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Moscow’s quiet reaction to Joe Biden’s election victory is not surprising and says it all. The Kremlin is likely preparing for a bigger confrontation with Washington, as US policy toward Russia tightens.
That is saying something. Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and revelations of Moscow’s interference in the 2016 U.S. elections, U.S.-Russian relations have plummeted to a post-Cold War nadir, despite the obvious President Trump’s affinity for Russian President Putin.
Putin himself has already noted the “sharp anti-Russia rhetoric” of the incoming US president. In the run-up to the elections, Biden characterized Russia as an “opponent” and the state that represents the “greatest threat” to the security of the United States.
America’s policy toward Russia will not only get tougher, but also more consistent, with fewer mixed messages from the Trump administration. It is also important to note that Russian politics can prove to be a rare area of bipartisan consensus in Congress, where Moscow will find few friends among Republicans or Democrats.
How could life become more difficult for Moscow under Biden?
First, the president-elect supports a strong NATO alliance and will take the first steps to reassure and repair relations with his European allies, especially Germany and France. This offers the prospect of a revitalized and more cohesive NATO alliance, politically and militarily. Biden favors the strengthening of NATO’s capabilities to face both traditional military and new hybrid security threats.
Biden has foreshadowed that in dealing with Russia he will balance confrontation with compromise: “Hold on but keep talking.”
This is not to say that there are not yet friction between Washington and its European partners over Russia, especially as there remains considerable “America first” sentiment on Capitol Hill. Under Biden, the United States will continue to pressure its European NATO allies to pay more for their own defense. Biden is also opposed to the Nordstream 2 pipeline, which may prove problematic for relations with Angela Merkel’s Germany. And tougher Russian policy from Washington may make European partners inclined to conciliate Russia uncomfortable, mostly for economic reasons. However, while transatlantic differences will inevitably persist, Biden will approach alliance management issues in a more reasoned and respectful way.
Second, Biden is committed to America’s renewed multilateral leadership and cooperating with partners to uphold shared democratic values and human rights. He has vowed to impose “real costs” on Russia’s violation of international norms, in particular heralding more unequivocal US support for Ukraine. Movements in Congress to toughen sanctions against Russia are likely to receive strong support from the White House. The new administration will take a firm line on Belarus, challenging the violent crackdown on political dissent and human rights by the Moscow-backed Lukashenko regime following the discredited presidential elections. Biden has also voiced his support for embattled Russian civil society, protesting what he described as Putin’s “kleptocratic authoritarian system”. Globally, Biden will want the United States to be more visible and diplomatically engaged, reducing the room for maneuver Russia has enjoyed during the Trump era, whether in Africa, the Middle East or Latin America.
All of this will discourage, if not surprise, the Kremlin, which has benefited from the uncertainty and divisions caused by Trump’s antagonism toward America’s allies, his disdain for international norms and values, and his erratic international engagement. The Kremlin expects, and will shrug, Biden’s harsh rhetoric. You will be more concerned about the extent to which this translates into action against Russia. The more tangible US support for Kiev and democratic movements around Russia’s periphery will worry Moscow, fueling latent insecurities in the Kremlin, fearful of possible contamination at home by “color revolutions” in its neighborhood.
Yet despite it all, the Kremlin may not view the Biden administration as a totally ugly change.
Biden can quickly reach out to Moscow to try to negotiate at least a temporary extension to the new START deal, which expires in early February.
Moscow will likely welcome the greater predictability and consistency that a more orthodox Biden administration is expected to bring. Even in the depths of the Cold War, Moscow was able to negotiate arms control deals with the relentlessly anti-Soviet Reagan administration, because at least it knew where Washington was coming from. Biden and Secretary of State-designate Antony Blinken are numbers known to Russians: Biden made his first official visit to Moscow in 1979.
Furthermore, Biden has foreshadowed that by negotiating with Russia he will balance confrontation with compromise: “Hold on but keep talking.” This suggests a strong and clear approach, in which Washington will be open to dialogue and cooperation with Russia, when necessary. It would be very advantageous to the wider international community if Washington and Moscow developed a more functional working relationship.
Gun control is an urgent case. The bilateral New START agreement will expire in early February and, with it, any remaining limits on strategic nuclear weapons. Biden can quickly reach out to Moscow to try to negotiate at least a temporary extension of the deal. There may also be scope to cooperate with Russia in areas such as climate change, Iran’s nuclear problems, recovery from a pandemic, and the fight against terrorism.
Expect, then, that the chill in US-Russian relations deepens under Biden, but don’t rule out the chances that Washington and Moscow will find ways to pragmatically do business with each other when they see fit.
