Commentary: China’s divide and rule strategy no longer fools anyone



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LONDON: Exactly 500 years ago, the Italian Renaissance philosopher Niccolo Machiavelli published his treatise The Art of War.

In it, the main protagonist, Lord Fabrizio Colonna, declared: “A Captain must, among all his other actions, strive with each art to divide the forces of the enemy.”

Half a millennium later, this principle seems to describe one of China’s foreign policy dictates.

Case in point? Australia. The country has gone unnoticed by China in recent months.

Import bans, tariffs and other restrictions on Australian wines, beef, barley and more were imposed after April 2020, when Australia led calls for international investigations into the origins of the coronavirus, apparently without consulting with China in advance.

Joe Paratore (left) shows off his western lobster catch to Fremantle customers.  Australian

Joe Paratore shows off his western lobster catch to Fremantle customers. Australian fishermen have had to find new markets for their catches after China imposed a near-total ban on lobster. (Photo: AFP / Trevor Collens)

A second round of restrictions was put in place in early November, with live lobster, timber and further delays at the borders, though no formal notices about the bans were issued.

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A SPACE BETWEEN NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIA

But the punitive sanctions against Australia are only part of the divide and rule story.

Here’s Exhibit B: China signed a trade deal with New Zealand in January to enhance an existing free trade agreement, removing or lowering tariffs on many of the same products that Beijing just sanctioned Australia.

The general message is clear: enrage Beijing and we will punish it. But stay on the good side of Beijing and we’ll make it up to you.

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And the strategy is effective. It is a challenge for countries that benefit from greater access to the world’s second-largest economy to forego that reward.

That same month, Australia and New Zealand recently had an extremely rare diplomatic dispute.

New Zealand Trade Minister Damien O’Connor suggested Australia should “show respect and speak with a little more diplomacy” with China when asked by CNBC about the timing of New Zealand’s trade deal with China and what role. could play New Zealand in mediating the dispute.

It was a remarkable statement that underscored the growing tensions in the generally rock-solid trans-Tasmania relationship.

Trade between China and Australia has been affected by growing diplomatic tensions between the two countries.

Trade between China and Australia has been affected by growing diplomatic tensions between the two countries. (Photo: AFP / STR)

A PATTERN OF COERCIVE DIPLOMACY

Beijing uses a variety of tools and tactics to divide and conquer. It consists of economic and diplomatic levers to punish states that have transgressed unwritten red lines and market-based temptations for smaller and weaker states to cultivate influence.

Many of these tactics are not unique to China. It is commonplace for countries, particularly larger ones, to illegally sanction others to shape behavior and keep state-to-state relations in balance in protecting domestic interests and achieving national goals.

But Beijing is relatively unusual in the way it carries out this coercion, using disproportionality, extralegal processes, and denial.

Through obfuscation and manipulation, he wants to condition countries to consider China’s interests.

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In Australia’s case, for example, China gave technocratic reasons for sanctions rather than government policy, from alleged mislabeling of wine to delayed quarantine inspections and claims of wood beetle infestations.

China’s track record in this regard has been consistent. The award of the Nobel Peace Prize to a Chinese dissident prompted an unofficial ban on Norwegian salmon exports in 2013.

Japan’s arrest of a Chinese trawler captain resulted in an unofficial export quota for rare earth metals in 2010.

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Mongolia also saw an increase in import taxes following a 2016 visit from the Dalai Lama. China’s Foreign Ministry even went so far as to say, “We hope Mongolia has taken this lesson seriously.”

In all of these infractions, China punishes each nation disproportionately in an attempt to deter similar actions, while at the same time using unofficial avenues to avoid being labeled a stalker.

It is worrying that the use of such coercive diplomacy has expanded rapidly in recent years: a report by the Australian Institute for Strategic Policy in September 2020 tabulated more than 150 cases of Chinese economic coercion between 2010 and 2020.

From 2010 to 2017, the number of cases of such coercion never exceeded 20 each year; in 2019, they were almost 60.

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GLOBAL PUSHBACK

This growing use of coercion is a key part of China’s divide-and-rule strategy, along with incentives and diplomatic attempts to break through the multilateral grouping.

An officer adjusts China's national flag ahead of the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) Summit in Singapore

An officer adjusts China’s national flag ahead of the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) Summit in Singapore on November 15, 2018 (Photo: REUTERS / Athit Perawongmetha)

The strategy has served China well in recent decades, especially in this region. As an example, China’s insistence on bilateral negotiations and the overall delay has hampered the progress of a binding Code of Conduct in the South China Sea with ASEAN states, some 20 years since the Declaration of Conduct was signed. non-binding in 2002.

But now there are signs that this strategy is beginning to fail. China’s more assertive foreign policy has managed to baffle a number of regional states, be it from clashes on the Sino-Indian border, the coast guard and maritime militia activity in the South and East Seas of China, or flights. through the air defense identification zones of neighboring states and entities.

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These activities are fostering a more united stance among regional states, with a broad push back against China now facilitated by a more committed America.

With a strong bipartisan consensus in the US for tougher policy toward China and a new administration, the US is taking a traditional leadership role in this key strategic area.

In doing so, the United States is rallying allies who might otherwise be looking to compete with each other for China’s favor.

Thus, China watches with dismay as the Quadrilateral Security Initiative (Quad) quickly becomes an anti-China proto-alliance, while four of the Five Eyes (the United States, Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom) are engaged in activities that irritate China. From arresting Huawei executives to offering Hong Kong passports.

China’s strategy of divide and conquer could backfire, as states become aware of such tactics and cooperate with each other to protect themselves against China in various fields of engagement: trade, regulation, defense, and security.

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The consequences for Beijing are dire.

A more hostile international environment could emerge, with rival states merging into alliances and groupings designed to thwart China’s ambitions to become a global superpower and achieve sustainable growth.

That would be unfortunate not only for the world but also for China, if such a divide and conquer strategy creates a more bifurcated and antagonistic international order, contrary to the rise of China.

Christian Le Miere is a foreign policy advisor and founder and managing director of Arcipel, a London-based strategic advisory firm.

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