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THE decision of the Department of National Defense (DND) to unilaterally revoke the 1989 Agreement between the University of the Philippines (UP) and the DND has once again brought to light the notion of academic freedom, still evolving. Particularly in the Philippine context, academic freedom may have been defined by the courts, but only partially. In my opinion, the Philippine jurisprudence in this regard has not been fully enriched. This may be due to the fact that Philippine colleges and universities are not that aggressive or inflexible in fighting for things that should be very well within their territory.
The fact that many people, including those who are educated, wonder how revocation would affect academic freedom, demonstrates the underdeveloped and shallow collective consciousness of the importance of freedom for educational institutions. An example no less is the measure of the Commissioner of the Higher Education Commission (Ched), Prospero De Vera, to “define the meaning of academic freedom and the role of the security forces in the protection of academic freedom and well-being. of the students”. To accomplish this goal, De Vera plans to create a panel of education experts to arrive at the desired definition.
To what extent a definition of academic freedom will be useful, we do not know. As to whether the military will adopt such a definition, we don’t know either. DND Secretary Lorenzana has said that the Armed Forces of the Philippines will not place military personnel on campus and it is in no way part of their plan to restrict academic freedom. Things like this are always easier to say, but in reality, we should expect greater chances of misunderstandings and conflicts that would arise from vagueness and overlapping principles.
In fact, we have more questions rather than answers at the moment. However, these are questions that need to be discussed and answered. First, what is the degree of tolerance of the military towards ideas or ideologies? Have we reached that area in our historical timeline where we have become less tolerant of perspectives or opinions that are critical of the state? Marxism, for example, is a subject that cannot be avoided in history, sociology, philosophy, and even comparative literature. But are academics and state forces of the same understanding when it comes to things like this?
Social criticism doesn’t just come from the left. In fact, there cannot be a lack of sustained interrogation of our socio-economic realities. Let it be clear that not only the left has been critical of the government. Churches, non-governmental organizations, academia and even members of the health sector are or could be critical of our problems: poverty, unemployment, agrarian reform, and labor violations by companies.
Social criticism exists because problems exist. These problems cannot but be subject to research by academics at universities. What use are academics, especially those of Humanities and Social Sciences, for if they do not investigate (and more so if they cannot say anything about) these problems? So again the question: to what extent will the forces of the State and the agents of peace and order tolerate those who wish to critically investigate socio-economic and political issues and concerns? What assurance is there that academics will receive the highest degree of protection and, therefore, the enjoyment of academic freedom?
History reminds us that a great contribution to the evolution of academic freedom was the experience of scientists who had to defend their right to conduct scientific research without the interference of major social institutions, especially the Church. Apparently this belongs more to the past. But in a similar way, we can ask those of Social Sciences and Philosophy – To what extent can teachers and professors in this field be allowed to write and teach ideas, even those that may not be aligned with the dominant discourse that is favorable to the State?
I’m not sure if Commissioner De Vera’s plan is and will be helpful. This skepticism stems from the conviction that academic freedom can only be such in the context of less bureaucratic interference. Confidence in the responsibility of the university or academia to dispose of its role in society, as a partner responsible for social transformation, is key to this.
I hope that Ched’s move is toward the end of protecting academic freedom rather than limiting it. There may be that noble intention of clarifying academic freedom by providing it with a more improved or evolved definition. But sometimes, and by its very meaning, a definition is more of a “limitation” than an “expansion” of our horizon of life.
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