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Engineer Mihai Rotaru sent us for publication an exclusive document related to an exceptional achievement from Romania, but also about mistakes and errors that could cost Romania enormously. “Nobody realized that we missed a catastrophe of great proportions”, transmits Eng. Mihai Rotaru.
“Things that are not known about how the heavy water plant in Romania was built. The following text is interesting only if you read it carefully. It is, very briefly, about how the H2S turbochargers for the water plant were designed and built heavy equipment that is probably still subject to embargo today, as well as management errors at different levels, which could cost Romania enormously. No one realized that we went through a catastrophe of proportions “, writes Eng. Mihai Rotaru in the document sent to the editorial office of DC News.
We present you an extremely interesting extract of this material, and at the end of the article you will find, in PDF format, the complete document:
“In the autumn of 1988, when I remember that the Bucharest International Fair (TIB) was being held, a very serious event occurred in the heavy water factory, respectively, during operation, a piece of the rotating disc of the H2S turbocharger broke I, what was projected through the discharge pipe and was not found again, initially I did not realize the terrible situation that could have happened, because what worried me the most was understanding the cause that caused the break I measured the missing part of the rotor disk and calculated that it produced an imbalance equivalent to a rotational force of about 2500 kgf, an imbalance that at such nominal speed caused such a strong vibration that it could also have started the engine. base turbocharger.
Due to the emotion that the incident caused, neither the others nor I realized that my seal was resisting and nothing serious was happening. The camps also resisted. But this is nothing compared to other information that I did not react to then, namely that after the rotor broke, the turbocharger stopped only after 16 minutes from failure, according to the vibration diagram recorded in the control room, that is, in the control room. There was no one in charge of the factory, which was at the same time a giant bomb.
I believe that only in Romania can there be such irresponsibility (can something similar happen in the control room of a nuclear reactor in Cernavoda?). They told me that someone had heard noise from the facility and raised the alarm, probably left a meeting to go to the bathroom and, with the window open, heard the noise. I was lucky with the large size of the suction and discharge pipes that kept the turbocharger in the base and no catastrophe occurred. But if the seal designed by me had not been installed, then the grip would have completely melted the seal, and in 16 minutes the shaft would have broken, with unimaginable consequences, because in addition to the massive gas leak it could also occur. column explosion.
I think it would have been one of the greatest catastrophes in the history of Europe. I have not heard of the irresponsibility of those who allowed the turbocharger to run for 16 minutes in emergency mode. In any installation, in case of exceeding the dangerous values of certain parameters, the shutdown of a machine is automatic and is accompanied by the triggering of the audible alarm in the control room.
At the heavy water plant, some “irresponsible” people decided that no shutdown should be automatic, regardless of the measured parameter, even if the alarm came simultaneously from three different devices from the same control point, and the shutdown decision was made exclusively. manually by one of the control room operators. In the case of turbochargers, the sudden onset of strong vibration can result from a part breaking or a bearing melting, in which case every second delay from shutdown can have a devastating effect, and an operator present can take time. a few minutes to be convinced if the emergency signal is real. “
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