The conversation: what Australia can learn from New Zealand

OPINION:

The recurring metaphor of New Zealand as an “experiment” or “social laboratory” might date back to the 1890s, but it continues to resonate in the 21st century.

Australian political journalist Laura Tingle has revived the venerable idea in the latest edition of the Quarterly Essay, The High Road: What Australia can learn from New Zealand.

His comparative historical narrative reveals strange parallels between the two countries – and significant divergences – with special attention to the recent history of neoliberal reforms, beginning in the 1980s, and then through the post-global financial crisis and the Covid eras. 19.

Time and perspective make a difference, of course.

In the 1990s, for example, when New Zealand was the global model for neoliberalism, Australian business lobbies might have asked: why don’t we embrace the New Zealand model? Today, the Australian left may look longingly at Tasmania and ask a similar question, for radically different reasons.

What Australians believe they can learn from New Zealand, then, depends on the interests and values ​​they defend, and the twist they put in recounting the stories of both countries.

Good and bad lessons

Although long, Tingle’s essay could hardly do justice to the length of the story it covers. It’s a commendable effort anyway, with just a few inaccuracies. For example, write “there was no official British administrative presence in New Zealand […] until 1839 “, with a view to the arrival of James Busby in 1833 as the first British resident.

But overall, Tingle’s trans-Tasmanian comparative political economy hits the mark.

She argues: “[T]The scope and speed of change in New Zealand. [in the late 1980s and early 1990s], and the chaos it caused, would be impossible to defend from an Australian perspective. “

And indeed, the “sea change in New Zealand’s industrial relations [from 1991] it has provided no panacea “for its persistently low productivity levels, nor for the widening income gap with Australia.

In contrast, New Zealand’s Treaty of Waitangi (1840) recognizes indigenous rights and provides constitutional support for reconciliation and reparations. Its relevance has only grown, putting New Zealand well ahead of Australia in this regard, although there is still much work to be done.

Growing apart

In the early 1900s, New Zealanders politely declined to join Australians in federation. The invitation remains open, in principle, but it is unlikely that it will ever be accepted. Neither party has an interest in completing that work.

As both countries matured after the world wars, they tended to ignore each other, looking more at the UK, Europe and the US as leaders and exemplars. This despite the CER agreement of Closer Economic Relations (1983) and the many parallels in their political histories that Tingle points out.

Unfortunately, the two countries have grown apart. The post-1984 nuclear-weapon-free policy led to New Zealand being expelled from the ANZUS Treaty. Then, when immigration and security became serious issues, then Australian Prime Minister John Howard unilaterally withdrew the social rights (once reciprocal) of Kiwis in Australia (an event Tingle fails to mention).

There was an accusation that the New Zealanders were beating up the Australians in terms of income and regional defense. Today Australia is promptly deporting its unwanted kiwis, which Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern deliberately described as “corrosive to our relationship”.

Trust in the government

Given that diplomatic corrosion, Australia probably won’t learn much from New Zealand. However, the shared trauma of a global pandemic could bring the two countries closer together again, especially once travel restrictions are eased.

Many Australians view political behavior in New Zealand as more civilized and mature. Ardern certainly refines that reputation, despite skepticism at home about the actual performance of his government.

Tingle correctly points out that New Zealand’s proportional representation electoral system encourages competition for that theoretical median voter. Hence there is convergence between the main political parties, rather than polarization. New Zealand politicians never know when they may need the support of their opponents.

Perhaps related to this, international comparative data indicates that “people’s dissatisfaction with democracy” has grown alarmingly in Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, but not in New Zealand.

Keep the dialogue open

Being a small unitary state with a unicameral legislature, change is institutionally easier and faster in Wellington than in Canberra. Because of this, New Zealand occasionally does something that makes Australians stop and think.

For example, Australia once came close to adopting New Zealand’s universal no-fault accident compensation model. That failed with the removal of the Whitlam government. But Australia’s federal constitution would have complicated implementation.

Whether New Zealand is an example worth following depends on your political judgment. But Tingle’s essay is an important contribution to the maturing of the Tasman dialogue that looks far beyond ANZAC jingoism and sporting rivalries.

Still, both countries are divided on how to understand their own stories, much less learn each other’s. And there will always be discussion about whether Australia could learn something from New Zealand and why, or vice versa.

Tingle suggests paying more attention to New Zealand, in the sense that it is still an experiment or a laboratory, and that seems to be it.

However, if the Australian government were to reconsider its “corrosive” approach to the relationship, we could start to see a more constructive exchange of ideas in both directions.

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This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.