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Since the formation of the European Union, it has been a habit for British prime ministers to try to define their position as prime minister through a dispute with the rest of the bloc, especially given the glowing headlines in national newspapers that breed such disputes.
The leading exponent was Margaret Thatcher, ironically in many ways the architect of the single market from which Boris Johnson is fighting to organize the UK’s withdrawal.
For four years, between 1980 and 1984, it demanded that UK contributions to the then European Economic Community be adjusted, warning that it would withhold VAT payments otherwise, and demanded: “I want my money back.” The crisis finally came to a head at Fontainebleau in 1984, where a British official had to be placed under Thatcher’s watch to ensure that she remained calm. Helmut Kohl, the German chancellor at the time, later recalled his French counterpart, François Mitterrand, whispering to him: “I’ve almost had enough of these endless discussions. I think we should agree between ourselves that we will offer him nothing, nothing, nothing. “
Later, when he noticed that foreign ministers were failing to get down to work on solving the UK budget problem and were instead swapping stories and joking around, he exclaimed: “How dare you? We saved all their necks in the war. “His technique, his diplomats said, was based on his mastery of detail, carrying not only his briefing notes, but also” portfolio points “to force the final presentation and” needle notes “to pierce the hypocrisy of your interlocutor.
John Major, initially an agnostic on Europe, used a more tactile and patient negotiating style than his predecessor. “You catch more flies with honey than with vinegar,” he reasoned. In Maastricht, in 1992, he negotiated an exclusion for the United Kingdom not only from the economic and monetary union, but also from the social chapter. Major’s technique was to sit solemnly, almost with pleasure, refusing to accept the logic of being one against 11. “There’s no use asking me. I can not do it. I won’t, ”it said.
“Game Set and Match,” the phrase invented at 3 am by an over-inventive press official to sum up its success, never passed Major’s lips, or how he viewed relations with Europe. Yet it somehow helped him win the 1992 elections, only to suffer the exit from the European exchange rate mechanism five months later, a humiliation that caused him to lose the support of the Sun and led to his crushing defeat to Tony. Blair in 1997.
But even pro-European Blair had his fights with Brussels, ruining a summit in June 2005 by rejecting a cut in the UK downgrade and irritating his fellow leaders by demanding further economic reform and questioning his obsession with treaty changes. . However, he fought less with EU leaders than with an astute negotiator closer to home: his chancellor, Gordon Brown. Blair was never able to convince him that the UK economy had passed the five Treasury tests to join the euro.
After finally succeeding his rival, Brown tried to turn a new page with other EU leaders, but ended up becoming the only one of them who did not travel to Portugal to sign the Lisbon Treaty. He ended up having to sign the treaty alone in Brussels, seemingly so embarrassed he refused to look up. Brown’s advisers were divided over whether to say that he had not been able to go to Lisbon due to a daily confrontation, or to reject European integration. Both versions were reported in an episode that summarized the flaws in Brown’s style of government.
David Cameron, with Ukip behind him and facing secondary rebellions, vetoed the EU’s Stability, Coordination and Governance Treaty in December 2011 after 10 hours of talks. His departure at 3 a.m. after demanding a protocol allowing London to opt out of the proposed changes in financial services surprised his EU colleagues.
The prime minister returned to London as something of a hero, enjoying a temporary boost in the polls and believing he could ride the Eurosceptic tiger. In 2014, he tried to pull the trick again by blocking Jean-Claude Juncker’s appointment as chairman of the EU commission, replicating Major’s feat who vetoed Jean-Luc Dehaene at a summit in Corfu in 1994. But Cameron had no veto, and found himself totally isolated in a show of humility from the lack of British influence. It was not the last time that Cameron misinterpreted Germany’s willingness to help Britain.
As Johnson prepares to travel to Brussels, claiming to have all the cards, he can only hope that German Chancellor Angela Merkel finally turns out well. If not, the UK will leave once again, but this time into the unknown.
