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The hasty execution of the two is “the work of the FSN and the center of power in the Army.” On the other hand, without the execution of the Ceausescus, says Andrei Ursu, historian and researcher at the CNSAS, the war of distraction and the loss of human life would have continued.
The head of the Securitate, Iulian Vlad, needed this diversionary war because, should Ceausescu return to power, the general would secure his back. When asked whose job was the trial and execution of Ceausescu, Andrei Ursu states that “Ceausescu’s trial was the work of the FSN leadership and the army at that time, the key organizing factors being Victor Atanasie Stanculescu and Gelu Voican Voiculescu. But the connotation of the question, regarding the motivation of the process – so hastily, violating the code of criminal procedure and other legal norms, deserves a more complex answer. “
The war of rumors, media and psychological fun
The plan to take power from the revolutionaries involved making deviations, even if it meant human losses. Andrei Ursu affirms that “we must remember the atmosphere of those days (something forgotten by many” analysts “). The context of the process is dominated by fear of the FSN leadership, the army and the revolutionaries gathered in front of” objectives “/ key power centers, the terrorist attacks of those days and especially at night.
Practically the entire new leadership had entrenched itself in the Ministry of National Defense since the night of the 22nd, as a result of the CC shots, but also the news from the country. The rumors —many transmitted to and through television, but also by other means —direct telephones, radio— constituted the media / psychological deviation. According to the plan of the Securitate’s resistance struggle, this deviation was intended to amplify the effects of the military and electronic deviations. The three started on December 22, after the dictator fled (“to organize resistance” in Targoviste, according to testimonies).
He was shooting covertly, soldiers were shooting in the head
Many key military units (located on “escape routes”, especially CAAT – antiaircraft defense units) were subjected to harassment or “guerrilla” fire. It was fired sporadically, from different points, generally fire to fire, in disguise, especially at night. But it was shot accurately. There were not many casualties among the military, but many of them were hit in the head. It was not a conventional frontal attack to try to occupy the units. Nor would it have been possible. Obviously, the attackers were small. And they didn’t have tanks and other massive fire hydrants. But they had sophisticated equipment, with night observation devices, that the army did not have. The goal was obviously to create panic. What happened.
Radioelectronic drift with false targets on radar screens
In parallel, radio-electronic drift has created false targets on the radar screens of radiolocation units. Giving the impression of an imminent air attack, with superior forces. Very few of those targets materialized and it turned out that they were generally some kind of balloons (dummy targets).
But all this created a state of deep panic among the new leaders of the army. The dominant sentiment was the firing squad (or Milea-style “suicide”) in the case of Ceausescu and the Securitate returning to power.
Iulian Vlad and Stefan Gusa, played on both ends
Starting at age 22 at CC, Iulian Vlad (and other DSS directors, especially Ardelean), but also Gusa (a close friend of Vlad) played on both ends. The new leadership of the FSN and the Army sensed (and some knew) that Vlad & comp knew and even coordinated the resistance struggle. That is why, on the morning of the 23rd, they ordered him to go to the M.Ap.N. There, Brucan first, and then Militaru, became more and more suspicious. They confronted the captured terrorists (who were security guards, with identification). Consequently, gradually, on December 23 and 24, the new leadership removed Vlad and Gusa from the operational telephones of the Ministry of Defense.
Iulian Vlad needed fun in case Ceausescu returned to power
According to Andrei Ursu, the deviation was necessary because Iulian Vlad saw the “resistance struggle” as an advantage if Ceausescu returned to power. But the fight, once started, could not be easily stopped. That was one of the principles of the fight: the degree of independence, the dedication to the goal, the preparation for the Supreme Commander’s ‘supreme sacrifice’. (Vlad probably saw the resistance fight as an advantage to him, even if Ceausescu had not returned: it offered the possibility of his “indispensable”, of Vlad, but also the means for the Securitate units to remain, at least for a time, “in control “, in possession of secret deposits of arms and mountains, of archives, and other means of blackmail and threats).”
Militaru sends Ceausescu the dose of insulin, the dictator was diabetic
The Ceausescus were arrested at UM 01417 in Targoviste. The trial had to be held, it was the condition imposed by Iliescu, even if the decision had been taken to execute them. Andrei Ursu states that “Until then, Iliescu would have preferred a proper trial of Ceausescu. He said so. Brucan, Voican Voiculescu, Militaru and Stanculescu insisted that Ceausescu should be executed as soon as possible. Militaru (whom Iliescu had appointed as Defense Minister since who was 23 years old, due to his suspicion of Stanculescu) also would have wanted, initially, a somewhat legal trial of insulin in Targoviste (further proof that he did not want a murder) “.
As long as the Ceausescus are alive, the Securitate’s resistance fight will not end
But both the Militaru and Mazilu soon realized that as long as the dictator is alive, the resistance struggle and possible attacks from the commandos will not stop. Both Stanculescu and Voican Voiculescu had been informants of the Securitate, and Mazilu had been (it is true, for years on the trail) director of the Baneasa School of Security, it is very possible that they knew of the plan (Mazilu had just been released from the custody in Jilava; he was at the time a declared, formidable dissident, via UN reports on human rights violations by Ceausescu).
Read also https://ziare.com/social/revolutia-din-1989/unde-au-fost-tinuti-sotii-ceausescu-in-timpul-hestului-de-la-targoviste-1652631
Brucan and Militaru (who had been investigated by Vlad and Postelnicu, respectively, in the 1980s) probably intuited the plan of the resistance struggle, knowing quite well the psychology of the dictator. For everyone, the specter of being attacked by snipers still exists in those days. For Stanculescu, Hortopan, Voinea (the commander of the 1st Army and the chief of Kemenici, the commander of the Targoviste garrison), the alternative – in the case of Ceausescu’s restoration to power, as I said, was the firing squad ” .
Read also https://ziare.com/vlad-voiculescu/ministrul-sanatatii/ce-a-facut-vlad-voiculescu-in-mandatul-precedent-si-ce-proiecte-a-pastrat-1652534
Soldiers implicated in Ceausescus’s arrest feared counterintelligence agents
The atmosphere was hellish at UM 01417 Targoviste, the military feared that they were listening while they spoke on the phone, they communicated encrypted. Andrei Ursu describes the atmosphere of those days: “And the perception of the possibility of Ceausescu’s liberation by the Securitate forces / resistance fighters – she was pregnant, permanent in those days. All the soldiers directly involved (Stanculescu, Militaru, Voinea, Kemenici) were afraid to overhear while talking on the phone, they were talking in code about Ceausescu.
They feared the CI-ists (counterintelligence officers, from the 4th Directorate of the Securitate, who generally projected a power clearly superior to the commanders of the respective units), and the eventual command teams infiltrated in the M.Ap.N . and especially in the Targoviste unit where Kemenici had Ceusesti. But also in the MI and even in the army units in the area. The Kemenici unit (air defense), although defended by other forces, formidable, as in the M.Ap.N. – armored vehicles, tanks – was attacked night after night, like other units in the country. Like the M.Ap.N. Including 24-25 “night.
“The Soviet Mix”, Securitate propaganda
The fear of the FSN and the military leadership that Ceausescu would return to power was very great because it would have meant that “the respective hierarchy would not only have lost their power, but certainly also their life.” For this reason, they decided to make it a form process and run it as soon as possible.
Regarding the theory of the “Soviet mixture”, Andrei Ursu states that “I did not find any credible evidence in this regard. The idea of this mixture (from Ceausescu) was propagated by the Securitate, also as a self-apology (knowing this very well, like Ceausescu, the anti-Soviet sentiments, otherwise explainable and justified, of the Romanians) “.
FSN and the Army executed Ceausesti for fear of the Securitate
Andrei Ursu claims that he is working on the second volume of the book “Shooters and mystifiers, the security counterrevolution in December 1989”, together with Roland O. Thomasson, coordinated by Madalin Hodor. “We gathered even more extensive evidence. The conclusion is the same: the Ceausescus were tried and executed briefly, in violation of legal norms, because the new leadership of the FSN / Army feared: the possibility of returning the dictator to power (through an action commando / diversion / urban guerrilla warfare / infiltration of Securitate forces; including the possibility of being killed by snipers who act in that fight), and the fight itself, which generates casualties and panic among the population and The resistance fight is has dropped dramatically after the release of Ceausescu’s run movie. “
Read also https://ziare.com/social/revolutia-din-1989/25-decembrie-1989-procesul-ceausestilor-si-executarea-1652463
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