Sad footprints of the banks 0 VND | News



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During his time as Governor of the State Bank (2011 – 2016), the Politburo determined that Mr. Nguyen Van Binh (now Head of the Central Economic Commission) had many violations and deficiencies “causing consequences.” serious, difficult to overcome ”.

In 2015, the Vietnam State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) took turns issuing a mandatory acquisition decision at 0 VND for banks such as Construction Bank (VietnamCB, now known as CBBank), Petroleum Bank. Global (GPBank) and Ocean Bank (OceanBank), to restructure, ensure the security and stability of the credit institution system, while helping to maintain political security and order and security. All society.

In another operational area of ​​the Banco del Estado in the period 2012 – 2016, there was an issue of public concern and multidimensional debate, which was the monopoly policy of gold bars, which gave SJC gold bars a unique position . ; All buy and sell prices are operated by SJC, and SJC is also approved to process SJC gold bars that are distorted into SJC gold bars capped at hundreds of thousands of taels in the years 2014-2016.

This policy is said to be successful in removing gold from monetary circulation, helping to stabilize the exchange rate, positively affecting the macroeconomy.

However, the Vietnam Gold Trading Association and other non-SJC gold trading units have reflected a series of consequences, by proposing transparency in the monopoly of import, export, buying and selling and mobilization of gold; It is necessary to facilitate the conversion and circulation of large quantities of gold among the population and the production, purchase and sale of gold jewelry, fine arts …

However, 2 years later by the State Audit, the State Audit assessed: “The restructuring of commercial banks with 0 VND bought by the State Bank is slow and not very exhaustive; The financial situation of the banks has not improved, business activities continue to suffer heavy losses and bad debt collection is difficult ”.

State Audit indicates that the default rate in 3 banks with 0 VND is very high. Specifically, GPBank’s bad debt was VND 2.8 billion, which represents 59.32% of outstanding loans; OceanBank is 14.234 billion Dong, which represents 72.25% of outstanding loans. For VietnamCB, bad debts from clients (excluding financial institutions and credit institutions) were 18.073 billion VND, representing 95% of outstanding loans (19.024 billion VND). Meanwhile, the bad debt recovery rate was very low, GPBank in 2016 recovered 307 billion dong from bad debts, reaching 14.99% of the plan; It is estimated that only 866 billion dong can be recovered from bad debts, which represents 31.53% of total bad debts. OceanBank has bad debts that are difficult to recover due to no guarantees, insufficient legal guarantees, or uncooperative customers …

The results of the audit show that the Banco del Estado has not directed the development, approval and implementation of the GPBank restructuring plan in a timely manner in accordance with the provisions of Decision No. 48/2013 / QD-TTg of August 1, 2013 on the mandatory contribution of capital, purchase of shares by credit institutions under special control; Slowly approve the restructuring plans of GPBank and OceanBank, leading to the impossibility of taking measures to reduce the financial decline of banks that can buy 0 dong. SBV’s special inspection and supervision activities are still limited.

Reporting to the National Assembly in 2018 and recent years, the State Auditor said that it is necessary to have measures to focus on completely solving 3 banks with 0 VND, even considering a dissolution or bankruptcy plan, to avoid the situation of “loss of the mother overlaps with the loss of the child “, because according to the estimates of the State Audit, the annual loss of these 3 banks is up to billions of billions of dong.

Also due to the aforementioned consequences, as of 2017, the SBV’s policy of buying 0 dong banks was forced to end.

Many State Bank officials have to appear in court

So far, all 3 banks have been bought with zero dong associated with economic crime, money-losing corruption, and losses of up to many trillions of dong. The results of the investigation and adjudication of the prosecutorial agencies show that, in addition to the responsibilities of the people who operate and direct the bank directly, there are also the responsibilities of the personnel of the State Bank, which is obliged to handle criminal cases. Typically, the case occurred at VietnamCB Bank.
In 2012, Dai Tin Bank (TrustBank), VietnamCB’s predecessor, fell into a high default situation, risking breaking the entire system. The State Bank then asked TrustBank to report on the situation and did not approve of TrustBank restructuring. In June 2012, SBV Governor Nguyen Van Binh approved the transfer of 85% of TrustBank shares to a new group of shareholders, Pham Cong Danh, and appointed Mr. Dang Thanh Binh, then Deputy Governor of the State Bank , to accept the approved the policy of allowing Mr. Pham Cong Danh to be a new investor to participate in the TrustBank restructuring of the old group of shareholders, Ms. Hua Thi Phan, and approved the staffing for Mr. Pham Cong Danh is the Chairman of the Bank’s Board of Directors.

During this period, TrustBank changed its name to Viet NamCB and was placed under special control by the State Bank during the restructuring process. However, the supervision of the State Bank in Vietnam is mainly formal and irresponsible, creating the conditions for Pham Cong Danh to “remove the guts” from the Vietnam Fair for VND 19 billion. Regarding the violations by VietnamCB, the process determined that Pham Cong Danh and his accomplices had caused damages of 18,000 million VND. The consequences of the case forced the State Bank to buy back VietnamCB for 0 VND. In addition, the prosecution agency prosecuted and tried 5 officials of the State Bank for irresponsibility, including: Dang Thanh Binh, former deputy governor of the SBV; Ha Tan Phuoc, head of the supervision team, former deputy director of SBV Long An Branch; Pham The Tuan, Deputy Oversight Team, Former Deputy Director, Vietcombank Branch in Ho Chi Minh City; Le Van Thanh, former Chief Inspector of the State Bank of Long An Province; and Ngo Van Thanh, member of the oversight team, former deputy director of the Inspection and Compliance Department of Vietcombank Long An.

There is no feasible structural plan yet

According to the report of the State Bank of Vietnam just sent to the tenth session of the National Assembly, term XIV, based on the guidelines and orientations of the competent authorities, and the legal provisions, the SBV has focused on managing 3 banks. on the construction and completion of restructuring plans / recovery plans, active search for partners, negotiation with national and foreign investors who wish to participate in the restructuring. At the same time, the State Bank of Vietnam has actively led these banks to reorganize their operating networks, reduce costs and implement safe business activities … on the principle of decision, prudence and strictness. On this basis, the Banco del Estado has informed the competent authorities of the management plan.

Restructuring and selling to foreign investors is a feasible solution, and the Banco del Estado has repeatedly presented a plan to reactivate these banks, but for various reasons, it has not been fully resolved. The report of the State Auditor to the X National Assembly, term XIV, confirmed that there are no feasible structural plans approved for these 3 banks, while the financial situation of the 3 The ice becomes harder.



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