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IAF F-35I Adir on its maiden flight over Israel, Israel Air Force photo via Wikipedia
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 1,728, September 3, 2020
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The normalization of relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates will have significant strategic and political ramifications for the Middle East as a whole and Israel in particular. However, Israel’s regional position is based primarily on the perception of its technological and military superiority and not on the fluid nature of reversible political arrangements. In the Middle East, peace treaties, as the examples of Egypt and Jordan show, must be protected by security arrangements that discourage their violation rather than provide military capabilities that will one day, under a change of leadership and intent, encourage defiance. to Israel.
Following the recent ad From the agreement to normalize relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), a major obstacle was removed in the way of the launch of the F-35 fighter jet to the UAE. After classified briefing In the F-35 to the Emirati Army, President Trump publicly indicated that he is seriously considering launching the F-35 to the Gulf State. “They would like to buy F-35s,” he said. set at a recent press conference. “We’ll see what happens. It’s under review.” At the same time, administration officials are trying to reassure Israel that the United States will secure its Qualitative Military Advantage (QME) in any future arms deal with the UAE.
The sale would certainly be a boost for Trump politics to increase US arms exports. The many billions of dollars such a deal would be worth could help offset the removal of Turkey from the F-35 program following its purchase of advanced Russian surface-to-air missiles and contributing to the effort to shoot down the unit costs of the fighter. At the same time, it would assure Washington’s regional partners of its continued long-term support and send a message to Iran that the United States will defend its Gulf allies. Furthermore, it signifies Washington’s recognition of the role of the United Arab Emirates in the Trump administration’s “Deal of the Century” proposal.
However, the launch of the F-35 to the United Arab Emirates will have significant adverse consequences for Israel that must be taken into account.
First, such a decision would represent a significant diversion from America’s historic commitment to preserve Israel’s QME. According to us legislationSecuring Israel’s QME means providing it with military means and capabilities that go beyond the weapons systems provided by the United States to Arab countries, regardless of its stated intention towards Israel.
In the volatile Middle East, circumstances and intentions change much faster than capabilities. Examples from the recent history of the region include the so-called “Arab Spring” and the rise and fall of the Muslim Brotherhood regime in Egypt, and Turkey’s antagonistic Islamist turn. The former was a signatory to peace with Israel and the latter was a close partner of Israel in the region. Israel’s peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan are limited and susceptible to public hostility. Given this innate vulnerability, the United States has to date refrained from providing Egypt and Jordan with its most advanced military capabilities, thereby safeguarding Israel’s military superiority over its existing peace partners.
Second, the decision to deliver the F-35 stealth fighter to the United Arab Emirates would be a precedent that it would be impossible not to extend to other Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, Washington’s main partner and arms customer in the Gulf. The saudis want buy the F-35, and it would be impossible for the United States to deliver it to Abu Dhabi and not Riyadh. Consequently, Israel’s air superiority, a essential Prerequisite for the preservation of your overall QME – it will be undermined. Once this threshold is crossed, it will be more difficult for Washington to deny other highly advanced weapons systems to Egypt, Jordan or Morocco.
Even if the Gulf version of the F-35 were downgraded, it would still provide game-changing fifth-generation stealth, network-centric, command-and-control operational capabilities that would undermine Israel’s capabilities. advantage. These capabilities include interconnectivity between fifth and fourth generation fighters, making the hundreds of advanced fourth generation fighters already in existence in the Gulf and Arab air forces even more lethal. The only air capability that could surpass the F-35 is the F-22, but the United States so far refused to release that ability to Israel.
Third, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia have no real military need for the F-35, and their existing fourth-generation F-16s, F-15s and Eurofighters, with their advanced radars, avionics, air-to-air missiles and planes. – ground munitions – are more than a rival to Iran’s antiquated air force. The US presence in the Gulf provides additional deterrence should the Iranians launch a full-scale attack. the attack Last September, on Iran’s strategic oil processing facilities in eastern Saudi Arabia, illustrates the need for Gulf states to enhance defensive capabilities rather than the means to carry out surprise stealth attacks. Furthermore, providing the Gulf states with the F-35 could encourage them to act against Iran and possibly lead the United States and Israel to the consequences. According to this line of thinking, the United States has been careful not to provide Taiwan with offensive capabilities that could embolden it against China and only recently agreed sell it F-16V fighters.
Fourth, agreeing to release the F-35 to the Gulf states could inadvertently increase the Iranian threat against those states by unleashing Iranian offensive actions in the years before the fighter jet actually reaches its destinations. This development could increase America’s potential for entanglement at a time when it seeks to reduce its regional footprint, not increase it. Furthermore, said announcement, in the context of the failure Extending the arms embargo against Iran – would boost efforts by China and Russia to supply Tehran with their versions of advanced aerial platforms.
Historical precedents
The history of advanced arms sales to the Gulf and Arab countries, both before and after the 2008 QME legislation, shows that if a US administration is inflexible and willing to lean heavily on Congress, it will eventually succeed in passing such deals. Previous attempts by Israel and pro-Israel lobbyists to prevent arms sales to Arab countries succeeded in delaying or mitigating them, but not preventing them entirely.
In 1978, for example, the United States agreed to sell 60 F-15 fighters to Saudi Arabia. To overcome expected unconditional Israeli and Congressional opposition, the Carter administration promised that the sale would not include external fuel pods and bomb racks to reduce its offensive capabilities against Israel. Congress approved the deal in large part because of this guarantee. However, two years later, following the overthrow of the Shah in Iran, the Carter administration retracted this guarantee, but had to delay a decision on expanding the F-15 package to Riyadh due to the upcoming presidential elections.
After his inauguration, President Ronald Reagan decided to approve the sale of fuel capsules and bomb racks, as well as modern Sidewinder air-to-air missiles. Given strong opposition from Israel and Congress, Reagan temporarily delayed the sale. Still, in April 1981, he not only revived the extended F-15 package, but added five AWACS patrol jets, seven KC-135 refueling tankers, ground radar stations, and additional sophisticated equipment. Although he faced fierce opposition, Reagan managed to persuade enough senators to get the package approved in October 1981.
In 2010, the Obama administration decided to sell 154 advanced F-15s to Saudi Arabia. Once again, Israel could not prevent the sale, but managed to make up for it with the launch of the F-35. Former Defense Secretary Robert Gates refers to this qualitative compensation in his memories, writing that among the measures taken “to ensure that Israel’s QME is not diminished by the sale of the F-15 to Saudi Arabia … we would sell to Israel the same model F-35 Joint Strike Fighter that we were going to provide to our NATO allies. ” In part, Israel’s position vis-à-vis the Obama administration was strengthened by the QME legislation, which required the administration to assert that Israel’s QME would not be undermined by the proposed sale.
The above examples illustrate the main avenues of influence with which Israel may attempt to block or influence the sale of the F-35 to the Gulf States. The main way is the commitment with the administration. Israel should strongly oppose any sale of F-35s to the region, but allow the administration to present its plans to keep Israel’s QME if such a deal is approved. Given Israel’s position among President Trump’s evangelical supporters, Jerusalem may be in a position to request that such discussions be postponed until after the US presidential election in November.
Second, Israel must actively engage with Congress on this issue. The more support Israel gets in Congress, the stronger its hand will be in the face of the administration. Again while Congress has never successfully blocked proposal for a large arms sale has affected the timing and composition of such sales. By expressing strong opposition, he has dissuaded presidents from formally proposing certain arms sales.
However, in a showdown between the president and Congress, the former has the upper hand, unless a two-thirds majority in both houses can be mobilized to override a presidential veto and prevent a sale. The recent use by the Trump administration of emergency authorities circumventing congressional opposition to selling arms to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Jordan demonstrates the advantage that a given administration has over Congress. However, given the strong criticism this step generated, it may be politically difficult for the administration to repeat this maneuver in the case of the F-35s.
Even after taking into account the strategic and political advantages of the agreement between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, the Israeli defense system continues to oppose to the launch of the F-35 to the Gulf and the Arab states. It remains to be seen whether Washington will heed this objection in its political deliberations and subsequent discussions in Congress.
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Shimon Arad is a retired colonel in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). His writings focus on regional security issues.
