The conflict in Tigray is about TPLF, not ethnic federalism

This Tigrayan dominance in the Ethiopian military establishment was so deep that, after the TPLF coordinated with Tigrayan generals to paralyze the Northern Command, the Abiy administration was fighting, until November 5, only to replace the deserting officers, calling on retired generals for help. .

Therefore, it can be argued that Abiy was committed to appeasing the TPLF’s military and political power since he became Prime Minister. In contrast, the only sector of TPLF’s dominance that the Abiyan government did touch was its economic power. As early as November 2018, some Tigray military officials who profited from multi-million dollar companies were charged with corruption.

Unfortunately, some have misrepresented this complex reality of a multidimensional logic behind the TPLF bet. Disregarding the variable of economic power and the TPLF’s intricate web of motives that complement each other, some analysts have mistakenly fixed on one part: its ideological interests. One of these interests is said to be TPLF’s commitment to multinational or ethnic federalism as opposed to Prime Minister Abiy’s supposed infatuation with a unitary system.

Beyond ethnic federalism

By Olivia Woldemikael

But this is another myth designed to undermine the post-2018 reform.

One of the main misconceptions about the ruling Abiy party is that it opposes federalism. In reality, his Prosperity Party (PP) remains the vanguard of the multinational (ethnic-federal) structure established largely by the TPLF. Not only is this federal framework still intact today, but the Abiy administration granted statehood to a new autonomous region of the Sidama ethnic group in 2019, albeit after some evasion. In contrast, the TPLF-dominated EPRDF denied autonomy to Sidama nationalists nearly 20 years earlier.

The most militarily active insurgency in Ethiopia since the 1990s was the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), whose goals are autonomy and self-determination up to the secession of the Somali-Ethiopians. After Abiy took power in 2018, for the first time in decades, the ONLF decided to abandon the armed struggle and peacefully oppose his government.

And this is partly due to officials from the Abiy Prosperity Party defending ethnic federalism on the ground. One of these leaders is President Mustafa Omer of the Somali state, who publicly denounces the TPLF as an anti-democratic and anti-federalist force in Ethiopia. Somali nationalists are not alone, as some Afar leaders and other ethnonationalists have also placed their trust in Abiy.

While Abiy’s support for multinational federalism is clear, those who assert the dangers of a unitary Ethiopian state, defining it as the dominance of Orthodox Christianity and the Amharic language, are enough to fuel the conflict in Tigray are false. Actually, Tigray is the state where Amharic is already the second most widely spoken language. Under the TPLF government itself since the 1990s, Amharic has been kept within the cities of Tigray, a move that helped increase the number of Tigrayans in the federal bureaucracy, in which Amharic is the primary language.

Also, historically, Amharic and Tigrigna have a common lineage that goes back to Ge’ez and they share the same script; while Orthodox Christianity is more widely practiced in Tigray than in Amhara.

One of the reasons Somalis and other ethno-nationalists support Abiy is because the TPLF put ethnic federalism on paper, but never in practice. It was also selfish during the 1990s, what I call the “fight for Ethiopia.”

What is the point of Amhara nationalism?

Teshome M. Borago

During the formation of the new administrative boundaries, TPLF rewarded Welkait and Raya; while rewarding the Oromo nationalists to most of the former Shewa province for weakening Amhara. In essence, Amhara never participated in the original decision-making process, when TPLF and its smaller Oromo partners divided Ethiopia. Even after the new lines were drawn, Tigray officials de facto rulers within other states, such as Somali.

If there is an ideological basis for the conflict in Tigray, it is not the TPLF’s commitment to ethnic federalism, but rather the TPLF’s opposition to a new multi-party and pluralist Ethiopia where its monopoly of political power (hence economic interests leadership) will be threatened.

In fact, according to the latest AFP report, the TPLF began digging trenches in anticipation of war seven months ago. It was then that his leadership in Mekelle decided to defy federal rulings and organize their own tightly controlled elections that ultimately helped each other to ‘win’ almost every vote in Tigray, while their established opponents boycotted the elections.

Thus, it is not Abiy’s supposed centralization scheme, but rather, the promise of a bright democratic future, which is the only possible explanation for why two highly contradictory opposition groups: the most ethnonationalist party (ONLF) and the most Ethiopian nationalist. party (Ezema) – both have relied on Abiy for the transition to a new Ethiopia.

The game of ethnic federalism is over: Isaías

Eritrea President Isaias Afwerki criticized Ethiopia’s multinational federation and the “narrow clique” that promoted it.

While the Abiy government received support from all ethnic regional states, some political analysts with their own agenda focused only on the temporary support it enjoyed from Amhara nationalists and Ethiopian nationalists.

The Amhara nationalists and the Ethiopian nationalists were the two most disenfranchised blocs under the EPRDF rule for decades. These two blocs know that the Abiy government wants to maintain the status quo of ethnic federalism that they oppose. But they still support the Abiy administration on the basis of hope.

In fact, Ethiopian nationalists, often urban or mostly mixed Ethiopians who descend from two or more ethnic ancestry, are not even counted in the official census. The EPRDF made it illegal to recognize millions of mixed Ethiopians who identify as ethnic Ethiopians because it wanted to justify a new constitution in 1995 that described Ethiopia as a country made up of discrete “nations, nationalities and peoples”.

However, Ethiopian nationalists support Abiy over the TPLF because of his promise of a future democratic election, where their voices will be heard and where his constituents will finally enjoy representative democracy. If anything, the ruling Abiy party is ideologically closer to the TPLF on paper than to the Ethiopian nationalists. But the TPLF did not want to share power with any entity and assumed that it could regain power militarily.

In addition to bringing the TPLF culprits to justice, the conflict in Tigray is about equality for all, pluralism and all regions following the same rules. It is a battle to give all Ethiopians the freedom to choose our destiny.