Turkey strongly supports Azerbaijan



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Ankara does not appear to be interested in reducing the escalation of the conflict over Nagorni Karabakh. At the national level, you can score points by siding with Azerbaijan. There are great dangers lurking in foreign policy.

Turkish solidarity demonstration in front of the Azerbaijani consulate in Istanbul.

Demonstration of Turkish solidarity in front of the Azerbaijani consulate in Istanbul.

Tolga Bozoglu / EPA

The presence on Twitter of the Turkish Ministry of Defense leaves no doubt which side you are on in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Following the outbreak of recent clashes between the two southern Caucasus neighbors, the Ministry in Ankara your background image in the news feed changed. Now a Turkish and Azerbaijani soldier can be seen there, folding their hands in fraternal gestures.

In 1991, Turkey was the first country to recognize the independence of Azerbaijan and since then it has always supported its “sister state”. In view of a military-backed interest policy, which Ankara increasingly pursues beyond its national borders, observers wonder whether this support will also go beyond diplomatic backing. On Sunday, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared that his country would be Azerbaijan this time.

Syrian mercenary rumors

According to the Ministry of Defense of Armenia, Turkish military experts, but also weapons and drones, are deployed on the Azerbaijani side. The Armenian ambassador to Moscow had previously claimed that Turkey had relocated 4,000 Syrian mercenaries to the conflict zone. Baku and Ankara described these accusations as unfounded. Turkey, for its part, claimed that Armenia had recruited fighters from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).

Reports from Yerevan on Tuesday that a Turkish fighter jet shot down an Armenian Air Force machine over Armenian airspace also dismissed Ankara as fake.

None of these claims can be independently confirmed. However, the Reuters news agency and the British Guardian published an investigation according to which Syrians had been recruited for the fight against Armenia in the areas of northern Syria controlled by Turkey. The use of mercenaries plays an important role in Turkish military operations in Syria and Libya.

Tabloid media reports, according to which jihadists in northern Syria are now waging a holy war in the Caucasus, should in any case be treated with caution, if only because of the religious position of departure. The fighters in northern Syria are Sunni, but Azerbaijan is mostly Shiite.

Rhetorical weaponry

Regardless of any military aid, Baku’s rhetorical and symbolic support for Ankara has reached a new level. After fighting on the border with Armenia in July, the Turkish and Azerbaijani armies conducted joint maneuvers. Furthermore, Ankara repeatedly criticized the so-called Minsk Group, which has been trying to find a political solution to the conflict over Nagorni Karabakh within the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) since the 1990s. In the General Assembly From the UN two weeks ago, Erdogan described Armenia as the biggest obstacle to a peace solution in the southern Caucasus.

The tone of the pro-government press is particularly martial. The editor-in-chief of the revolver newspaper “Yeni Safak” tweeted on Monday that a bomb was supposed to accidentally hit the center of Erewan. Russian expert on the Caucasus Sergei Markedonow of the Carnegie Center in Moscow believes that Turkey cannot be said to have caused the latest escalation. Ankara’s stance certainly favored a more determined conduct on the part of Azerbaijan.

Popular support for the “brother people”

The question remains why Turkey is the only regional power rhetorically fueling the conflict rather than reducing it. At the national level, the government, which is under pressure in view of the increase in the crown number and a free-falling currency, can score points by defending the “brother people” in the Caucasus. With the exception of the pro-Kurdish HDP, all parliamentary parties have underlined their solidarity with Azerbaijan in a joint statement.

The conflict is a very emotional issue in Turkey. Turkish and Azerbaijani are closely related languages. Cultural solidarity is emphasized by the slogan “two states, one nation”. Surprisingly, despite the clear Sunni identity of the ruling Turkish religious conservative AKP party, the denominational difference does not matter.

Added to this is the historically charged relationship with Armenia, which in the heated nationalist environment is also infecting the Armenian minority in Turkey. On Monday, a caravan with Azerbaijani flags stopped in front of the headquarters of the Armenian Patriarchate in Istanbul. The image of the currently popular French enemy can also be used. In view of the large Armenian diaspora in France, Paris appears as the defender of Erewan.

Another front with Russia

Increased involvement in the South Caucasus dovetails with Turkish foreign policy in recent years, which aims to vigorously affirm Turkish interests also in the wider neighborhood. Azerbaijan is a major supplier of raw materials for Turkey and is also interesting as a potential weapons customer. In light of this, it makes perfect sense to bring the country closer to you.

Such a compromise would put Ankara in conflict with Moscow on another front. The Kremlin regards the Caucasus as a “near foreigner” in which it does not tolerate any other regulatory powers. Turkey and Russia are already on opposite sides in the conflicts in Libya and Syria. In Idlib, the last Syrian rebel stronghold, threatens another escalation, as mounting skirmishes at the front show.

It cannot be ruled out that Erdogan wants to use Turkish influence in the South Caucasus as a bargaining chip in other conflicts with Russia. The risk of such a game would be very high given the particularly uneven balance of power in Russia’s own backyard.

Despite some resentment recently, the Kremlin still has considerable influence in Baku. In addition to Russia, Azerbaijan is primarily dependent on Israel, whose relationship with Turkey has long been disrupted. Ankara has many opponents and almost no allies. The question of whether the country can afford another front in this situation is obvious.



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