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Rare earth elements are in high demand from manufacturers of electric vehicles, cell phones and solar panels, but with one country responsible for the majority of material exports, there are suggestions that New Zealand and others should come together to secure their own. supply.
ANALYSIS: More than 10,000 miles from New Zealand in a straight line, Greenland, understandably, features little in foreign policy discussions on our shores.
But it is the abundant rare earth minerals and metals on the world’s largest island that have prompted calls for New Zealand, along with the other members of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance, to pay greater attention to the autonomous territory and its geostrategic importance. .
A report released this month by the London-based Polar Research and Policy Initiative think tank has proposed the creation of a ‘Five-Eyes Critical Minerals Alliance’, largely due to concerns about Chinese dominance within of the sector.
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It may seem like a dark topic, but there are very tangible fears that prompt the argument for further attention.
Rare earth elements such as cerium and lanthanum have become increasingly important as countries turn to low-emission technologies, given their use in components for electric vehicles, solar panels and wind turbines, as well as in items of daily use such as mobile phones and computers.
AP
Workers use machinery to dig in a rare earth mine in Ganxian County, central China.
Despite their widespread and fast-growing use, minerals are overwhelmingly produced and exported in one country.
China was responsible for more than half of the world’s rare earth element production in 2020, according to the United States Geological Survey, while it was the source of about 80 percent of imports to the United States between 2016 and 2019.
That reliance on a single source of rare earths has caused concern over a lack of diversification within supply chains, a concern exacerbated by the great-power rivalry between China and the US and the associated trade war.
Last month, the Financial times (FOOT) reported claims that China was exploring whether it could harm US defense contractors by limiting the export of rare earth minerals used in the production of F-35 fighter jets and other sophisticated weapons.
The article followed the Chinese government’s decision to initiate consultations on new and stricter regulations on the extraction and export of minerals within the country.
An item owned by the CCP Global times last month responding to the FOOT The report dismissed claims that China’s rare earth exports to the US had been restricted, while warning that such a move could be taken in the future against “foreign companies that harm China’s interests.”
The country has taken similar steps in the past: in 2010, it was accused of effectively banning rare earth exports to Japan following a territorial dispute between the two nations (whether such a ban took place is somewhat disputed, while the then Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao said at the time that “China does not and will not use rare earths as a negotiating tool in international trade”).
At the time, the dispute prompted several countries to begin exploring alternative sources of rare earths, and similar work is now underway.
Shortly before last year’s presidential election, then-United States President Donald Trump issued an executive order aimed at boosting mining and materials processing, while Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison last week launched an 10-year plan to increase production within the country, had the second highest level of exports behind China in 2020.
But the Polar Research and Policy Institute report has encouraged countries to think further, saying: “The relative abundance of several critical minerals, including rare earth elements, in Greenland offers the United States and its allies the opportunity to reduce its dependence on China. for the essential resources for its defense and security, renewable energies and the needs of the high technology sector and, therefore, to improve the security of its resources and strategic competitiveness ”.
According to the report, 27 of the 41 companies with licenses to mine, explore and prospect for minerals in Greenland “are based in, or substantially related to, the UK, Canada and Australia.”
Debates on ‘decoupling’
While noting that New Zealand “does not appear to have been as active … in critical mineral projects in the broader North,” he says that the “outward-oriented mining sector and growing technical expertise in critical mineral research” they would make him an important partner in the Five Eyes mineral alliance.
The government here has paid some attention to the issue of rare earths and other critical minerals and their value to New Zealand.
In 2018, the Minister of Energy and Resources, Megan Woods, said that a GNS Science study showing the potential to extract lithium, rare earth elements (REE) and nickel-cobalt deposits in New Zealand “represent[ed] a real economic opportunity for New Zealand ”.
In a 10-year strategy document published in 2019, the government also pledged to produce a list of critical minerals for the country. A government spokeswoman told Newsroom that the list was “in its conceptual stages” and would provide a better understanding of domestic needs, while a number of organizations were investigating how minerals or elements could be mined or processed into a usable form and integrated. in new technology.
There seems to be little enthusiasm for the idea of a foray into Greenland, or an expansion of Five Eyes to cover the minerals: a spokesperson for Foreign Minister Nanaia Mahuta referred Newsroom to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, which in a A brief statement said “was not aware of any multilateral initiative in response to the issues raised.”
Given New Zealand’s apparent reluctance to expand the reach of Five Eyes beyond an intelligence-sharing relationship to a broader geopolitical alliance, it is no wonder there is no overt enthusiasm for the concept.
However, the idea is not entirely new: in July, the guardian they reported that center-right politicians in the UK and Australia were interested in “pooling” key strategic reserves as critical minerals to reduce dependence on China.
Given broader concerns about supply chain diversification and a push to “disengage” from some critics of Beijing, this is unlikely to be the last time New Zealand hears of the concept.
