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In early April, a year after forces calling themselves the “Libyan National Army” led by Major General Khalifa Hifter, began their continued attack on Tripoli, forces allied with the internationally recognized “Government of the National Accord “seized six cities west of the capital and advanced toward” Al-Wattia Air Force Base, which is a major supply point for the Libyan National Army. Since then, the fighting has continued in the south from Tripoli and the surrounding areas of Tarhuna, which over the past year provided a large portion of local forces and support to the Libyan National Army.
The ground invasion resulted in part from the “National Accord Government” militia tactical victories against low-level Sudanese mercenaries fighting alongside the “Libyan National Army”, amid reports of reductions in the number of company contractors Private military who contracted with the “Russian Wagner Group” that overthrew with the forces of the “Government of the National Accord” between September and October.
However, it was the fundamental transformation in the air war that played the most important role in allowing the “Government of the National Accord” to achieve its greatest victory since the beginning of this year, through Turkish support that helped it regain a much of the neighborhood of the capital.
How Haftar and his supporters in the United Arab Emirates and other countries respond to his setbacks will determine the next stage of the civil war in Libya. It seems that the defeats suffered by General Haftar led him to call for a ceasefire on April 29 after he had rejected previous calls in March and the start of Ramadan; In parallel, Major General Haftar issued a general declaration on April 27 imposing the military regime on the entire country.
Meanwhile, Tripoli’s continued exposure to artillery fire, which has caused dozens of civilian casualties and destroyed vital infrastructure such as hospitals, indicates that the local fight may continue for some time, especially if the LNA rearms.
The initial air dominance of the “Libyan National Army”
When the current stage of the war broke out in April 2019, the “Accord Government” relied on “portable air defense systems” and small artillery to compete with its opponent for air control, and the parties to the conflict used their small groups of Soviet-era fighters with limited influence. However, the following month, the Libyan National Army managed to outperform its opponent by expanding its use of Emirates-managed systems after Haftar’s initial attempts to control Tripoli failed. The Libyan national army maintained this general air superiority until November.
The main fighter jet deployed by the UAE in Libya is a Chinese-designed “Wing Long 2”, which is similar in size and capacity to the US MQ-9 aircraft and provides clear intelligence and preference in attacks against the “National Army from Libya. ” See this phenomenon also when Emirati forces used this plane in Yemen.)
If the UAE decides to confront the Turkish presence in Libya, it may have to take costly steps to end any reasonable denial that still surrounds its unrecognized military role in Libya.
The “Winglong” planes proved particularly effective in targeting the group of small drones that Turkey provided to the “government of reconciliation” after Haftar launched his campaign last April. Emirati drones attacked the group’s land stations and airports, preventing them from providing the same capabilities to the “Government of the National Accord”.
The Libyan National Army also occasionally used manned aircraft that occasionally caused extensive damage. International investigations into the bombing operations that caused large numbers of casualties in civilian areas around Tripoli during July and November concluded that combat aircraft were responsible for these incidents, most likely Mirage 2000-9 aircraft originating in the UAE “Al-Khadim Air Base” east of Benghazi. .
In an effort to consolidate this air superiority, the UAE has also strengthened the LNA’s surface-to-air missile arsenal by adding several Panzer-S1 missiles to it. These ground-to-air missile systems have helped Haftar forces protect high-value targets from drones and some of the National Accord Government’s manned aircraft (despite suffering some losses, according to some reports).
Turkey is causing a decisive transformation
After reaching defense deals with Turkey last November, the National Accord Government quickly changed the equation in the air campaign. Thanks to the slowdown in fighting during the Berlin conference in January, the two military partners had the opportunity to create an aerial protection layer around the capital, by deploying various ground-to-air missile systems in and around the Mitiga Air Force Base.
The combination of American-made MIM-23 Hawk missile systems, short-range “Hissar” surface-to-air missiles and Korkut anti-aircraft guns have created a multi-layer protection system around the infrastructure. Vital and reducing threats to drones and launches of the “Al-Wefaq Government”. This protection, coupled with the increase in the number of Turkish operators and Turkish teams, allowed Libyan government forces to increase the number and effectiveness of their drone operations.
Turkey will have to significantly increase its military contributions to support any possible attacks by the “government of reconciliation” as it goes beyond northwest Libya.
The “Al-Wefaq government” mainly uses the Turkish “Tayyar Pilot” TB2, which is smaller and shorter-range than opponents of the “Libyan National Army”, but provides significant intelligence capabilities and allows targeted attacks.
Firstly, these aircraft are used for two tasks: first, to broaden awareness on the battlefield of the “government of reconciliation” by adopting recognition and blocking mechanisms against the supply lines of the “Libyan National Army” . Second, carry out targeted attacks. Turkey has used “Bayrakdar” aircraft with similar efficiency in Syria, where drones have been successful in a more traditional environment in which fixed-wing aircraft use various cannon and attack support weapons.
Ankara has also worked to protect “Mitiga Air Force Base” using the “Stuck” Coral system, which is said to be capable of exceeding Panzer missile radars and data link frequencies on Wing Long aircraft. This double interference ability could explain the increasing capacity of the drones for the “government of reconciliation” to resist and the recent interruptions in the operations of the Libyan national army with drones.
Continuous climbing or ceasefire?
Although Turkey has made a decisive impact in the fight for Tripoli, it will have to substantially increase its military contributions to support any possible attack by the “government of reconciliation” as it transcends north-western Libya. Similarly, if the UAE decides to confront the Turkish presence in the country and steal the benefits of the “government of reconciliation”, they may be forced to take costly steps to end any reasonable denial that still surrounds its unrecognized military role. in Libya. These dynamics indicate a commitment for both parties to return to the negotiations.
Turkish calculations will be based on the protective layer that helped establish around Tripoli, which can now only be expanded based on technical limitations and limited equipment. The general range of the “Bayrakdar” aircraft is only 150 miles, and requires a direct line, which means that any operation launched east of Sirte may require Ankara and the “government of reconciliation” to deploy front control stations or build towers. broadcasts, which will be subject to a counterattack by the Libyan national army.
Furthermore, the potential for interference and surface-to-air missiles in Tripoli is effective due to its class nature. Therefore, extending this broad coverage outside the capital may require the deployment of more surface-to-air missile systems at greater cost and risk.
The Al-Wefaq government also benefited from operating relatively short supply lines, a feature that may disappear in a broader attack that requires advanced logistics operations to provide fuel, weapons, parts and equipment. Turkey already supports massive operations in north-western Syria, so it may not be able to do the same in north-western Libya due to its largely scattered resources. In this context, a more realistic objective is to defeat the forces of the “Libyan National Army” outside the artillery range in Tripoli and accept the ceasefire under an internationally verifiable agreement at the time.
Given the limited options for Ankara and Abu Dhabi to escalate the situation at low cost, they may respond to renewed pressure on them to establish a permanent ceasefire line.
Similarly, the UAE can face many risks in any campaign it is launching to take the lead in the air. While Emirati forces are capable of carrying out “repressive missions of hostile air defense systems”, doing so in Libya probably means sending their F-16E / F fighters that have not yet participated in the fight. The move may lead to revenge attacks by Turkish air force units, which conducted exercises in mid-April that demonstrated their ability to show force across the eastern Mediterranean with F-16s and refueling capabilities.
It can also increase the risk of civilian casualties, exposing the UAE to a political response in the US Congress. USA Due to the use of American-made systems to achieve these ends. Exploiting any possible ceasefire agreement to rearm Haftar would expose the United Arab Emirates to further problems; According to flight trackers, more than 150 heavy shipments have been delivered to eastern Libya by air since January alone; and if this movement continues or increases in The Fight has stopped, it will be clearly evident.
Given the limited options for Ankara and Abu Dhabi to escalate the situation at low cost, they could respond to renewed pressure on them to establish a permanent ceasefire line, protecting civilians in and around Tripoli. Whether it is possible to revive the Berlin process or the military dialogue between the “Government of the National Accord” and the “Libyan National Army” or not, it is imperative that the permanently divided UN Security Council demonstrate greater unity for that the ceasefire agreement be successful; this includes, Agree on a new special representative and adopt a resolution that renews the powers of the “United Nations Support Mission in Libya” and its resources to oversee the line being negotiated.
In parallel, the United States should encourage all parties, especially the United Arab Emirates and Turkey, to accept any formalized line and provide the necessary intelligence resources to monitor and verify the compliance of each party and the external actors that support it with this obligation.
Source: Fikra Forum
The opinions expressed here are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US Department of Defense. USA Or the US Air Force. USA
