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Contact with trace apps built on Apple and Google’s built-in notification framework from Google have finally reached America. Virginia was first, mei Covidwise, followed by Alabama, Arizona, North Dakota and Wyoming, which launched their own variants. Recent reports suggest that Maybe 20 states will introduce similar apps, capable of reaching about half of the population. But they will not really reach half the population – nowhere near. There is a fatal flaw with such contact tracing apps, as America is about to find out.
Such bluptracing apps – which essentially detect and pair other phones with the app in their vicinity, in case a user tests positive for COVID-19, originated in Singapore and then set foot in Europe. Originally, the idea was that apps would capture enough data to identify local hotspots for infection and even contextualize contacts – sitting in a train then sitting in queues outside. But then Apple and Google stepped in with their first privacy framework to stop governments and healthcare providers from collecting such data. Complicated apps can tag the anonymous identity of a nearby phone, nothing more, no location or personally identifiable information is established.
As I have commented before, this is a big problem and seriously reduces the potential benefits of such apps. Yes, none of us want our governments to use these apps as a backdoor surveillance platform. But we now do not have enough evidence that our phones do not need a new app tracing app to betray our movements and behavior in any case? Shouldn’t we give health experts what they say they want?
However, you can put that argument to one side. It is not the critical issue here. The reason such apps fail is that there are not enough of us ready to install and use them. And that does not just mean downloading an app. It means the app stays turned on and running – maybe for many months, and then follows every instruction from them to isolate or test. Except that you will not receive many such instructions because not enough people use the apps. You can see the problem. It’s pretty basic.
The other issue with banning linking or collecting personal data is that health authorities cannot mandate or maintain isolation or testing or even follow up. You may not link apps to a right to work, travel or access games. Doing so would be dystopian, yes, but also a very effective alternative to wider lockdowns than locks. Is it not better to sacrifice some individual freedoms on our phones, which already follow us extensively, instead of the economically damaging alternatives? Six months fast forward, and in case of widespread second waves and the backlog of populations that have to work to earn a living, this debate will return.
Back when the apps first started gaining prominence, I reported that data scientists believed that about 60% of a population should install and use such apps to be effective. That equates to 75% of smartphone users in most places. To put this in context, it is comparable to the installation base that WhatsApp enjoys in its most popular markets. Again you can see the problem. It’s pretty basic.
However, it now appears that the situation is even worse. The latest survey published this week suggests that “even under optimistic assumptions,” that is defined as 75-80% of smartphone owners who install an app and 90-100% of users follow advice to isolate or test search, “there is not enough evidence to justify reliance on automated approach to contacts without additional comprehensive public health control measures.” And it is these physical measures for public health that actually work.
“We can not see it as a silver bullet,” said the lead researcher at University College London Financial Times, despite governments suggesting during the initial lockdowns that “this would be the panacea that would enable us to return to normal and forget about Covid – and if we could do this well, it would solve all our problems.”
Let’s go back to Singapore, where the innovators behind the original COVID-19 bluetooth app soon found that it was not on its own effect. The relatively complacent population has seen mandatory location inspections in a multitude of entertainment venues, workplaces and health facilities, as well as physical tokens introduced to complement their app. And those places that have done best include contain effective manual contact tracing (Korea / Taiwan) and / or much more intrusive measures (Israel / China).
However, all this will be immaterial. The FS will not see the recording needed to automate contact tracking. Polls suggest that such apps in the US will be installation, and follow, will be less than necessary, probably less even than Europe. Even Germany, where recording is seen as a success, there are only about 20% of the population with the app. And the less effective such apps are in reality, the less willing people will be to install and keep them up to date. It’s a vicious circle. It needs to be rethought.
As contact trace apps are work, make a significant contribution to reducing infection rates, then we need a further discussion on the balance on privacy and effectiveness. We have to decide when we are ready to commit to installation and attachment – as much as we may not like the implications and optics. We need to determine how we link such apps to QR codes that provide rights to travel and access to locations where we run the risk of infecting others. None of that will happen until we know what form the virus’s impact will take from here, but you can expect this debate to spiral in the coming months as the infection patterns that are now emerging in Europe and elsewhere.
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