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First, policy makers should plan the “worst case scenario”, for example, that soon there will be no vaccine or herd immunity.
Second, strategies must be developed to protect medical personnel as Covid-19 continues to spread.
Third, governments would have to develop concrete plans in case containment measures need to be strengthened if infection numbers explode.
Finally, fourthly, those responsible for risk communication must make it clear that this pandemic will not end quickly and that people must prepare for a periodic outbreak outbreak in the next two years.
These are the recommendations of a group of experts led by Michael Osterholm, head of one of the United States’ leading institutions for infectious and epidemiological medicine, the Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy (CIDRAP) at the University of Minnesota.
“Take action while there is still time”
In a “point of view” paper, where they rely primarily on knowledge of past pandemics and apply this to the Covid 19 pandemic, they dare to investigate “The Future of the Covid 19 Pandemic”.
The goal is to inform decision makers weekly with information on the situations they might face in the course of this or next year, “so that they can take action now while there is still time.”
In their first position paper, the researchers essentially present three scenarios of how the Covid 19 pandemic will unfold in the coming months, and which they believe will be from 18 to 24. None of them predicts a disappearance in a short time, all three assume a second wave and even more spikes of infection.
The researchers acknowledged that even the most experienced health experts worldwide could not predict how fast Sars-CoV-2 would spread and cause the “worst global health crisis in more than 100 years.” Consequently, the future development of the epidemic is unclear, there is no “crystal ball” that can predict this and reveal a way to control the pandemic.
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This is also due to the fact that the previously known and investigated new coronaviruses, Sars-CoV-1 or Mers, are very different from the new virus. The closest the 1918 influenza pandemic would be to the current Covid 19 outbreak. There have been six other influenza epidemics that can be learned today.
Parallel to the flu
This is possible because, despite substantial differences from Sars-CoV-2, influenza viruses have certain similarities: first, the latter has been so new to humanity since it appeared in Wuhan in late December 2019, and therefore, the immune system of all people, as new as it is. the H1N1 influenza strain was 1918. There was no natural immunity in the population.
Also, like the flu, Sars-CoV-2 is spread primarily through droplet and aerosol infections. And both are capable of transmitting people with few or no symptoms, so both can infect millions of people in the shortest amount of time.
[Verfolgen Sie alle neuen Entwicklungen zum Coronavirus in unseren Liveblogs zum Virus weltweit und zum Virus in Berlin.]
However, the Sars CoV-2 virus has some properties that go beyond those of influenza viruses. On average, you have about five instead of two days of incubation, more time to “hide.” This is further promoted by the fact that about 25 percent of all infections are asymptomatic, while it was probably 16 percent in the 1918 influenza pandemic, the researchers said.
And patients who become visibly ill are already contagious in a relatively long “presymptomatic” period, approximately three to five days earlier. With influenza, it was probably only a day or two. “All of these factors contribute to the transmissibility of the virus,” write the experts.
On the one hand, the researchers conclude, from the knowledge of the viruses themselves and past pandemics, that the Covid-19 pandemic “will probably last between 18 and 24 months” until the collective immunity, that is, an infection, of around 60 to 70 percent of the population. is that it slows down the spread of the virus. On the other hand, they describe three possible scenarios for the course of the pandemic during this period.
Three scenarios, including “worst” and “best case”
In the first scenario, the first wave in the spring, which has already passed in some countries, is followed by a series of smaller waves in the summer months and the following one or two years that slowly fade away.
That could vary from country to country, depending on the respective measures to contain the disease and its relief. “This scenario may require the periodic introduction and relaxation of containment measures,” the researchers write.
Basic information about corona virus:
In the second scenario, the first wave is followed by a much higher number of infections in the fall or winter of 2020 and smaller waves in the coming year, which would require a new “lock” in the fall to reduce the number of infections and not overload health systems.
“This pattern is comparable to that of the 1918-19 pandemic,” write the researchers, in which a fairly small wave in March 1918 was followed by a large wave in the fall of 1918 and others in the winter of 1918 and spring of 1919. The 1957 flu pandemic was similar.
In the third scenario, the first wave of Covid-19 would be the highest, followed by small “subsequent burns” with no “clear pattern.” “Although this scenario has not been seen in influenza pandemics, it remains an option,” the researchers said. This scenario alone (“best case scenario”) would not require any other containment measures, “although illnesses and deaths would continue to occur.”
Denver Lessons
As I said, what scenario will apply is open. However, a look at history shows that countries, cities, and municipalities can have a major impact on your pandemic destination, depending on when and if they allow for relaxation and how quickly you can establish contact restrictions to reduce rates of infection.
In Denver, for example, authorities lifted contact restrictions too early in 1918, when too many people were still infected in the city and new chains of infection began quickly. They paid for it with a second, higher wave of flu-related illness and death.
