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CANBERRA: Abe’s abrupt resignation on Friday as Japan’s prime minister came as a surprise to many, but not entirely unexpected given his health problems and the precedent he set in 2007 with an equally sudden resignation for health reasons.
Other considerations behind your decision are also important. Most obvious was his unprecedented loss of popularity as prime minister in recent months.
Despite strong support rates for more than seven years, Abe presided over a steady decline in support for his cabinet as 2020 progressed. The January cherry blossom scandal, which saw the use of public resources to his private political advantage marked an unfavorable start to the year.
Then the coronavirus appeared. A Jiji Press opinion poll in August recorded an approval rating of just 32.7 percent, close to the “red zone” of less than 30 percent, reached only once before during his prime ministers.
Many commentators attributed the trend to public misjudgment of the prime minister’s pandemic leadership, and it is clear that this was a major factor undermining his popular support.
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Missing in action amid pandemic
What was unprecedented was the unusually callous way in which Abe reacted to the slide.
The particular decisions Abe made to deal with the pandemic were criticized, such as those reflecting his ill-conceived judgment on where to find the balance between shutting down to slow the spread of the virus and opening up to boost the economy.
Prefectural governors such as Yuriko Koike of Tokyo and Hirofumi Yoshimura of Osaka were praised for their clear articulation of the COVID-19 threat and their role in pressuring the absent-minded Abe administration to declare a state of emergency.
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Low levels of COVID-19 testing, confusion and slowness around stimulus payments, and delayed deployment of shoddy face masks, derided as “Abenomasks,” indicated a government with weak control over stuff.
Another major factor at play was the nature of Abe’s leadership at this crucial time. Abe was increasingly seen as “missing in action.” Headlines on August 5, for example, asked: “COVID-19 cases are increasing in Japan. Where is Shinzo Abe?
Visitors wearing protective masks are seen at the Yasukuni Shrine for the war dead, ahead of the anniversary of Japan’s surrender in World War II, amid the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, in Tokyo, Japan, August 14, 2020. REUTERS / Issei Kato
Abe’s reluctance to hold official press conferences and convene a special Diet session to discuss the government’s responses to the pandemic was also noted.
It seemed as if Abe was deliberately trying to avoid personal responsibility as prime minister on an issue critical to the nation while largely handing things over to relevant ministers, such as Yasutoshi Nishimura, the Minister of State for Economic and Fiscal Policy, who was in charge of the government’s response to the coronavirus and who held an extraordinary number of press conferences to provide information to the public.
Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga also played a prominent role as de facto prime minister, with Abe openly calling him a “lame duck” – inconceivable a year ago – developments that were not helped by rumors that he was in poor health.
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HEAVY PERFORMANCE AS PM
Far from fighting to amend new and sought-after government initiatives, Abe’s performance as prime minister remained lackluster and unengaged.
The prime minister’s decision to resign suggests that helping his nation beat the coronavirus was not a very high policy issue for Abe. Rather, it was an unwanted, energy-consuming, and all-consuming distraction and an obstacle to achieving his historic mission as prime minister.
The long-standing political goals that were part of Abe’s nationalist agenda slipped from his grasp more and more steadily and elusively: most importantly, the revision of the “peace clause” in Article 9 of the Constitution to explicitly legitimize the existence of the Japan Self-Defense Forces, restoring Japanese Sovereignty over the Russian-controlled Northern Territories and ensuring the return of the Japanese hostages from North Korea.
Even its signature Abenomics program was being thwarted by COVID-19 and the government faced tough decisions to deal with the economic consequences of the virus.
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FILE PHOTO: A man wearing a protective face mask, following the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) outbreak, walks past a stock listing board outside a brokerage in Tokyo, Japan, on May 18, 2020. REUTERS / Kim Kyung-Hoon
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These considerations, in addition to his health, were clearly crucial in explaining Abe’s lack of political response and his increasingly weak performance as prime minister. They all influenced his decision to resign. Dealing with the coronavirus created a clear disjunction between the strong political demands placed on Abe and his own personal political ambitions and goals.
Factors beyond Abe’s control – COVID-19 combined with his personal health issues and a singularly unfavorable political outlook for the year ahead – made it extremely unlikely that Abe would be able to achieve his long-cherished goals even if he remained in office until official end of his term in September 2021.
Now, after seven years and eight months, the longest career of any Japanese prime minister in the history of the Diet, his immediate successor is guaranteed the position for just one year. This throws an element of uncertainty into what was a long period of Japanese political stability.
The tide of history had turned against Abe; His time was up and he became prime minister without a cause he could fulfill.
Aurelia George Mulgan is a Professor in the College of Humanities and Social Sciences at the University of New South Wales, Canberra. This comment first appeared on the East Asia Forum.
