Karabakh conflict: Iran finds itself in a dilemma



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Tehran is following the war at its doorstep with concern because it fears an increase in separatist tendencies among its Azerbaijani minority. A peace initiative should now defuse the conflict.

Iran's President Hassan Rouhani sent his Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Arakchi to Baku, Moscow, Yerevan and Ankara to mediate between the warring parties in the Karabakh conflict.

Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani sent his Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Arakchi to Baku, Moscow, Yerevan and Ankara to mediate between the warring parties in the Karabakh conflict.

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In the conflict over Nagorni Karabakh, Iran has so far remained remarkably low. Although the Islamic Republic is culturally and religiously closer to Azerbaijan than it is to Christian Armenia, Tehran’s leadership has clearly avoided taking sides with its predominantly Shiite neighbors. Since the outbreak of fighting over the Armenian enclave on its border in late September, Iran has called on the parties to the conflict to engage in dialogue and act as mediators.

Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Arakchi traveled to Yerevan and Ankara on Friday and Saturday to promote an Iranian peace plan. The envoy had previously flown to Moscow and met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Baku. Russia is Armenia’s most important ally, while Turkey supports the “Turkish brother people” in Azerbaijan with combat drones and probably also Syrian mercenaries.

The Iranian peace initiative underscores the importance Tehran attaches to the war on its doorstep. Despite all the reluctance, the leaders are concerned and fear that the conflict will spread to their own country. He is less afraid of the fighting moving across the Aras border river, even if Iran has recently increased its troops there. Rather, Tehran fears an increase in separatist efforts in its own country.

The conflict is also fueling tensions in Iran

About 15 million Iranians belong to the Azerbaijani minority, and thus almost 18 percent of the 84 million Iranians. This means that more ethnic Azeris live in northwestern Iran than in the Republic of Azerbaijan across the border. Members of the minority have always played an important role in Tehran politics: the revolutionary leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is Azerbaijani. But the ethnic group has long complained of discrimination.

Recovered from Azerbaijan

Under Armenian control

Nagorni Karabakh Former Autonomous Region

The demonstrations in early October showed how much they were concerned about the war in Karabakh. “Karabakh is ours and will remain ours,” chanted Azeri protesters in Tehran, Tabriz and other cities. Videos showing trucks on their way to the border with Armenia caused discontent. Faced with the commotion on social media, Tehran was forced to deny that it allowed the delivery of weapons to its troubled neighbor.

The leadership is also trying to counter the impression that it supports Armenia in other ways. In the Karabakh conflict between 1992 and 1994, Iran provided Armenia with valuable assistance by maintaining the flow of goods into the country between Turkey and Azerbaijan. His policy at the time showed that in foreign policy, despite all the pan-Islamic revolutionary rhetoric, national interests were often decisive.

Doubts persist about Iran’s neutrality

In view of the enthusiasm in the Azeri minority, Tehran has now stressed that the Armenians would have to return Nagorni Karabakh and the neighboring occupied provinces to Azerbaijan. The Iranian peace plan also emphasizes respect for the rights of minorities, respect for the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and an end to the occupation. For Armenians, however, it is inconceivable to evacuate the traditional Armenian enclave.

In principle, Iran has good prerequisites for mediating between the conflicting parties. Maintains close, if not stress-free, relationships with all parties. However, it is questionable whether Tehran can muster enough political clout to persuade Azerbaijan to halt its previously successful offensive or to persuade Armenia to make meaningful concessions. It is also quite possible that neither Baku nor Yerevan consider their southern neighbors to be truly neutral despite all their guarantees.

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