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- Think of the common EU standards for health security.
- Again, the lack of sufficient approximation between new and old Member States is highlighted.
- Most important will be the lessons that Warsaw will draw from Orban’s actions.
Recently, a joke has become popular that COVID in Bulgarian is a combination of Kostov and Videnov, two names that sum up the 1990s: the second, a symbol of the hyperinflationary crisis and the first, of the painful reforms that were needed then.
With recent specific legislation restricting citizens’ rights, experts make many comparisons to “orders” in communism. However, for the vast majority of Bulgarians, the deepest crisis they can remember is related to the 1990s. Scarcity, strong social disparities, political polarization and hyperinflation have passed through society. It is this traumatic experience that probably motivates the relatively high level of social discipline in times of emergency at COVID-19.
The return of a strong state is a fact across Europe. Prime ministers and presidents in the executive branch leadership have broad support (no news of a dispute over who will succeed Merkel at the CDU). The emergency requires strong governments and extraordinary measures: this principle was carried to the extreme in Hungary. The suspension of Parliament’s work and the decision to govern the Victor Orban government through decrees provoked violent reactions in European capitals without a deadline.
It is curious that while the EU is delaying the suspension of Hungary’s voting rights (Article 7 procedure), and although the European People’s Party has not yet ruled out the Orbán Fidesz party, the market may do the trick. Less than 24 hours after the Orbán waves, the Hungarian Central Bank had to take measures to stop the stubborn drop of the florin. The government then withdrew its plan to seize power from the mayors. A week earlier, the Bulgarian government withdrew the attempt to curb freedom of expression, presumably for fear of being included in the same category as Hungary. Ironically, Orban is about to implement Hungarians’ fears of an economic crisis that brought him to power a decade ago.
However, the most important thing will be the course of events in Poland and the lessons that Yaroslav Kaczynski’s party will draw from Budapest. For now, the Law and Justice Party (PiS) is ready to move forward with the May 10 presidential election, which in a coronavirus situation is unlikely to be preceded by a genuine election campaign. Since the opposition is excluded from public protests or speeches, the Polish president will win with unfair elections. If the EU and the market strongly oppose Orban’s move, it could also send a message to Warsaw.
In Kaczynski’s political narrative, the 1990s is synonymous with the dangerous ideology of an “open society.” Therefore, the PiS has moved towards an “anachronistic vision of the state, and instead of overcoming some of the long-standing problems of Polish society, it will only perpetuate and strengthen them,” as Pavel Zerka and Piotr Buras of the Council noted. European Foreign Policy (EEAS). An important feature of the PiS model is that it is based on direct transfers of money to families, not to public services. At a time when healthcare is not meeting the needs of society, this tactic, which has so far been profitable for PiS, can now backfire.
What Central European leaders with autocratic marathons learned during the 2015 migration crisis seems to be coming to fruition, namely that the closure of national borders can happen quickly with or without Schengen. Strengthening conservative instincts in societies and nurturing national selfishness were very popular at the start of the pandemic. However, the reality of interconnection has surpassed geography. The Bulgarian health minister tried to ban the trucks from going to Turkey and had to cancel his order within 3 hours. Commercial corridors in Europe continued to function, and leaders realized that this flow was more valuable than nationalist slogans.
The coronavirus crisis has once again highlighted the lack of sufficient rapprochement between the new and old Member States, illustrating the thesis of French President Emmanuel Macron (who for two years has been repeating that without socioeconomic cohesion there can be no real integration in Europe). Healthcare is not part of EU law (Acquis) and is therefore an easy victim of faltering reforms, weak institutions and the appointment of ladybugs instead of experts from the public sector.
In recent weeks, panic from central and eastern European governments that their health systems will not be able to cope with the pandemic has led to extremely strict measures. In addition to the lack of reforms in the health sector, which still seemed to be frozen in the 1990s, the crisis also demonstrated the effects of the brain drain on doctors and nurses in the West. Weak health care is partly behind the fact that Eastern Europeans are more concerned with emigration than with immigration and are pessimistic about their children’s future. If you want to strengthen European cohesion, the EU cannot continue to ignore this problem.
Germany’s success in managing the pandemic through an army of capable doctors and nurses should not be to the detriment of ECO partnerships. Europe will have to propose specific measures within the multiannual financial framework and the EU’s investment policies. Common standards for health security, technology exchange and information in the field of research, as well as better integration in the supply chain of medicines and health services could be post-crisis measures that will bring Europe a step further.
In the last few weeks, another effect of the free movement of workers has paradoxically brought millions of Eastern Europeans back home. More than 200,000 Bulgarians, who worked abroad and (mostly) paid their taxes there, have returned since the beginning of March. Compared to the active population in the country, which is approximately 4 million, this is a significant proportion, approximately 5%. The return, in addition to raising concerns that they may be contributing to the disease, may also become a long-term concern for governments that will receive a new batch of unemployment benefit recipients. And the returnees certainly did not pay insurance in Bulgaria. It may be appropriate for the EU to use this crisis to start thinking about general employment insurance to solve the problem in the long term.
Judging by the ability of Central and Eastern Europe to recover after several major public unrest in recent decades, we must hope that this will be the case again. In the 1990s, the power of civil society brought the region back to Europe. A new Marshall Plan, which has been talked about a lot lately, should seek not only to strengthen banks but also to strengthen the fabric of society. We can find that the populist wave has reached its ceiling and that the seizures of power are short-lived. However, achieving social (and health) convergence on the continent will remain a long-term task.
This article is from the website of the European Council for Foreign Policy (ECSC). Its original title is “Central and Eastern Europe can recover, based on previous crises”.
