How Borisov Will Go – Analysis

© Tsvetelina Belutova, Capital

The analysis was republished by Deutsche Welle.

The question of when Borissov will leave is important. But even more important is how this will happen. Because his resignation from the post of Prime Minister is an event that inevitably lies ahead of Bulgaria.

In parliamentary democracies, such events are not a particular problem. Even leaders like Margaret Thatcher or Tony Blair had to resign prematurely. Angela Merkel has now said that this will be her last term as chancellor.

In both British cases, the great leader also had a worthy successor, who developed and supplemented the policy of his predecessor with appropriate adjustments. Merkel, on the other hand, will probably have a (well deserved) chance to retire at the peak of her career with great recognition at home and incredible international prestige, and this will certainly guarantee her a successor to continue her line.

Borisov’s problem

In autocracies, however, the change of political leader is always problematic: the entire institutional and legal order of the country seems to go with it. John Austin had a theory of law as a set of general mandates of the sovereign. With the withdrawal of the person from the sovereign according to this theory, the rules / mandates he has created also disappear. That is why Lukashenko is afraid of resignation, after which he would lose everything, including the institutional guarantees of his rights and interests, which he himself has drawn up. That is why Putin chose the radical option: with a constitutional reform to stay in power until the second coming.

Borissov’s problem is that he wants to look like Merkel, but he has put himself in a similar situation to Lukashenko’s. Bulgaria is not an autocracy, but in the last ten years Borissov has succeeded in implanting and modifying the institutional and legal order with his own complex and increasingly problematic informal and behind-the-scenes arrangements. The point is that with the resignation of the prime minister, these agreements will be invalidated, and Borissov is obviously afraid of that.

For this reason, Bulgaria, a member state of the EU and NATO, is beginning to look like an autocracy in a period of leadership change. It is not a coincidence that Lukashenko has reached the same salvation formula as Borissov: resignation, but only after the adoption of a new constitution.

In our context, the great personal and public drama that Prime Minister Borissov has mixed is the following: how Bulgaria can remain a democracy, that it can resign as Prime Minister and that the agreements it has created will not disappear. There is no clear plan to accomplish all of this. We observe opportunistic experiments and copies of autocratic models, which in the Bulgarian environment inevitably leads to a political farce.

First: Putin’s constitutional reform

Borissov has already made it clear that he is willing to sacrifice the current constitution to stay in power. However, the problem with this strategy is that it has become too transparent for everyone. For the moment, only Mareshki is left to defend the merits of the “draft” of a new constitution (actually a torn version of the old one), without even reading it.

But the big problem with Borissov’s constitutional intentions is not Mareshki, but his MRF partners, who are unlikely to allow the opening of Pandora’s box with exotic whims of the “patriots” and whoever in a new Supreme National Assembly. .

Second: the electoral system à la Orban

Borissov would like to replace the current electoral system with a majority one to consolidate GERB’s leadership position. Majority systems (and mixed, as in Hungary) give a bonus to the first two parties (and especially the largest), while harming the others. With a cunning electoral maneuver, Borissov tries to consolidate the GERB, which would give it enough political weight without being prime minister.

But this plan is unlikely to work, because not only the MRF, but also the “patriots” have no interest in supporting it. In a majority system, small parties will disappear and the MRF will not be able to benefit from further mobilization of its electorate and will rarely be needed as a coalition partner (broken or open).

Third: secure a successor to the Yeltsin

The most important thing in Borissov’s situation is to provide a successor who abides by his agreements: as Yeltsin got a suitable president after his resignation in late 1999. Since Borissov’s agreements are primarily with the MRF, it would be more logical than his successor it was also acceptable to the Movement. For this reason, the MRF proposed the idea of ​​an “expert government” made up of the current parliamentary majority.

This option is convenient for the MRF, but it is high risk for Borissov. First, he will have to consume the political negatives of his resignation, which will further erode support for the GERB in the upcoming elections. Secondly, the MRF is used to pulling the strings from the second line, but GERB cannot afford the same: in the end, an “expert government” will be written again mainly on the GERB account. And thirdly, it will be even clearer to everyone that GERB and MRF are a political tandem, mounted on an “expert” wheel of government.

However, it is even more important how the inheritance of power will be carried out in GERB. Borissov’s resignation as prime minister may leave him at the head of the party, but he still has to think of successors. And his specific management style did not allow for natural competition and the imposition of new faces.

Fourth: patrimonial protection and immunity to Pinochet

Borissov is an ambitious man who will make a mark in Bulgarian history. The question, however, is what sign will this trail be. His daily tours of the country aim to establish him as a builder of modern Bulgaria. At the same time, however, another much more negative image of him as the dominant one has emerged in recent months: the patron saint of a government that has led to the capture of the state by concentrated private interests.

Borissov has always relied on MRF media to create, maintain and refresh his own charisma. However, this is an order, not a job of persuasion. Following his resignation as Prime Minister, these media may take a 180-degree turn, as in spring 2013. And today’s protests demonstrated that the MRF media cannot dictate public opinion. While still in power, Borissov risks not only the erosion of electoral support, but also the consolidation of a strongly negative image not only in the public consciousness in Bulgaria, but also among the public in Europe.

And Borisov’s fear of Chief Prosecutor Ivan Geshev, as well as any prime minister’s lack of criticism of the prosecution’s activities (given the obvious problems there), also betray Borisov’s hopes of obtaining de facto immunity on the model of authoritarian leaders. after its withdrawal. However, as the Pinochet case shows, this is a very risky strategy. And in our country that “immunity” would depend on some internal political agreements and would have no value in a supranational union like the EU.

Borissov has a useful move

Due to the impossibility of any of the above strategies working, Borisov simply postpones the inevitable. But if you want to look more like Merkel than Lukashenko, you still have a useful move: explaining the corruption scandals and openly running for a new election to seek a continuation of your own political line and a new one. legitimacy – for GERB and for itself.

And the sooner you do it, the better. All other options have a strong flavor of political and personal failure.