Ethiopia: The drums of war beat for almost two years. Why the conflict in Ethiopia could be avoided

I grew up in Ethiopia during the days of the military government. For years before its overthrow in 1991, the national army was locked in a protracted war against rebel movements in the north. In those days it was common to hear the state media report on the capture or reconquest of villages at the hands of the rebel forces. The parade of prisoners of war made daily news.

However, you would hear a completely different story if you had the courage to tune in to the rebel broadcasts, which were banned, or foreign radio. I remember my father making sure the door and windows in our house were securely closed before tuning in to Voice of America Amharic.

Thirty years later, Ethiopians faced another episode of internal armed conflict in the north and found themselves glued to the radio and television again so as not to miss the news about the advance and withdrawal of the armed forces. And it is equally difficult to verify the reports, as telephone and Internet links to Tigray have been cut and access is strictly controlled since the fighting began in November.

The federal government launched a military offensive against the regional government of the state of Tigray in retaliation for its attack on the Northern Command of the federal army stationed in the state government capital. Since then, the conflict has escalated markedly.

While the federal government of Ethiopia controls the federal police and the national army, the Constitution allows each of the 10 states in the country to deploy its own police force to enforce its laws. Also, some states have heavily armed special forces.

Although the conflict seemed to have started abruptly, the drums of war beat for almost two years. The seeds of the current conflict were sown even earlier when public unrest against the government, in power for nearly 27 years, broke out five years ago.

The protests eventually led to a political realignment within the ruling Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front, a coalition of four ethnically based parties. The end result was the eviction of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front as the dominant member of the coalition and the election of Abiy Ahmed as prime minister in April 2018.

Outwardly, the political configurations seemed to have developed smoothly. But it wasn’t long before fissures began to emerge within the ruling party. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front, whose leaders retreated to their stronghold state of Tigray, complained of ethnic marginalization and economic sabotage.

If the national government and the Tigray state government had tried to engage in intergovernmental dialogue, things could have turned out differently.

Elections and COVID-19

On March 31, Ethiopia’s National Electoral Board announced that due to the COVID-19 pandemic, national elections would not be held as scheduled. The decision led to a constitutional enigma. The Constitution, it appears, does not have a definitive answer regarding the fate of an incumbent whose term ends before elections are held in the country.

Therefore, the national parliament sought the advice of the Federation Chamber. This second chamber of the Ethiopian federal parliament ruled in favor of extending the term of the current administration until the next elections are held.

But not everyone supported the government’s decision to seek guidance from the Federation Chamber. Not with the decision that the Chamber made. The Tigray state government and several other opposition parties viewed the move as an illegitimate hold on power. They called for a national dialogue that should lead to the establishment of a transitional government.

Tigray took his opposition further by establishing his own electoral board and holding elections. Following his election, Tigray declared the federal government illegitimate and withdrew his members from the federal parliament.

Some aspects of the House’s decision are possibly problematic. These include his decision to extend the mandate of the state and executive councils. Unlike other federal constitutions, the Ethiopian constitution is silent on the organization and operation of state governments. That is left to the state constitutions. This suggests that any decisions related to state governments and state parliaments should be based primarily on state constitutions.

However, regardless of the merits of the decision, the Chamber body has the power to interpret the constitution and must be respected as such. For this reason, Tigray’s attack on the federal government as illegitimate was constitutionally problematic. The bodies that have the maximum power to interpret the constitution have allowed the federal government to remain in power until the next elections are held.

Intergovernmental tension was further exacerbated when the Federation Chamber suspended the transfer of funds to the Tigray state government. He chose to work directly with local governments in Tigray, bypassing the state government. Tigray reacted by making public his intention to withhold all federal taxes collected in the state.

One would have expected that Addis Ababa would first take care of the full implementation of the use of the power of the pocket to resolve the tension. But instead, the country was plunged into a military conflict to resolve intergovernmental disputes.

Federal intervention

The Constitution allows the federal government to intervene in state governments. This ranges from giving directives on matters normally left to the state government to removing a state government and assuming its responsibilities.

Although it is a constitutionally valid option, and more tempting once Tigray attacked the Northern Command, it was a politically reckless move that is fraught with disastrous consequences. A federal intervention in Ethiopia is not what we see in other federal countries, as some of the state governments command a heavily armed force in the form of a special police force.

The state of Tigray is reported to have 250,000 well-armed militiamen and special forces. A federal intervention that occurs in this context inevitably turns into an armed conflict, if not a civil war.

That is why the current administration’s claim that it is conducting a law enforcement operation fails amid reports of rockets and aerial bombardments dominating the news about the conflict.

Dialogue

The actions and reactions of both governments reveal the limits of the law and violence to cushion intergovernmental tensions. What is surprising (and tragically) is that there has not been a single report from both governments sitting behind closed doors and participating in an intergovernmental dialogue. This is despite several attempts by a group of elders.

Instead, things were allowed to escalate through demonstrations, press releases, and wars of words that only served to deepen the divide between communities.

The Tigray state government expressed its willingness to enter into a dialogue. But he said he was not interested in a bilateral dialogue aimed at resolving the conflict between the two governments. He insisted that the dialogue should include all opposition parties and other stakeholders.

It was hoped that Abiy could only see this as a call to unite against his administration and remove him from office, rendering the lawsuit useless. On the other hand, his government has rejected the efforts of international powers to stop the deadly fighting as interference in internal affairs. This is a strange argument coming from a prime minister eager to play peacemaker in neighboring countries.

Perhaps, what was needed, and still is needed, is a negotiation that aims to reduce the escalation of the conflict between the two governments. The rest can wait another day. The country cannot afford the continuation of the conflict that has already cost thousands of lives, created an environment conducive to mass human rights violations, further deepened communal divisions and made the country’s existence more precarious than ever. .

A version of this article was first published on Verfassungsblog.

Yonatan T. Fessha, Professor at the University of the Western Cape