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One can only envy the dexterity and dexterity with which Russia entered the conflict in Karabakh: without interfering in the military confrontation of someone’s country, Russia still forced the two opposing players to play by favorable rules and all the time controlled. events without interfering with them. At the same time, Russia is making excellent use of the fact that the United States, mired in discord and perpetual fights over the elections, has no time for foreign policy, writes the Iranian newspaper Javan, an official body of the Corps of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard, the FOCUS news agency reported. .
However, the obvious difficulty for her arose because in her dream of separating Turkey from NATO, Russia gave too much to Ankara and finally accepted that Turkey’s role in the Caucasus had grown significantly. The cost of this policy of condescension towards Turkey is that Russia runs the risk of reducing its own role in the Caucasus region, as well as a notable risk of repeated “IDILIZATION” * (ISIL “Islamic State”, a terrorist organization – ed. Note). ) from the Caucasus, especially in the already affected Chechnya and Dagestan.
Russia took such risks even on the eve of Barack Obama’s coming to power in the United States. Hoping to fulfill its pre-election promises related to the “recharge” of relations with Russia, the latter showed too much willingness to cooperate with the United States: a certain translator of this provision was the appearance of Dmitry Medvedev during a certain period of roles. leadership in the country. with his admiration for “advanced” western technology. However, in the brief years of his presidency, Medvedev managed to “open the door” for all pro-Western political and social institutions to enter Russia’s political environment. The cost of this was a certain loss of internal political stability: a series of threats to the country’s national security emerged.
At the same time, negotiations on the Iranian nuclear issue were underway and Iran became a kind of “bargaining chip”: Russia, hoping for an imaginary warming in relations with the West, agreed to a series of strong demands for Western countries to Iran to make it possible. the notorious “nuclear deal.” Russia, to some extent, has echoed the political experience of Iran, which also, expecting the loyalty of the West to itself, has opened its doors too far to any liberal public institution. This was not only a known self-deception, but also a deception by people who hoped that the economic situation in the country, which for many years had borne an unbearable burden in the form of Western sanctions, would immediately improve thanks to the lifting of sanctions. As a result, an agreement was reached with the West and a nuclear agreement was signed, but at a very high price: the country (Iran) was embroiled in protests organized by the same liberals who are generally not interested in the fate of people: people are also a bargaining chip. for them in their confrontation with the authorities.
Russia, hoping to include Turkey in the orbit of its policy, gave the latter too wide a field of activity in its traditional spheres of influence, in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Ankara, actively using the ideas of neo-Ottomanism and pan-Turkishism in its foreign policy, is trying to achieve this on its own. As a result, this is what happened: Russia, realizing the threats it would have to face in the immediate vicinity of its borders, stopped these backgammon games with the West, but the Caucasus had already become a ring in which Turkey orders without ceremony. Turkey only needs one thing: the United States will not completely deprive it of its support and Biden will not get too angry with him when he finally gets power in his hands, due to some persistence that Erdogan has allowed in relations with the West and the United States. , seeking the opportunity to acquire from the Russian high-tech complexes S-400. It is also obvious that for Turkey, stable and natural relations with its neighbors (be it Russia or Iran) are just a bargaining chip that will always be ready to use in negotiations with the West: without their support, all its neo-plans. Ottomanism with the impurities of Pan-Turkishism are not of much value.
What Turkey yearns for in the Karabakh conflict and the confrontation between Azerbaijan and Armenia is only to strengthen its position in the region at the cost of weakening Russia’s position here. Turkey hopes that once it has achieved its goal in Transcaucasia, it will be able to redirect the transit of regional energy resources onto more profitable routes for it, which at the same time benefits Israel, which also hopes to earn a lot of money from the transit. oil from Transcaucasia through the Eastern Mediterranean. This geopolitics of Turkey’s pipeline fits completely into all the foreign policy strategies of the United States, which always aim at one thing: to limit and break the position of Russia in the Caucasus region. At the same time, the United States hopes to create a barrier for Iran by controlling the strategically important corridor between Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan. It is obvious that the Azerbaijan-Nakhichevan corridor, with the accession of the Turkish connection to it, along with the inclusion of Israel, is definitely not profitable for Iran. Furthermore, Armenia is unlikely to allow its traditional adversaries to use its territory to achieve their plans. This circumstance may change Iran’s traditionally neutral approach to regional problems (related to the Nagorno-Karabakh order). The (Iranian) opponents will continue to the end to avoid Iran’s active role in this conflict.
Furthermore, Russia has fully appreciated Turkey’s expansionist plans in Syria and is hardly resisting a direct confrontation with Ankara. At the same time, it must be borne in mind that to achieve his expansionist goals, Erdogan will have to completely subordinate his foreign policy to the future Biden administration, or seek a compromise with other political forces in Turkey, who will undoubtedly become more active in the next presidential elections in the country. And there are those who strongly disagree with Erdogan’s adventurism in his Middle East policy.
In this sense, Russia must not place the fruits of its Caucasian policy on the altar of interaction with regional powers whose interests are directly at odds with its objectives, nor must it assign these forces any special role in the resolution of the Karabakh conflict. , which he has even provided in his statements. made after the signing of the armistice. This region is too sensitive to Russia’s foreign security to allow its possible “IDILATION” * or the presence and influence of NATO and its partners here. Some of Erdogan’s tenacity with the previous Trump administration could very quickly turn into bondage to Biden when he becomes the full-fledged master of the White House and when his team and advisers begin to form a new alliance against Russia in the southern Caucasus and the Middle East.
Russia
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