Comment: Can Myanmar’s civil disobedience movement reverse the coup?

CANBERRA: Since Myanmar’s coup on February 1, Tatmadaw Commander-in-Chief General Min Aung Hlaing has been working to remake the country’s political landscape by eliminating the National League for Democracy (NLD), detaining its leaders and installing a military junta.

But the success of the coup is not guaranteed, given the junta’s lack of control over parts of the state apparatus, the population and the spiraling economy.

The civil disobedience movement is spreading through key ministries. The staff of the Central Bank of Myanmar and commercial banks are on strike, and limitations on withdrawals indicate an impending liquidity crisis.

Foreign trade is frozen and exports are reduced by 90 percent. Medical professionals are on strike, and two-thirds of the country’s hospitals fail to function properly during a pandemic. Some policemen have joined the protests, refusing to do the dirty work of the military.

READ: Comment: Myanmar Learned the Wrong Lessons from Indonesia’s Political Transition

A wave of protests has swept across the country, and Myanmar’s tech-savvy youngsters have proven to be a creative mobilizing force that the old guard had not faced before.

While Min Aung Hlaing wears bulletproof vests on rare exits and uses state media to criticize the civil disobedience movement and protesters, the junta’s own propaganda machine suggests that the resistance is having an impact.

Can the military maintain internal cohesion in the face of a nation and multiple crises? Based on the results of the 2020 elections, there may even be indications of support for the NLD within the military.

WHAT ARE THE SCENARIOS?

A number of possible scenarios are emerging with different facilitating factors, notably the sheer determination of the Myanmar people for democracy.

One scenario is the return to absolute military rule. The junta would use crisis, violence, and coercion to eliminate any semblance of social order, and then present a false dichotomy to the population: anarchy or dictatorship.

A delay in holding elections for several years would be justified on the pretext of restoring stability.

A second scenario follows the path outlined by Min Aung Hlaing: holding elections within a year and reinstalling a semi-elected parliament.

The military has probably already realized that the political system they designed under the Constitution does not guarantee their political victory.

The army-backed Union Solidarity Development Party (USDP) has failed to secure enough seats to outnumber the NLD, even with the advantage that a quarter of parliamentary seats are allocated to the military.

The board may attempt to redesign the electoral system from first in office to proportional representation, framing this as an opportunity for ethnic and other political parties to win more seats in a new election.

Then a false election could take place with the NLD removed from the electoral map.

While ASEAN countries initially seemed tempted this way, it does not provide a way to reduce resistance.

READ: Comment: Is China Using Myanmar’s Coup To Increase Its Influence In Southeast Asia?

A rigged armed election would not transfer the electoral legitimacy that voters gave to elected officials in 2020, some of whom have formed the Committee Representing the Union Parliament in opposition to the junta.

STAY A LOT A LOT?

In another, third scenario, the coup does not clearly fail or succeed, creating a protracted crisis.

For more than 70 years, the Myanmar military has failed to win a series of asymmetric internal armed conflicts. The battle for state control would become another front line of protracted crises in which the use of state violence generates more resistance and new support for the civil disobedience movement.

READ: Comment: Defiance in Myanmar’s Diplomatic Ranks Threatens Military Power

A protracted crisis could also materialize if there is a significant reorganization of power within the military that leads to unforeseen contests.

Possible deadlocks due to the failure of the military and civilian blocs to recognize each other for negotiations, as demanded by various ASEAN countries, could also prolong events.

In scenario four, the coup fails and there is a return to hybrid government under the 2008 constitution, with members of the NLD released and the results of the 2020 elections respected, as called for by the United Nations and much of the international community. .

For the coup to fail, the civil disobedience movement would need to maintain popular and financial support and continue to impact the junta’s control over the economy and administration.

This scenario hinges on support for Min Aung Hlaing’s leadership declining as multiple crises hit regular military families and businesses.

But scenario four is unlikely with Min Aung Hlaing in command of the military. It would also require Western countries to postpone normalization of relations with the junta, and for ASEAN countries to continue negotiating between the elected government bloc and the military, not just with military-appointed officials.

A NEW MYANMAR?

In a final scenario, fifth, the coup fails and the civilian government leads a new transition. Many protesters and groups are calling for a new political settlement by removing the military from political life and the military-drafted 2008 constitution.

Rather than exclusively supporting the NLD or Aung San Suu Kyi, many in Myanmar are marching for democratic federalism, a system that ethnic minorities have been fighting for since 1947.

For this scenario to take hold, a backlash within the armed forces may be necessary to generate a new leadership willing to work under civilian rule, a difficult task.

Elected officials would take office and an inclusive constitutional committee, including armed groups, civil society and ethnic political parties, could be established to draft a new constitution.

READ: Comment: With violent repressions, is Myanmar passing the point of no return?

While Nepal offers an example of federal transition after civil war and popular movement, this process is complex and fraught with challenges.

Ultimately, the people of Myanmar must choose their destiny and system of government to be legitimate. A prolonged return to a military government or illegitimate government will only perpetuate continued suffering and instability.

Nicola S Williams is a PhD Candidate at the Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University. This comment first appeared on the East Asia Forum. Read it here.