[ad_1]
According to the Justice Ministry, on Wednesday evening the Interior Ministry released the part of the commission’s first report on the terrorist attack in the center of Vienna on November 2, which concerns the Interior Department. Not entirely for intelligence reasons, as Secretary General Helmut Tomac explained. The published passages show blatant omissions on the part of the intelligence service in dealing with the later assassin.
In early December 2019, Kujtim Fejzulai was prematurely released from a 22-month prison sentence for terrorist organization: he wanted to join the radical Islamist terrorist militia “Islamic State” (IS) in Syria. In a so-called threat approach a few days later, on December 17, he behaved uncooperatively according to the commission and was therefore appointed by the Vienna State Office for the Protection of the Constitution and the Fight against Terrorism. (LVT) for a risk assessment. However, LVT only released it on September 11, 2020. On top of that, it had to be touched up twice and was only completed on October 7, just under four weeks before the terrorist attack that killed four bystanders. It was only on that day that Fejzulai went from “moderate risk” to “high risk.” The Commission’s conclusion: “The fact that an initial assessment takes almost ten months does not seem acceptable.” The LVT explained the long duration to the investigation committee as a lack of resources and time, what the committee, chaired by criminal lawyer Ingeborg Zerbes, calls an “organizational deficit”, in case the objection is justified.
From the point of view of the investigating commission, it would have been appropriate to classify Fejzulai as “high risk” no later than July. But although German intelligence agencies knew that Fejzulai had met with German and Swiss Islamists several times in the federal capital in mid-July and that the group had been observed by local officials, the Viennese LVT, responsible for operational security at the federal capital, was the explosive factor. Unaware of the encounter. The Islamist gathering was a “terrorist cell that was deemed ready to attack,” the investigative commission emphasized in the 25-page report. A single LVT employee knew that it was a “highly dangerous terrorist cell” joined, but the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and the Fight Against Terrorism (BVT) had “emphatically forced him to remain silent,” he says. the commission, which denies this process.
From the Commission’s point of view, it was also neglected when the Slovak authorities reported clear indications that the 20-year-old had tried on July 21, 2020, to buy ammunition for an automatic assault rifle in Bratislava, which he then used in the terrorist attack. On July 27, the BVT received images from the surveillance camera of the Slovak arms store, which were only sent to the LVT in Vienna on August 24 with a request to identify the person represented. The following day, LVT informed BVT that the photos “apparently” show the “well-known” Kujtim Fejzulai. According to the commission, an LVT employee has now acknowledged a “dubious concentration of information”; however, his suggestion to take action under the State Police Protection Law has not been accepted by his superiors and the BVT, according to the investigating commission. Ultimately, from the BVT’s point of view, Fejzulai was only clearly identified as a failed ammunition buyer in Bratislava on October 16.
The investigating commission also criticized the fact that the prosecution had no knowledge of the events surrounding Fejzulai and his failed purchase of ammunition. His history and social environment would have “definitely raised the (renewed) suspicion of belonging to a terrorist organization,” according to the commission. And also: “At least a procedure could have been started to revoke the parole.”
The commission, which held three meetings with the BVT and two with the Vienna LVT, expressly states in the report that the employees of both authorities “complained about their high workload and the lack of technical and human resources”. who complained directly. could affect the quality of work. “In addition, with the BVT” a great uncertainty of the workforce is perceived, which is particularly due to the raid operation in 2018 (that is, the house raids in February 2018, which have been recognized as illegal in BVT facilities and in employee departments in the course of an investigation by the corruption prosecutor’s office, Note) expires “.
The commission pays tribute to the forces involved in the November 2 attack. They had “responded extremely quickly, specifically and in a coordinated manner.” Regarding the flaws identified, the Commission admits: “None of the weaknesses identified in the flow of information, no delay can be considered even remotely as a cause of the November 2. ‘What would have happened if’ – such a question that many want a simple answer that cannot be solved. Nor can there be a risk-free society. “
“The first interim report shows and demonstrates how important it was to create the Commission and investigate what was happening,” the Director General of Public Safety Franz Ruf responded to the report. And furthermore: “For the Minister of the Interior, for me and for the President of the State Police, Gerhard Pürstl, it was important that there was total clarity and transparency. The results will above all be a significant contribution to the ongoing reform of the constitutional protection “.
The secretary general of the Ministry of the Interior assured Parliament full information on the initial findings of the commission of inquiry, whose final report will be available at the end of January. “Those excerpts that cannot be published because otherwise investigations would be compromised, but which would also make cooperation with partner services difficult, are of course made available to the secret subcommittee of parliament.” The interim report will now be studied in detail at the Interior Ministry, Tomac said. They have created their own research group, “which examines the legal steps and then draws the appropriate conclusions.”
Minister Alma Zadic (Greens) stated that the judiciary was “acting correctly.” He had published this part of the report for some time before the Interior Ministry, “for the sake of transparency and clarification,” as the Minister of Justice stressed in a broadcast. The commission’s recommendations to develop work to de-radicalize convicted Islamists and to hold case conferences prior to the release of convicted Islamists have already been included in the first anti-terror package.
The opposition saw their criticism confirmed by the interim report. For the SPÖ security spokesman, Reinhold Einwallner, he made it clear “that the verbal attack on the judiciary by Chancellor Kurz and Interior Minister Nehammer was a pure distraction from the failure of the Interior Ministry.” The FPÖ, under whose Interior Minister Herbert Kickl the 2018 raid took place, felt its criticism of the BVT reinforced. “This office, which was completely destroyed by decades of deep black personnel policy, apparently is not even willing to inform other BMI authorities about the dangers of explosives,” said security spokesman Hannes Amesbauer. For NEOS defense spokesman Douglas Hoyos, the report presents a “devastating picture of the state of the Austrian security authorities, especially the state of the BVT.” NEOS security spokeswoman Stephanie Krisper called for a “complete reorganization” of “constitutional protection, which was abused from the start by the ÖVP as a political-partisan playing field.”
Vice Chancellor Werner Kogler (Greens) declined to draw a final conclusion from Thursday’s report in “ZiB2”. We should wait for the Commission’s final report because “in theory the outlook could get worse,” he said. Kogler recalled his earlier statement that a reform of the BVT will in all likelihood be needed. He defended the turquoise-green anti-terror package: in combination with other criminal offenses, it could lead to increased penalties, answered the lawyers’ doubts about the meaning of the law against religiously motivated extremism.
(SERVICE – The report is available at)
[ad_2]