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BEIJING: The situation on the other side of the Taiwan Strait appears to be on the brink of crisis since 2018.
Beijing has sent numerous sorties of military aircraft to conduct exercises near Taiwan and frequently crossed the middle line of the Taiwan Strait.
The mainland is rumored to be considering taking Taiwan’s outlying islands, suggesting that it is increasingly eager to take Taiwan by force.
With the exception of missile exercises during Taiwan’s first direct presidential elections in 1996, Beijing has historically been restrained in its military intimidation, choosing to vent its anger through rhetorical or token sanctions.
WHY DOES CHINA SEEM MORE ASSERTIVE?
His recent assertiveness is best explained by his growing status of military power and stronger expressions of motivation for reunification.
Improved amphibious warfare and anti-access or area denial capabilities mean that the military balance is tilting in favor of the mainland over Taiwan and the United States.
With growing domestic strength, the Chinese leadership believes that continuing to adopt softer policies as it has in the past can give the impression of weakness to both domestic and foreign audiences.
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Unlike his predecessors, Chinese President Xi Jinping has shown greater intensity in the desire for reunification.
The report of the XIX National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2017 demonstrated this enthusiasm, announcing that the “great rejuvenation” of the Chinese nation must be achieved by 2049, and that the reunification of China is a condition for it.
INTERNAL POLITICAL COST
But the continent is unlikely to intend to seek reunification by force any time soon.
A Taiwanese coast guard observes a Chinese-flagged sand dredging boat in the waters off the Taiwan-controlled Matsu Islands on January 28, 2021. (Photo: REUTERS / Ann Wang)
One reason is that domestic political stakes are high if the use of force is unsuccessful.
Victory is not yet a lost conclusion: having prepared for conflict with the mainland for decades, Taiwan has hardened its ability to defend itself. Taiwan’s will is strong. Polls show that 80 percent of Taiwanese are willing to defend the island by force.
In the context of the 20th Party Congress in 2022 in particular, Xi needs a stable domestic political environment to ensure the extension of his term as the CCP’s General Secretary.
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Risky policy toward a foray can jeopardize internal stability, provoke public discontent, and provoke reactions that could undermine your leadership.
OTHER OPTIONS REMAIN
There are still other options for reunification.
Some in China suggest that the possibility of peaceful reunification has not yet been completely lost, and that Taiwan may be cornered towards reunification through the so-called “Beiping model.”
This model is based on the CCP’s 1949 negotiations with the Kuomintang garrison to seize Beiping, now Beijing, without bloodshed, and it could be a profitable option to take the outer islands of Taiwan.
Anti-landing spikes on the Kinmen Islands of Taiwan, which are located just 3.2 km off the coast of mainland China. (Photo: AFP / Sam Yeh)
China faces the risk that, if it uses force, the United States could extend its full military support to Taiwan, in which case China would end up paying an unpredictable cost to achieve its goal.
China remains the weakest party in power dynamics, and while the economic gap between the two is large, the military, technological and financial gaps are even greater.
INCURRING INTO THE ANGER OF US
Although some in the United States waver on the issue of defending Taiwan, the country is unlikely to leave Taiwan; doing so would mean an embarrassing lapse in security commitments and an excruciating loss of international leadership.
Professor Graham Allison once said that the United States and China are more likely to wage nuclear war over Taiwan than anywhere else.
Even if it chooses not to send troops to Taiwan, the United States and its allies can isolate China economically, diplomatically, and militarily, just as China experienced from the 1950s to the 1970s.
Violation of the rules against aggression and coercion by force would make China an outcast of the international community and prevent it from achieving its modernization goals by mid-century.
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STATUS QUO A STRATEGIC CHOICE
Beijing also lacks a convenient excuse to use force.
Taiwan, much weaker in military terms, does not dare to declare independence and can only maintain the status quo.
Meanwhile, the legal provisions of the mainland are vague and can be interpreted flexibly.
Article 8 of the Anti-Secession Law stipulates that the mainland can take non-peaceful measures if Taiwan “secedes from China in any name or by any means, or if a major event occurs that will cause Taiwan to secede from China” if it is lost by I complete the possibility of a peaceful reunification ”.
China has increased pressure on Taiwan since the election of Tsai Ing-wen as president, as it does not recognize Beijing’s position that the island is part of ‘One China’ AFP / Sam Yeh
In addition to an explicit declaration of independence, it is unclear what actions it covers.
Does the United States’ diplomatic recognition of Taiwan count as a “major event”? And what are the criteria for the loss of chances of peaceful reunification? In this ambiguity, the continent has room for maneuver over when to launch an offensive.
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Given the constraints, reunification by force is still not an option for China, and Beijing has no choice but to bide the time.
Force could be considered an option only when China’s national power significantly exceeds that of the United States, the international community is limited in its collective motivation to back down, and there is greater certainty of physically winning the war and retaining the island.
In the meantime, the mainland will continue to use gray zone tactics, which are a better alternative to a military attack, and will look for ways to subdue the island without fighting.
And perhaps, at some future inflection point, Taiwan might consider accepting a Beiping-type model to avoid an imminent use of force by the mainland.
Cui Lei is a researcher at the China Institute of International Studies, This comment first appeared on the East Asia Forum. Read it here.
