Why isn’t Russia fed up with the US Navy’s carrier strike group? | Soldiers

The Carrier Assault Group (CSG) is one of the most powerful weapons in the US arsenal, capable of deploying extremely high levels of firepower, far beyond US waters. In the modern version, the CSG generally includes an aircraft carrier, a carrier squadron (CVW), at least one guided missile cruiser, a fleet of destroyers, and several attack submarines. This fearsome formation not only became the backbone of American naval doctrine, it is also one of the most recognizable symbols of American military might. Washington’s opponents have taken notice, too. And this is what Russia, one of America’s two biggest military competitors, thinks about the American CSG.

Russia does not have a CSG and is unlikely to have such a capability for the foreseeable future. Its only aircraft carrier, Admiral Kuznetsov, aged and in trouble, was unfit for the mission. Admiral Kuznetsov was also not really an aircraft carrier in the traditional Western interpretation of the term. Instead, it was called a “heavy aviation cruiser” to emphasize the hybrid role between a heavy missile cruiser and an aircraft carrier. Armed with far more weapons than its American rivals and capable of operating independently, the Kuznetsov class was not designed to imitate American carriers, but to intimidate them if they invaded the territory of the Soviet Union (now Russia). Kuznetsov’s own intentions reflect a fundamental difference in the way Russian and American strategists think about naval power. Russia has always been a land power, structured around land forces. While the United States is a maritime nation that needs its navy to deploy forces on a global scale, the main task of the Russian Navy is to secure its vast Eurasian border.

Simply put, Russia does not have a CSG because its military doctrine does not require the unique capabilities it provides. However, Russian experts respect the threat posed by the CSG. A 2017 article by the Russian news agency RIA Novosti titled “The Resources of Democracy,” described the CSG’s capabilities meticulously, if not entirely, in detail. The article ends on a note: “The CSG represents a formidable force, capable of destroying, or at least degrading, the infrastructure of even a great nation with a powerful army. Coastal and island states are particularly vulnerable to them [CSG]. “

But recent Russian assessments have been more optimistic, reflecting confidence that the Kremlin’s latest array of weapons projects gives the CSG an edge. In late 2020, retired Russian Colonel Mikhail Khodaernok writes that Russia’s new 3M22 Tsirkon anti-ship winged hypersonic missile “will completely change the balance of power at sea.” While admitting that the Soviet-era P-700 missile lacks the range and performance to threaten American carriers, the RT article argues that “this problem will be largely solved” by Tsirkon. With a range of 1,000 to 2,000 km, a top speed of over Mach 8, and mid-cruise maneuverability, Khodaernok believes Tsirkon can easily outperform CSG’s current surface-to-air systems. Russian military observers have also pointed to the upcoming Poseidon system, a nuclear-powered unmanned submarine equipped with a 2-megaton atomic warhead, as a strong competitor for the CSG. The blast from the warhead created a radioactive tsunami capable of contaminating a large area. The Russian military installation claims that the unmanned ships are moving too fast and have too great a range to be intercepted by the CSG.

The CSG is no longer an unstoppable army, at least not in the eyes of Russia. Citing the Kremlin’s recent advances in advanced weapons technology, contemporary Russian observers increasingly believe they have the tools to neutralize these formations in the event of a war convention with NATO. With the catastrophic global consequences of such a conflict, let us hope that this debate will remain an exercise in theory forever.

Mr minh