Commentary: Trump’s playbook on China in the South China Sea has some lessons for the Biden administration

SINGAPORE: The fateful meeting between then-US President Barack Obama and Chinese leader Xi Jinping at the White House in 2015 has often been held up by Washington as a clear example of Beijing’s perfidy over disputes. of the South China Sea.

The issue revolves around Xi’s assurance in this meeting with Obama that China would not militarize the disputed Spratly Islands. The accusations and counter-accusations on this issue have contributed to increasing tensions between the two countries since then.

For example, according to Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin at a press conference on September 28, the Spratlys are “Chinese territory” and therefore deploying “defensive facilities” on “Chinese territory.” It is equivalent to an exercise of national sovereignty and defense granted by international law.

READ: Comment: Why Biden Will Find It Hard to Undo Trump’s ‘America First’ Trade Policy

READ: Comment: China and Australia went from being cold to barely talking. That could have been avoided

Instead, he argues, the Americans are the “biggest driver” of militarization in the South China Sea due to their frequent military exercises and close reconnaissance missions.

Wang’s statement is not new, it has been China’s constant narrative of militarization in the South China Sea.

For the sake of peace and stability in the South China Sea, can this issue finally be solved with the incoming Biden administration?

DEFINING MILITARIZATION

Overcoming the conceptual hurdle of “militarization” must be the essential first step. Militarization can refer to a continuum of actions, from the deployment of a squad of lightly armed troops to the deployment of nuclear-tipped missiles at a location.

That seems easy. But what about the construction of runways and ports?

This is where the water gets cloudy. These facilities are “dual use”; for example, the same runway can support flight operations by both civil aircraft and combat aircraft.

In the Single Draft Negotiating Text (SDNT) of the proposed Code of Conduct in the South China Sea adopted in 2018 by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China, Vietnam was the only party that attempted to define “militarization “, which is referred to as” installation, deployment or development for any purpose … of any weapon of an offensive nature. “

This formulation is problematic: How is the “weapon of an offensive nature” determined when most of the armaments meet both defensive and offensive requirements? It really depends largely on how the user chooses to employ the weapon.

Compounding the challenge, modern weapons systems are mobile and therefore do not have to be permanently deployed on site.

When politically convenient, these weapons can be deployed and withdrawn from the disputed area, allowing them to scale up and down the scale of escalation in times of crisis.

In practice, therefore, it is difficult to clearly determine what amounts to “militarization”.

The parties involved in the South China Sea disputes engage in various types of militarization in the area.

READ: Comment: Parts of Asia will miss Donald Trump’s tough China policy

The most notable of all Spratlys outposts are those in China, packed with airstrips, ports, bunkers and other dual-use infrastructure, which help maintain Beijing’s projection of power and allow the use of coercion against others. claimants in the South China Sea.

RESPONDING TO THE FAIT ACOMPLI OF CHINA

A sizable swarm of Chinese ships, allegedly including the maritime militia, which appeared off Thitu Island in the Spratly Islands last year in the hands of the Philippines, were able to maintain operations thanks to nearby Subi Reef, another major island. artificial china.

In the Vanguard Bank’s showdown with Vietnam late last year as well, the Chinese geological survey ship Haiyang Dizhi 8 stopped at the nearby Fiery Cross Reef.

These outposts serve their usefulness as convenient “pit stops” that avoid the need for Chinese assets to return regularly to their mainland bases for resupply and other purposes, thus allowing continuous operations with minimal interruptions for extended periods.

The opportunity to prevent this eventuality passed with the Obama administration, which had the opportunity to confront China over island building and militarization in the Spratlys.

After all, the extensive and ubiquitous American intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities could not have overlooked the hugely obvious Chinese dredging work and land reclamation work in the area.

Instead, the Obama administration chose not to risk losing Beijing’s cooperation over other hot topics like climate change.

By now it should have been apparent that the fait accompli in Beijing has drastically altered the situation in the South China Sea.

The recurring spiral of military positions and oppositions between China and the United States also demonstrates the difficulty of reaching a bilateral consensus on the issue of militarization.

READ: Comment: Joe Biden takes office at a crucial time for climate action. Can you deliver?

Notably, in early July, in response to the Chinese military exercises in the South China Sea, the US Navy dispatched the Nimitz and Ronald Reagan carrier strike groups in early July in a rare show of force. of two aircraft carriers.

Beijing responded with a series of maritime strike exercises, including the reported launch of an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) the following month.

Not to be outdone, the Ronald Reagan returned to the South China Sea in mid-August, to which Beijing responded with a new series of war games, launching two ASBMs into waters near the Chinese-controlled Paracels later that month. .

Soon after, the American destroyer Mustin carried out a Freedom of Navigation Operation (FONOP) off the Paracels.

INHERITING THE “BAD PROBLEM”

There appears to be a recent shift towards a more comprehensive US strategy with Secretary of State Michael Pompeo’s statement on the South China Sea in July in which he said: “Beijing’s claims on offshore resources in most of the Sea of South China are completely illegal as it is their bullying campaign to control them ”.

Until then, the Trump administration addressed Beijing’s fait accompli through a largely militaristic approach, aptly expressed in the routine presence of the US Navy and FONOPs.

But these have failed to roll back Beijing’s activities in the South China Sea, especially the recurring incidents of Chinese coercion against the claimant Southeast Asian states.

But the regular military presence in the South China Sea does indicate Washington’s continued commitment to regional peace and stability, and at least serves to dissuade Beijing from taking more drastic action, such as forcibly evicting other claimants. features occupied by non-Chinese in the Spratlys. .

The incoming Biden administration will inherit the same Chinese fait accompli in the South China Sea.

But repealing certain policy actions already established by the Trump administration, such as the FONOPs, would send the wrong signal about America’s continued security commitment to the region, and thus embolden Beijing to take more aggressive action.

In any case, the eventual Code of Conduct is unlikely to exclude a US military presence in the South China Sea, despite Beijing’s proposals in the SDNT that seek to exclude foreign military presence in the area.

Various parts of ASEAN certainly wish to maintain the sacrosanct sovereign freedom to engage with foreign military partners who so desire.

READ: Comment: After years of demonizing China, the US must start an honest dialogue

READ: Comment: America has a chance to repair diplomacy. Don’t waste it

But the code is unlikely to address the “wicked problem” of militarization in the Spratlys. This will be another challenge that the Biden administration will inherit as an enduring legacy from previous administrations.

With Beijing’s growing economic influence in the region, it becomes more pertinent for Washington to work on a comprehensive strategy that limits China’s ability to further alter the status quo in the South China Sea using an ever-expanding range of tools from the South. art of government, beyond militarization and including economic pressures such as sanctions.

The Biden administration may do well to continue with certain pre-existing policies, such as FONOP and blacklists of Chinese entities involved in the build-up of the South China Sea.

But instead of taking a one-sided approach, it can also help take a more consultative approach toward regional allies and partners, ensuring that US policies in the South China Sea work in sync with their prevailing concerns and interests.

Collin Koh is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore-based Nanyang University of Technology.