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Parallel to the growing calls by the US and Europe to expand the nuclear agreement with Tehran in 2015, so that it is a comprehensive agreement for all the issues before it, that is, the nuclear and missile programs and the regional policies, yesterday, Thursday, statements were issued by the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Raphael Grossi, in which he requested an agreement. New to Iran, believing that the measures taken by the latter over the past two years to reduce its nuclear promises cannot be quickly reversed.
While the Iranian government claims that it will return to these steps if the rest of the parties to the agreement fully comply with their obligations, Grossi said: “I cannot imagine that they will simply say, ‘We will return to the first frame” because “the first frame no longer exists. “, and added:” It is clear that we will necessarily need a protocol, agreement, understanding or accompanying document that clearly defines what we will do. ”
Commenting on these statements, Tehran confirmed, on Friday, its rejection of it, saying that “there is no need for any new document, agreement or understanding”, and rejecting the “force” to renegotiate the nuclear agreement.
The IAEA Director General’s statements raise urgent questions, first about the reasons for raising the question of the need for a “new agreement” with Iran at this time, and secondly about the purpose and nature of this new agreement. .
As for the timeliness of this issue, there is no doubt that it comes at a delicate moment, when the victory of the US Democratic candidate in support of the nuclear deal, Joe Biden, in the US elections, generated expectations that the next US administration will take a different tack than the losing president Donald Trump, the deal’s arch nemesis, took. Nuclear. Consequently, Grossi’s statements and a striking European escalation these days on Iranian nuclear measures reveal the difficulty of the next stage regarding the conflict with Iran, and that these expectations may not be adequate, because the legacy of Trump and its effects have established a difficult reality that cannot be easily circumvented, and that is very difficult. Going back to before January 2017, that is, before Trump took office, as Tehran demands it, that is, when all parties applied the nuclear deal on a “benefit for benefit” basis.
In addition to this reality derived from Trump’s policies, it is no secret that there is a tendency for the next American administration and the three European partner countries in the nuclear agreement, France, Great Britain and Germany, to reverse the Trump legacy to achieve what he failed, since the statements of these parties today are dominated by the need to expand the nuclear agreement. To include all issues raised with Iran, in a clear indication that the priority of Biden and the European parties in dealing with Iran during the next stage is not to revive the faltering nuclear deal with the content on which it was built, but rather reach a new comprehensive agreement.
While the US (Biden and his team) and European statements focus on presenting Iran’s missile program and its regional policies for discussion and negotiation in order to reach a comprehensive agreement, Grossi’s statements reveal that there is also an international and international tendency to renegotiate the Iranian nuclear program itself, to conclude with a new agreement on this program, as part. From that broad desired agreement.
This trend confirms two things, the first is that the nuclear agreement concluded in 2015 has ended and that nothing remains of it but a title and a name, and it is no longer valid even to deal with the Iranian nuclear file.
Regarding the second issue, the intention of the International Atomic Energy Agency of the new agreement on Iran’s nuclear program is an agreement that, in the first place, revives the restrictions imposed on Iran that ended according to the planned schedule, such as the embargo of weapons that ended according to Resolution 2231 on October 18, and secondly, it extends the deadlines for other restrictions. Third, it imposes other restrictions that prevent Iran from technically resuming its nuclear activities and nuclear research and development operations, especially in the field of centrifuges with ease, and fourthly, the agreement has to determine the destination of the quantity of Enriched uranium produced by Tehran after lifting restrictions on its production. The latest report from the International Atomic Energy Agency, released last month, indicated that Iran has increased its uranium production and reserves 12 times the limit allowed in the agreement.
On the other hand, Iran refuses to negotiate again on the nuclear deal, either on its expansion, including missiles and regional issues, or on its nuclear program again, and appears to be moving towards another approach in the face of these increasing pressures from the International Agency and the European parties, through What could be considered a “nuclear strategy” change.
This Iranian trend is evident in the bill, which was approved by the Iranian parliament earlier this month, titled “The Strategic Measure to Abolish US Sanctions.” The bill, which has become law, explicitly signifies the withdrawal of the nuclear deal, as it forces the Iranian government to implement it after two months, and stipulates nuclear measures that end this deal, such as forcing the government to finish the job. in accordance with the additional UN protocol in which Tehran “voluntarily” promised to subjugate its facilities. For “strict control” by the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as to increase the enrichment rate of uranium to 20 percent or more “if necessary”.
The two-month deadline given by the Iranian parliament to the rest of the parties to the nuclear agreement to implement their promises and lift sanctions means that this law is an Iranian pressure card on these parties to force them to comply with the demand to abolish historic sanctions. and comprehensive before heading towards “no return” in its nuclear program.
In addition, this Iranian trend and escalation practiced by the three European countries and the International Atomic Energy Agency are strong indicators that the conflict with Tehran is heading down a path that may be more difficult than it was in the time of US President Donald Trump in recent years.
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