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Tensions are rising between Sudan and Ethiopia following the failure of the latest round of tripartite negotiations, with Egypt, on the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). An unresolved border dispute between Khartoum and Addis Ababa has contributed to the problem, but there are additional reasons for the escalating tension.
Sudan has been bearing the burden of tens of thousands of Tigray refugees who fled their region in northern Ethiopia following clashes between Tigray and the central government, led by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, in Addis Ababa. The UN estimates that more than 200,000 Tigray refugees have fled to Sudan, adding pressure to Khartoum’s ailing economy.
The tensions with Sudan cannot be seen separately from the events within Ethiopia: the war in Tigray and the fighting by Amhara militias in the north and west on the border with Sudan.
Ahmed has the Amhara political circle, which has been the ruling class for centuries. He is eager to win the support of the political and intellectual middle class now that he has lost the backing of his own people, the Oromo, following protests that erupted as a result of the murder of famous singer Hachalu Hundessa last year.
The Amhara believe that Ethiopia should once again be a unitary state, as it was before 1991, when Tigray took control of the country after the defeat of Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam (1974-1991). It was then that the Tigray-led Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front divided the country into nine regions based on the ethnic components of the “federal republic.”
Ethiopia has about 80 ethnic groups, 10 of which have a population of more than one million each. The largest ethnic group is the Oromo, from which Ahmed comes, who represents 34% of the Ethiopian population, followed by the Amhara, who comprises 27%, the Tigray and the Somalis, each with just over six percent.
All ethnic groups in Ethiopia want the federal system to remain in place because it gives them relative autonomy. The Tigray, in particular, know very well that a unitary state will marginalize them due to their small numbers compared to the Oromo and Amhara. On the other hand, the Amhara, the most educated group and the most qualified to rule, believe that a unitary state will allow them to control Ethiopia’s army, institutions and economy.
The presence of more than 250,000 trained fighters in Tigray increases Addis Ababa’s fears of a new conflict with Sudan. This adds to concerns regarding Ethiopia and Eritrea.
The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) accused Eritrean forces of accessing the Tigray region to support central forces. The accusations were denied by both Asmara and Addis Ababa. Observers, however, believe that Tigray’s accusations are not unfounded. Asmara regards the TPLF as her enemy. A large number of Ethiopians outside of Tigray circles believe that Ethiopia’s war with Eritrea was simply a conflict between former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and Tigray on the one hand and Eritrea on the other.
If it were true that Eritrea intervened, many Ethiopians would feel bitter, especially since Ethiopia lost tens of thousands of lives in the 1998-2000 war and refused to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice which ruled that most of the Badme lands should be handed over. to Eritrea. However, the Eritrean forces announced that they recovered these lands together with the start of the war in the Tigray region, and now the Sudanese Information Minister has declared that Sudan recovered the Fashqa from Addis Ababa after a battle against Ethiopian militias.
This is the opposite of what happened after the Ethiopia-Eritrea war, when Addis Ababa seized Asmara’s lands and began negotiating with Sudan in a 744-kilometer border dispute. Fashqa was the most contentious point in the border dispute. International treaties of 1902 and 1907 prove that Fashqa is Sudanese land, but wealthy Ethiopian farmers settled there, paying taxes to the Ethiopian government.
After years of negotiations, Ethiopia recognized Sudan’s sovereignty over Fashqa in 2008, and Khartoum allowed Ethiopians to cultivate their land.
What sparked the conflict recently is that the Amhara, who support Ahmed, who came to power in 2018, see the deal as a “secret deal” that the Tigray sealed when they were in power, and demanded that a border line be drawn. end to end the situation. State of “soft borders” in a way that does not disrupt people’s livelihoods.
Therefore, during talks in Khartoum on December 24 between Ethiopian Deputy Prime Minister Demeke Mekonnen and Sudanese Minister for Cabinet Affairs Omar Manis, Addis Ababa requested to renegotiate the border issue and cancel the 2008 agreement. Sudan rejected Ethiopian demand, maintaining the status quo and adding border markers on the disputed land.
Ethiopia’s position was a setback from the consensus reached between the two delegations when the Border Commission was formed in May, as the two countries agreed to a friendly solution to the border problem according to documents signed between them. The agreement stipulates that the Technical Border Commission will begin to demarcate the border in October 2020 and finish its work in April 2021.
To stop the negotiations, Addis Ababa demanded compensation for Ethiopian farmers who were driven out by Sudanese forces from Fashqa, as the Sudanese residents of Fashqa had returned to their lands after nearly two decades of leaving them.
However, early last week, reports revealed that Ethiopia was mobilizing forces on the border with Khartoum. Sudanese military and political leaders pledged not to abandon their lands no matter the circumstances.
This is a point of no return for the Sudanese government, especially after mobilizing the masses in the cause of the recovery of Fashqa. The mobilization couldn’t be more evident than on social media platforms.
Furthermore, many Sudanese supporters of the transitional government believe that restoring Fashqa would correct a mistake made by the Islamist government led by the ousted President Omar Al-Bashir, which left Sudanese lands to join forces with Addis Ababa against “common enemies”.
* A version of this article appears in print in the January 14, 2021 issue of Al-Ahram Weekly.
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