Three theories that may be useful in the dispute with North Macedonia – Analysis

© Julia Lazarova

The analysis was republished by Deutsche Welle.

Foreign policy should not be an amateurish activity in which national historical agitators yell and insult regardless of the end result and quality of the game. In the Balkans, of course, emotions in relations between countries are extremely strong. It is very easy for nations and especially for their representatives to embark on effusions and explanations – to the other team and to the referee – from which everyone finally comes out disgusted and even with a broken head.

Relations between Bulgaria and North Macedonia are currently at a point beyond which things will be said and action taken, condemning the two neighboring countries to isolation, marginalization, loss of profits and unnecessary disputes. In other words, we face the possibility of receiving a historic yellow or even red card, and we may even lose the match officially.

Bulgaria has often found itself in a losing position in terms of its Macedonian policy: at least two national catastrophes have been a direct result of it. Of course, the blame for these tragedies may lie with our neighbors and the great powers. It seems that it has not occurred to our neighbors or to the great powers to understand our statements and interpretations. But this is something of a natural fact, a kind of Kovid-19 in our foreign policy, which we must fulfill by acting as intelligently as possible in an unfavorable environment.

Rational choice theory, in fact, has developed patterns of behavior precisely in an environment where all players are selfish and guided by their own individual or national interests. Here are at least three standard theoretical developments that may be helpful in our Balkan politics:

Pareto balance and our balance

For a sustainable solution to a problem, you must take into account everyone’s interests and strategies. Balance and resilience are lost when some win at the expense of others (Pareto) or when the players’ strategies become useless and meaningless for both parties (Nash). Both Wilfredo Pareto and John Nash were “beautiful minds” who saw and mathematized these seemingly simple truths. (There is even a Russell Crowe movie about Nash.)

Players looking for unbalanced and unsustainable solutions to problems must have great resources to enforce them despite the will of others. Donald Trump’s “America First” is such an unbalanced strategy. After all, the United States is still the most powerful country, but it is not even clear whether it can afford such a policy in a multipolar and globalized world. (And Trump lost the presidential election.)

Bulgarian policy in the Balkans was also often unbalanced, following the “Bulgaria first” principle. And it has happened on several occasions that we did not have the resources to defend this unbalanced strategy.

The most tragic incident of this type occurred in 1913 after the end of the First Balkan War. On May 17, an international peace treaty with the participation of the great powers was signed in London, according to which Bulgaria could secure a territory larger than San Stefano: the Bulgarian occupation zones in the former territories of the Ottoman Empire made the country was greater than the ideal of San Stefano. However, as is well known, a large part of Macedonia was not in these territories occupied by the Bulgarian troops. Instead of choosing the equilibrium solution, to guarantee with an explicit agreement what has already been acquired, Bulgaria is opposing Greece and Serbia to take Macedonia. The following story is sad and famous: the unbalanced solution turned out to be out of reach.

In the current situation with North Macedonia, we also have an unbalanced strategy (albeit on a less dramatic issue): we want to get “recognition” from our neighbors that they are of Bulgarian origin, that they do not have their own language and that their identity is completely new and in this sense “artificial”. The resources at our disposal to achieve this objective are mainly the veto for the accession to the EU of North Macedonia.

A sober analysis would show that this resource is not enough to impose such an unbalanced strategy, which does not take into account the interests and actions not only of our neighbors, but also of other EU countries. We must not forget that the veto is a trump card that cannot be abused often: if we scratch it before negotiations can begin, we will only have weak cards in hand. And most importantly: the blockade of North Macedonia and Albania ultimately brings losses for Bulgaria: our region remains isolated, underdeveloped and marginalized. That is, we trust a trump card that we can screw with.

The Prisoner’s Dilemma

The second desk study examines the “prisoner’s dilemma”: in it, the goal of all investigators is to make captured members of a criminal group betray each other. If one admits and the other does not, the former may escape at the expense of the latter. And vice versa. From a purely selfish point of view, it is better for anyone surprised to admit and immerse others. But if everyone is driven by selfish interest, they will betray each other and end up in jail.

This is the “prisoner’s dilemma,” which shows that by following individual and selfish rationality, people can collectively make extremely stupid decisions that are harmful to themselves. Bulgaria and North Macedonia are mired in a classic “prisoner’s dilemma” and the difference is that they do not acknowledge each other’s crimes, not their crimes.

Bulgaria wants North Macedonia to recognize its Bulgarian origin and language. PCM wants Bulgaria to recognize its nation and its language as key attributes of sovereignty. The risk is that in the end no one will admit anything, and the two countries will end up in prison for mutual hatred and blocked relationships for at least a decade.

The tragedy of the commons

If a village has municipal land, every farmer has an interest in sending his cattle to graze: feeding them will be free. If everyone sends their cattle out to graze at the same time, the municipal measure will be trampled and destroyed. The tragedy is that everyone acts rationally from their own point of view, and in the end the common resource is destroyed and everyone loses. The redevelopment of the sea coast is a more urban example of a rural tragedy: everyone has an interest in building a hotel on the coast, but when everyone does, the beautiful coast disappears.

The EU is an environment of mutual cooperation that benefits everyone. The common market, the free movement of people, goods, services and capital is a kind of municipal measure, a common resource from which everyone benefits. As long as it is not abused and everyone wants it only for their own livestock.

The veto by a Member State of a common position in this regard is an instrument that must be used with extreme caution. The veto is actually a guarantee that your cow or donkey will be the first to graze. However, if everyone uses it, the EU will collapse. The measure will disappear: ie. the strongest will simply encircle it.

That is why, in the EU, real power is “soft power”: politicians and leaders who manage to achieve their goal without putting it down the throats of others. The “tough” Orban and Kaczynski may seem strong, but they are not. And all the important decisions will be sidelined and will eventually have to give in. And the paradox is that if they start to win, the EU will simply fall apart and everyone, and they in particular, will remain losers.

Bulgaria gained significant “soft power” in the Balkans during its presidency of the EU Council. So everyone saw us as the constructive actor in the region, the one that seeks and offers mutually beneficial solutions. And then we achieved a significant victory in the EU: we changed the opinion of very skeptical countries of the Balkans in favor of the full integration of the region into the union.

We are now giving up our “soft power” as a regional broker and coordinator, at the expense of the supposedly “firm veto.” Yes, we will stop North Macedonia and Albania, but what do we gain besides pumping up the actions of the “patriots” on both sides of the border? And for how long, in the next 30 years?

From this point of view, the change in position on North Macedonia is a sign that we are stopping to understand how the EU works and how it can be of use to us. “The Bulgarian cow is always the first in size” is an unsustainable policy: it is another unbalanced strategy, impossible to contain.

***

Rational choice theories have long been used in international relations. For example, the policy of nuclear deterrence during the Cold War was entirely based on them. Perhaps it is time for Bulgarian foreign policy to start to be based on rational theoretical models, and not just on heroic legends and romantic interpretations of history.