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LLast week, senior figures from government, business and civil society from the UK, the EU, the US, Canada and China participated in a conference on UK-EU relations. Our goal was to articulate the steps that each of us could take to propel the new relationship to a better place. The tense opening months of the post-Brexit trade deal show how difficult this process can be.
For this government, the EU is not a priority. He wants to focus on other parts of the world, not least the United States and the Indo-Pacific, as the recent integrated review made clear. His other priority is domestic, in post-pandemic recovery and “leveling off.”
However, over the two days we met, it became clear that the success and impact of “global Britain”, as the government has put it, depends largely on a more productive relationship with the EU.
The most obvious example is the UK government’s desire to polish its credentials with those of the US. Joe Biden has made it clear that he expects the UK to abide by the treaties it has signed and not do anything to jeopardize the Good Friday agreement.
The UK also has a keen interest in working with the EU to raise global climate standards. A political success at Cop26 in Glasgow in November would be a great vindication of the global Britain that Boris Johnson wants to lead. However, it can only realistically be achieved through partnership with the EU.
Another example is Britain’s ambition to catch up with the United States and China on artificial intelligence. While the University of Oxford has one of the strongest computer science departments in the world, its ability to compete with other institutions, such as Stanford, could be improved through a student exchange program and visa with the EU. This would allow the government to attract and retain the talent of a large group of students at the door of the UK, while staying well below its own red lines on free movement.
In each case, the influence, indeed the great success, of the global UK would be enhanced by a more collaborative relationship with the EU. This, in turn, depends on the implementation of the Northern Ireland protocol.
More importantly, the government should urgently reaffirm its commitment to the protocol and end speculation that it seeks to undermine it by showing that it cannot work. This requires David Frost, the EU’s top adviser, to work through the joint withdrawal agreement committee with his EU counterpart, Maroš Šefčovič. Unilateral decisions will only damage trust and cooperation, seriously undermining Britain’s policy. objectives.
The pragmatism of the EU is also needed. Their preferred solution to the frictions on the border between Great Britain and Northern Ireland is a veterinary agreement on food, animal and plant standards. However, the UK government is unlikely to agree, as this would limit the concessions it could offer in agriculture and hurt its ability to reach a trade deal with the United States.
Therefore, it is necessary to find other compromises. A start would be for the government to provide the customs data that the EU has been requesting. This would show that there are no substantial trade flows from Great Britain to Northern Ireland which then enter the broader single market. The existing scheme for determining whether or not goods will remain in Northern Ireland for tariff purposes could be expanded, to allow food products that remain in the north to be subject to fewer paperwork and inspections. These measures would not be a permanent solution, but they could ease the scope and frequency of checks and reduce some of the friction currently experienced.
If the government gets involved in this process with the EU to make the protocol work, it would generate goodwill that could flow to other parts of the relationship.
For example, it now seems unlikely that the government will embark on a “Singapore on the Thames” deregulation agenda, as some in the EU feared. Chancellor Rishi Sunak’s budget in February, in which he noted an increase in corporation tax, actually did the opposite. Regulatory ‘divergence’ is more likely as EU rules and regulations evolve and the UK chooses not to follow suit. After all, the government did not promise to follow EU rules in perpetuity in the trade and cooperation agreement signed last December.
In these circumstances, the EU could still try to impose “rebalancing” tariffs if it believed that the UK was gaining a competitive advantage. But if other parts of the relationship are working well, the commission is more likely to be judicious, as it should be.
Over a longer time horizon, other improvements that would benefit both parties may be easier to achieve, such as an agreement on labor mobility, mutual recognition of qualifications, or greater regulatory cooperation that allows for more “equivalency” decisions and increased trade. cross-border financial services.
Both parties should now seek to depoliticize their relationship and focus on technical fixes to protocol to help make their new relationship work. This will not be easy, given next year’s assembly elections in Stormont and in France, as well as suspicions in Brussels that conservatives see an electoral advantage in taking a hard line with the EU.
That may be correct. But Britain’s overall success depends largely on friendly relations with its neighbors. As highlighted in this week’s row on vaccines, the government must find a constructive way to coexist with the EU, even if its priorities now lie elsewhere.
