Coach Ole Gunnar Solskjaer liked what happened in the last game; perhaps the last game was the first time this season that he played against a weaker team with very specific tactics: always overwhelming control of the game.
When experts speak of “tactical acumen” they often take it in simple terms: a coach who is tactical or poor in strategy. Or maybe there’s a matching scale – in the Football Manager style, the game uses a scale of more than 20 to measure a coach’s tactical ability.
In fact, tactical acumen in modern football is a much more complex concept than that. There are hundreds of things in the broad concept of “tactics” that a coach can be good or bad at. He can be great for helping the team play in control, but he’s not good in dead ball defense situations. Or you can be good at tracking and analyzing the opponent, but you are surprised when the opponent changes the lineup in the match.
Manchester United’s 6-2 victory over Leeds United was an excellent example of two coaches presenting completely different things in the concept of tactics. After the game, there was ridicule about the reputations of the two rulers, claiming that an ignorant Ole Gunnar Solskjaer surpassed an inspiring, qualified and methodical Marcelo Bielsa.
But in fact they are just two completely different coach models. Bielsa was praised for his ability to build a team with identity and identity, they excel at playing under “Plan A” for their ability to move, rotate and coordinate structured in a third of the last court. and. However, he is not the most versatile strategist.
Solskjaer is quite the opposite: Manchester United’s lack of identity remains problematic and his team struggles to break through a deep defense. However, Solskjaer has consistently demonstrated the ability to assess the opponent’s weaknesses and come up with suitable strategies, especially against opponents who want to control the ball. Such a coincidence fits Solskjaer.
Leeds’ tactical trademark was a one-on-one defense with one-on-one possession, which made Bielsa far more distinctive than his influence. Therefore, Solskjaer wants to exploit Leeds through the ability to combine two factors.
First of all, the central players are attracting. As a striker in a 6-goal game, Anthony Martial’s absence on the scoreboard will disappoint a lot of people. But the French forward was crucial to his mobility as he launched Manchester United’s attack by repeatedly falling back, lifting defender Luke Ayling and making room for others to infiltrate.
Similarly, Bruno Fernandes spent a lot of time drifting to the flanks, knocking Kalvin Phillips out of the defensive midfield position and allowing his teammates to penetrate the void. As a good example, Martial is ready to receive a pass from Victor Lindelof in an area where we would normally think to see Fernandes. Instead, Fernandes ran to the right.
The larger image below shows Leeds struggling in person. As everyone clung to their opponents, Leeds midfielder Ayling (yellow) was brought into midfield, defensive midfielder Phillips (pink) on the left-back and left-back Ezgjan Alioski (red) followed Daniel James in the middle from the field. Stuart Dallas (blue) remains in the right-back position with Marcus Rashford and Liam Cooper (green) has yet to attach anyone.
The second idea is to run straight to the position where the space opens up with those movements that incorporate the Leeds mentoring process. For example, in the situation below, Harry Maguire (marked in red) from home knew that all Leeds midfielders were accompanied by a Man United player, as well as knowing that Patrick Bamford blocked the pass to Lindelof. Because of that, Maguire was able to freely hold the ball by lifting himself forward …
… and dribbled the ball into deployment position.
Almost all Manchester United goals are, in some way, related to those two parts: the attacking players creating space and the players on the ice.
This was the first goal, slightly different because Phillips was not pulled by Fernandes, but Phillips ran there to find a space away from Fernandes when Leeds deployed the attack. In fact, Dallas is holding the ball by the wing, the three Leeds midfielders are standing in front of the opponent …
… That meant that when the deployment was stopped, no Leeds player was in position with the opponent. Fernandes stands in the middle of the lines and McTominay can move into the space ahead.
The second goal came from a throw-in and was a good example of the Manchester United attackers’ ability to change positions. To be fair, while Leeds’ one-on-one accompaniment in live ball situations is quite unique, most teams defend this way in serve situations so you can be a bit strict if you take this as a point. negative in his game.
And with Man United it’s still a familiar idea. Rashford (yellow) began to advance, Fernandes (blue) began to go deeper down the field, Martial (pink) stood on the wing and ran between two teammates and prepared to receive the ball from Luke Shaw. Meanwhile, McTominay came back up to receive a pass and score. Once again, it is the way to move the “bait” and penetrate the void.
Fernandes’ third goal came from a ball where he moved “bait”. When James took the ball, the Portuguese midfielder probably did not want to receive the pass but simply ran to the right wing to occupy the space that James left empty, thus opening space for other players to penetrate. .
However, James still passed the ball to Fernandes and the Portuguese midfielder, almost surprised to receive the ball, had to stop and kick his heels in the direction of Fred, who could run like McTominay in love. last situation. In the end Fernandes kept running towards the penalty area and finished off, but his handling in the middle of the field had more tactical significance.
The fourth goal was scored by Lindelof from the corner. However, how did Man United win this corner? Yes, again from an ice situation from the home field. Similar to the situation where Maguire held the ball to accelerate to number 10 above, here Shaw won the ball in a 50-50 situation on the left back …
… and then, like Maguire before, he appeared in the middle of the two lines when there were three options to pass the ball forward, including James’ appearance in midfield. Notice that the Manchester United player not marked as Fernandes, moves to the right again. That led to Phillips turning there again instead of immediately defending with a player dribbling down the middle of the field as you would normally expect from a defensive midfielder.
The fifth goal is a bit lucky. McTominay’s pass was probably going to Fernandes, who was running to the right again. With Martial back to stand between the player’s two lines, James reappeared in forward position, touched the ball with precision and then scored with his left foot.
Table 6 originates from a different kick from the home field. In this situation, Leeds seemed a bit confused as Fred was taller than Fernandes.
Fernandes ran as McTominay in the first half and received a pass from Fred …
… and then passed it on to Martial. In subsequent events, when Rashford lost the ball, Martial received the ball again and was fouled in the penalty area. A penalty was awarded to Manchester United.
The course of this match is what Solskjaer likes; perhaps the last game is the first time so far this season that they have faced a weaker team with very specific tactics: always claiming control. Island party. Solskjaer has made the right personnel and tactical decisions, including an energetic midfielder like McTominay, a speed player like James, and the other constantly moving attacking players.
The result was the first time in nine years that Manchester United scored six goals in a Premier League match at Old Trafford.
The translation of the article “Lures and races behind Solskjaer’s Man United exposing Bielsa’s Leeds” by Michael Cox in The Athletic.
