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Ethiopia’s democratic transition was already precarious. Two events have made it even more uncertain.
Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed (left) with President Paul Kagame (right) in February 2020. Credit: Paul Kagame.
When Abiy Ahmed became Ethiopia’s prime minister in April 2018, his arrival was greeted with a collective sigh of relief both in Ethiopia and abroad. The new leader was seen as a reformer who would turn the tide of the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). In power since 1991, the ruling coalition had turned the country into an African economic power, but it also exercised growing authoritarianism.
Hopes were high and Abiy enjoyed some initial accolades. He was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for making peace with Eritrea. His reforms in the judiciary marked an encouraging advance. And many of his early political actions were greeted with caution.
However, change remained elusive in many other areas. The Ethiopian army, for example, has continued to be accused of human rights violations, most recently in the Oromia region. Meanwhile, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) 2020 country report on Ethiopia concluded: “The new political leadership changed its attitude towards civil society engagement, but so far there is no visible institutionalization of the dialogues between the State and civilian society”.
Two recent events in particular have made Ethiopia’s fragile transition under Abiy even more precarious.
The delay in the elections generates an intense debate
The first is that COVID-19 has made things even more combustible. Most significantly, the pandemic has led to the postponement of Ethiopia’s long-awaited general elections, initially until August, but now indefinitely.
That vote was seen as an important milestone in Ethiopia’s democratic transition. For many previously marginalized parties, the 2020 vote was to be their first interaction with voters who had been denied access for nearly three decades.
The delay has also set off a fierce constitutional debate. Ethiopia’s constitution stipulates that legislative elections are held every five years. Any ruling party that exceeds its mandate is automatically made illegal. This raised questions about how the government and the opposition should overcome the stalemate.
Many Ethiopians, including some of the country’s leading constitutional scholars, pleaded with the ruling party to enter into a national dialogue with all opposition parties and other stakeholders to forge a way forward. Instead, Abiy took the matter to Parliament, which is fully controlled by the EPRDF, to seek a constitutional interpretation.
Parliament, in turn, referred the decision to a Constitutional Investigation Council (CCI). Led by Chief Justice Meaza Ashenafi, the body approved the indefinite extension of the federal legislative term limits until after COVID-19 is no longer considered a threat to public health. Even more dangerous, the ICC also went beyond its constitutional mandate and extended the limits of the legislative mandate of the regional states, which are independent of the federal government.
The regional state of Tigray, already at odds with the federal government, was the first to reject this decision. In an unprecedented move, the regional government announced that it would hold its own elections unilaterally before the term limits of its legislators expired. Senior opposition leaders also criticized the move, accusing Abiy of using the judiciary to illegally extend his mandate. The political atmosphere rapidly deteriorated, prompting the prime minister to issue a stern warning and even to raise the option of using force to safeguard the constitution and the country.
Political murder triggers violence
A second development that has increased uncertainty in Ethiopia is the murder of Hachalu Hundessa in June. The musician and activist was loved throughout the country, but revered by the people of Oromo. His murder at the hands of unknown assailants sparked violence that revealed how the Abiyan government long ago exhausted its options in trying to create a stable political order.
The night Hachalu was shot in Addis Ababa, the Oromia region caught fire. Initially, crowds gathered to express their grief and anger at the musician’s murder, but this soon turned into attacks on minorities and other civilians, including Oromos. According to the government, more than 160 people were killed in the attacks and the subsequent response by the security forces. In cities like Shashemene, one of the region’s business centers, important areas were burned to the ground.
The government responded to the violence by arresting more than 7,000 people and detaining a number of journalists, activists and opposition figures such as Jawar Mohammed, who had initially helped Abiy consolidate power but later became a fierce critic. The government also shut down at least four media outlets and blocked the Internet for 23 days. During this period, the Prosecutor’s Office pressured the state media to disseminate its findings on the murder of Hachalu, which blamed the rebel group Oromo Liberation Army and the Tigray Popular Liberation Front (TPFL), the constituent party of the EPRDF. . coalition.
Questions without answer
What will happen next? How, if anything, can Abiy steer Ethiopia toward a stable political order without meaningful dialogue to resolve the deadlock? Where is the troubled relationship between the state of Tigray and the federal government heading? How can the prime minister stabilize the most troubled and troubled state, Oromia, after imprisoning almost all opposition political leaders?
All these questions need urgent answers that will determine the destiny of the nation. However, through its propaganda, use of state media and heavy-handed law enforcement, the Abiy government has apparently managed to sedate urban Ethiopians and foreign supporters into deliberate paralysis. by asking them. However, this has pushed Ethiopia into a vortex of the unknown, leaving more questions than answers.
A version of this article was first published on the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s BTI blog.
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