
[1] Personal communication, April 6, 2020.
[2] Originally, zemecha it refers to a great military campaign. the Derg He used the term widely for mass mobilization towards land reform, literacy campaign, etc.Follow us on twitter @EthiopiaInsight and join our Telegram channel here
This is the author’s point of view. However, Ethiopia Insight will correct clear factual errors.
Publisher: William Davison
Main photo: Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed with Alibaba owner Jack Ma; November 25, 2019; Prime Minister’s Office.
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More information from René Lefort
February 25, 2020 Preaching Unity but Flying Alone, Abidy’s Ambition May Halt Ethiopia’s Transition
Oct 31, 2019 A blink in the gloom
October 25, 2019 Local chiefs can fill party-size gap in Ethiopia’s upcoming elections
August 18, 2019 Federalist facade for the centralist front
May 29, 2019 Political shake-up and localism can push Ethiopia forward
February 27, 2019 The Ethiopian elite lost in the electoral maze under the gaze of Abiy
November 21, 2018 “Leba! Leba! Abiy Inspires Farmer Revolt in North Shoa Village
October 21, 2018 Ethiopia: the uncertainty of the mountain climber
August 29, 2018 Abiy’s first questions and answers raise more questions than answers
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