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Mistake: they are everywhere. But the Federal Council has never spoken publicly about what it did wrong in the crown crisis. Whether it be the question of masks or other decisions: When making appearances, the state government tried to give the impression that it had everything under control at all times.
However, there is now a document showing where there was a problem in crisis management. This is a hitherto neglected report, approved by the Federal Council on Friday, which had been prepared by the Federal Chancellery. You want to be better equipped for the next crisis. The behavior in the first corona wave, from February to August, was examined. Basically, the conclusion is positive. Crisis management was effective and proven. But it also shows omissions, and that sometimes it just depends on who has good contacts with whom.
There is potential for improvement in the following areas:
Senior administrative staff was missing
During the crisis, it was mainly the departmental crisis teams and the internal BAG that acted. There were high-level crisis teams, such as the federal crisis team in Corona and federal civil protection personnel. However, they did not have clearly defined competencies, they were too large and therefore could not carry out their management tasks, it says in the report. “Departmentalism and silo thinking increased in the crisis management of the federal administration as the crisis lasted.” Information flow between individual departments was sometimes insufficient.
2. Data on the age of the fax:
For the first time, the federal government gives a concrete idea of how chaotic the data collection was. “At the beginning of the crisis, the federal administration bodies did not have the necessary and relevant information for decision-making quickly enough,” he says. Some of the data still came in by fax. It was “chaotic” getting the data from the hospitals. “Data on the number of infected people or the number of intensive care beds, for example, first had to be compiled and processed,” writes the federal government. However, the finding is not as new as it sounds: CH Media’s research has shown that the problem has been known for years, but has been postponed.
3. Cantons: very poorly informed
Cooperation with the cantons occupies a large part of the criticism. The federal government admits that it did not inform the cantons quickly enough when new decisions were made. It has happened that the cantons extracted details from the media even though they had to implement the resolutions. Therefore, the cantons were surprised by the financial consequences of national decisions. Also, the explanations of the specs were not accurate enough. Sometimes they would have confused more than clarifications.
The cantons should also have been better heard in the consultations. However, the short time often did not allow for “any serious inquiries”. However, the federal government is also criticizing the cantons: they should organize better. It was not clear whether the federal government had to turn to the conference of cantonal governments, individual cantons, or the conference of health directors “to quickly receive meaningful and consolidated feedback.”
4. Important actors were missing:
The federal government writes that Spitex staff, hospital, home and physician associations have received very little attention. “The social and social impacts received very little attention.” It was also quite a while before science was included. This is apparently due to the fact that before there was a crisis between the FOPH and the scientists. “Existing lines of conflict” made cooperation difficult, according to the report.
5. The Federal Council was too cautious.
At the beginning of the summer, the cantons took over again and the extraordinary situation ended. The report now says that the transfer of responsibility was not sufficiently coordinated. The Federal Council should have provided better support to the cantons and managed them more effectively. It was also expected to “make strategic guidelines that will result in uniform measures.”
6. Masks, grandchildren: they can’t communicate like this
The report also criticizes his own communication, or perhaps better that of his now retired “Mr. Corona” Daniel Koch: The federal government says that the Federal Office of Public Health gave responses to media inquiries that were “scientifically unsustainable” “Not clear enough.” For example, in the question of masks or the question of whether grandparents can see their grandchildren. This has caused confusion. Going forward, “statements and data must be verified and based on scientific fact.”
7. Who gets the masks: nowhere was this clearly regulated
The masks were already known to be missing. “Too non-binding” and “too vague” were the regulations on critical materials inventories, the report gives a reason for the omission. It was just a recommendation in a strategy document that cantons should store masks. It is also unclear who should acquire the supplies in an emergency. This should be improved.
8. And Ignazio Cassis?
The Foreign Relations Department (EDA) “was sometimes too late, little or no involvement in international affairs,” the report says. Existing networks were not used enough, foreign governments were not involved enough, for example when entry restrictions were relaxed or when medical supplies were in short supply. The report speaks of a “lack of structured cooperation between the FDFA and the BAG.” So it also depends on who already knew who in the federal administration, and liked them.
December 15, 2020: Federal representatives and experts call for comprehensive measures:
