After April 4: two scenarios, but only one solution and not a very good one – Analysis

© Julia Lazarova

What will be the formula for power in Bulgaria after April 4? Two main scenarios emerge as realistic, and the solution seems to be only one, although it is not the best. Comment by Daniel Smilov for Deutsche Welle.

According to serious opinion polls, there are currently two possible scenarios for the results of parliamentary elections:

Opposition

Market Links on March 29 came out with the following forecast for voter preferences: GERB 22.8%; BSP 18.1%; ITN 12.7%; DPS 9%; DB 7.5; ISMV 4.5%; IMRO 3.3%

Patov

Alpha Research of April 1 gave the following electoral panorama, quite different: GERB 28.1%; BSP 19.8%; ITN 12.7%; MRF 12.5%; DB 6.3%; ISMV 6%; IMRO 4%

If the April 4 results come close to the opposition stage, GERB will unconditionally lose power. Borissov’s party, together with its partners MRF and IMRO, would have 35.1% and around 103 seats in the National Assembly. The opposition – BSP, ITN, DB, ISMV – will have 42.8% of the votes and some 137 seats in parliament. The interesting thing about this option is that a government can be formed not only without GERB, but also without MRF.

Even if the BSP and the MRF have agreed to play together in the post-election talks, as the behavior of both sides indicates, the BSP will have to make a difficult decision: risk Oresharski II-style failure or try to negotiate with the parties. like the ITN, which opposes the centenary.

If you choose the MRF, the BSP is actually closing its chances of forming a majority, because almost none of the protest parties (DB, ISMV, ITN) would support them in a package with Ahmed Dogan. Which means that by electing the MRF, the BSP is beginning to think of a grand coalition with GERB, the only other mathematical possibility for a majority. The thoughts are one, but Cornelia Ninova is unlikely to bring Borissov back to power, when for the first time in so many years she would have a real chance to send him into the opposition.

If the Alpha Research stalemate scenario is realized during the voting, then GERB + MRF + IMRO would have 44.6% of the votes and 120 seats, and the opposition – BSP + ITN + DB + ISMV will turn out to be 44.8% and also 120 seats. Of course, one of the two blocks could go a bit further, but the balance of power would be a given anyway, and any majority would be extremely fragile.

What to expect

If these are the two most realistic options based on existing information, what follows from them? In fact, in both scenarios, party coalition governments will be nearly impossible. In the opposition scenario, BSP, ITN, DB, ISMV should agree on positions in a common cabinet, insert their main political figures in it, explain the many compromises they have to make. Although not entirely ruled out, this option is less likely at the expense of another cabinet of technocratic experts. The prime minister and his ministers would be authoritative but non-partisan figures, and the cabinet would have a limited mandate (up to a maximum of two years) to meet certain objectives.

Interestingly, even in the stalemate scenario, the solution of the impossible equation can also be an expert cabinet. Even if GERB + MRF + VMRO have one or two more MPs than the opposition, they are unlikely to risk forming an open coalition with important party appointments in it (not to mention Borissov’s prime minister). Such a coalition would be extremely fragile in terms of parliamentary support and almost completely illegitimate in the eyes of society. The concubinage between GERB, MRF and the “patriots” was also a fact in the previous assembly, but an open coalition would be an attempt to pass this concubinage as an orthodox marriage. Neither the supporters of the “patriots” see themselves as a girlfriend of the MRF, nor would the electorate of the MRF be related to the people of Karakachan. GERB voters seem to tolerate everything, but even for them, official affinity can be helpful.

So even at a standstill, a technocratic, expert government seems the most likely outcome. However, what is this expert government? These governments, though rare, do occur from time to time in democracies. Italy has the richest experience in the formation of such administrations, and now Mario Draghi’s cabinet is like that, and before it was Monti’s cabinet (2011). In Romania, Dacian Ciolos formed an expert (technocratic) cabinet in 2015. In Hungary, Bainai (2009) and in Greece, Papademos (2011) can be classified similarly.

In Bulgaria, cabinets are also generally expert and technocratic, but here we are talking about technocratic governance in a functioning parliament, which is based on a parliamentary majority. This condition was fulfilled by the government of Berov (1992-1994) and that of Dimitar Popov (1990-1991), which was declared a “program”.

The characteristics of an “expert”, “technocratic” or “programmatic” management are the following:

1) A prime minister who is recognizable, non-partisan authority: typically a respected professor, a high-ranking magistrate (not entirely applicable in our country), who held positions of responsibility in international organizations;

2) Ministers with a similar profile, experts in their specific field. There may be one or two political figures in such cabinets as a sign of the parliamentary support provided by their groups. But the important thing is that the government is not formed on the principle of a quota party, but on one of technocratic experts;

3) Parliamentary support for such cabinets generally does not follow ideological boundaries between the left and the right. In Italy, technocratic cabinets have the support of the main political parties on both the left and the right. In a sense, they are becoming a variant of the Grand Coalition. But, at a minimum, parliamentary support must include a wide range of ideological parties. The Ber government in Bulgaria was “expert” without being a Grand Coalition: it relied mainly on the votes of the BSP and the MRF;

4) The mandate of these technocratic governments is usually limited in both time and tasks. They come with a mission to lead the country through some difficulty or until the next early elections, while performing urgent tasks. In the current Bulgarian version, there are many urgent tasks: vaccination and management of the Kovid crisis; the country’s recovery plan based on generous European funding; judicial reform and changes in the prosecution service.

Technocratic governments have their serious weaknesses: a tendency to blur responsibility, unsustainable parliamentary support, and difficulty carrying out consistent reforms. But they may also be the only realistic post-election option.