France and the “war on terror” trap

France and the “war on terror” trap

Lorris beverelli

France, once again, is facing terrorism. The murder of French teacher Samuel Paty on October 16^th, 2020 by a radical Muslim and the knife attack in Nice less than two weeks later on October 29^th it led to political and social talks in the country about France and radical Islamic terrorism. Among these discussions, people have mentioned that France was “at war” against “Islamist terrorism” or the ideology of “radical Islamism”.[1] Even the former chief of staff of the armed forces, General (retired) Pierre de Villiers, acknowledged that France was waging a war.[2] In fact, such an idea is not new. In September 2020 and October 30^thInterior Minister Gérald Darmanin declared that France was at war, respectively, against “Islamic terrorism” and “Islamist ideology”. [3] In 2015, former President François Hollande had also used the word “war” after the terrorist attacks in November of that year.[4]

However, using the word “war” to describe the current security situation facing France may be a mistake. In fact, there seems to be a misunderstanding of the meaning of “war” between part of the French politicians and the French population. War can be defined simply as a military engagement between at least two adversaries (typically states) to achieve one or more political objectives. Ideally, such objectives are realistic and limited, which essentially means that they must be achievable in a relatively limited period of time and in relation to the means and tools available. Furthermore, being at war implies being able to win it. Victory may have many faces, but an uninformed general public is likely to tend to perceive victory as decisive and well-defined, with clear and visible results.

A war against “ideological terrorism” is not that. The “war on Islamic terrorism” is a war both against an ideology and against a means of action. It is something quite different from a typical war. There is no territory to conquer or hold, no enemy unit to destroy or capture, and no international convention to sign a peace treaty, an armistice, or accept the enemy’s capitulation. Victory does not always take the same form, of course, and will vary depending on the type of conflict being waged and the political goals pursued. The problem with a war against ideological terrorism is that there is no state, armed group, territory or material objective that defines itself as an enemy. Terrorism and ideology are the enemy. The enemy is then something immaterial, and the very fact that he is immaterial makes him, by nature, literally indestructible.

Of course, that does not mean that ideological terrorism cannot be “defeated”. It can, but not in the way that most people expect. In the minds of most people, “defeat” could imply a decisive and permanent state of affairs. Radical Islamic terrorism cannot be defeated that way, even with all the goodwill and best resources in the world: an idea or ideology cannot be erased from humanity and will always be prone to resurface, in one form or another, possibly. one way. For example, Nazism was undoubtedly “defeated” in 1945, but it was not eradicated from humanity. Importantly, even then, the Allied Powers had declared war not on Nazism, but on Nazi Germany, a clearly identifiable and therefore defeatable material enemy, whose defeat allowed the downfall of Nazism. However, neo-Nazi groups exist 75 years later; Nazism was defeated, but it is not dead, because an ideology is essentially immortal.

The idea of ​​a war on terror is similar to a war on poverty, disease, communism, or capitalism, to name just a few examples. The goal is something that cannot be clearly defined or destroyed, because its very nature makes it impossible. Poverty and disease can be drastically reduced and prevented; communism and capitalism can be prohibited. But it will require constant monitoring and ongoing investment.

The war on ideological terrorism, despite its name, is not a real war, but a political one. Consequently, the whole idea of ​​victory must be adapted to such a policy, since it cannot be the same kind of victory that is displayed in regular or irregular wars. Here, the “victory” would be the lasting and dramatic reduction of terrorist acts (radical Islamic) in the French national territory, but not only. Arguably, that would be the easy part and would not address the roots of radical Islamic terrorism. A true victory against this ideology and tactic would imply a reconciliation between Islam, the French republican principle of secularism (secularism) and non-Muslim French citizens; show that the French Republic cares for its Muslim citizens and does not marginalize them; and that even the most staunch Muslim faithful feel comfortable living in France and voluntarily respect French republican principles and values, among other things. In short, objectives that can only be achieved through prolonged and sustained efforts, which involve not only security measures but also, and most importantly, socio-economic and educational efforts.

Politicians and decision-makers need to know what they are getting into when they use the word “war”, appreciate its implications, and avoid using it to qualify an anti-terrorism policy, for reasons of practicality and realism. It is not just a matter of semantics. Coining the current French security situation as a war could have a long-term negative impact. Declaring a state, country or nation at war is a powerful declaration that can lead to a “rally around the flag” effect and justify the use of extraordinary means and resources. However, these effects are only valid in the short and medium term. A war against ideological terrorism would necessarily be tiring and extremely long, and being at war implies being able to win it. However, when the enemy is both an ideology and a means of action, victory might not be clearly visible for a (very) long time.