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Therefore, the calm and accurate reading of the interview with the newspaper “Israel Hayom” shows that Baram really wanted to remain without the roof of the language that we were witnessing in recent years about the destruction of Lebanon and his return for decades. This is clearly due to the desire of Israeli leaders not to provoke Hezbollah, realizing that this will lead to similar messages along with the availability of the will and ability to implement it.
However, in order to maintain balance, Baram also tried to reinforce the image of Israeli deterrence, brandishing a response that could lead to “days of fighting” rather than war. And when the interlocutor specified a scenario to attack Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, he replied that this would happen under certain circumstances! By the way, he did not show arrogance when talking about this matter, unlike what military commanders often do, but instead stayed within the roof of avoiding provocation and challenge. Therefore, in response to the question ‘Should (Sayyed Nasrallah) be a target of liquidation? His response was: “Yes, under certain circumstances” and “Currently this is not appropriate, but things may change.”
However, far from entering into a discussion about this option and the scope of the ability to implement it, it is also striking that Baram established the same restrictions in response to another question from the interlocutor about the scenario of attacking Hezbollah’s “strategic capabilities”. that the Israeli leadership places as its top priority. He considered that Hizbullah must understand that “there is a price for dead Israeli soldiers and that this is slippery”, indicating that this path may roll towards a scenario that leads to this objective. Therefore, it is clear that with regard to sensitive joints, Baram was eager to link them with swaying and sliding, that is, with the outbreak of war, which he also announced in the interview, that Israel and Hezbollah do not want it. .
The commander of the northern region does not leave an opportunity but tries to limit the growing image of Hezbollah in the consciousness of his soldiers, in order to preserve their morale. On previous occasions, his threatening language was louder than mentioned in the interview with “Israel Hayom”. However, this same military commander acknowledged that Hezbollah’s determination to respond – to the assassination of the fighter, Ali Mohsen, in a raid near the Damascus International Airport – is not the result of events that recently took shape, but dates back to six years ago, when the Secretary General of Hezbollah announced: “Equations” And he showed it, that in response to the murder of any member of Hezbollah in Lebanon or Syria, the resistance will respond by killing an Israeli soldier, which it carried out in more than one stage, starting with the response to the Quneitra attack in January 2015, up to the “Avivim” operation in September 2019.
In the same context, Baram also specified that the goal of Hezbollah’s anticipated response is to maintain the deterrence equation with Israel. In the text, the commander of the northern region made it clear that Hezbollah “does not want to exaggerate, preserve the rules of the game and ensure that its men are not killed.” Thus, it implicitly recognized that the dimensions of this response are directly related to the preservation of the equation that protects Lebanon and the resistance.
The most important thing about this description provided by the commander of the northern region is that it also revealed an Israeli awareness of the concept that is present in the mind of the decision maker in Hezbollah, and represents a fundamental factor in their determination to respond, which will not allow let the deterrence equation vibrate because it will contribute to feeding the illusions and bets of the two security institutions. And politician in Tel Aviv.
Although the threat of war is theoretically supposed to contribute to strengthening Israel’s deterrence image and raising the level of fear of the repercussions of Hezbollah’s response, it was noted that the northern region commander explicitly and directly stated: “Until now, I believe that both parties are rational and that both do not want war. And I say in the heads of the martyrs, we don’t want a war. “It is not wise to get there, and the wisest thing to do is avoid it, and (Hezbollah) doesn’t want to either.”
Baram’s position summarizes many explanations and inferences because it directly indicates to what extent Hezbollah’s will and capabilities profoundly affect the consciousness of top Israeli leaders. And it reveals a “state” the size of “Israel”, not only about waging war against Lebanon and the resistance, but also about hinting at this station. This is considered exceptional at the moment, not only in terms of the huge gap in strategic advantages between the two countries, but also in light of what Lebanon faces domestically. Here, a completely different reality is evident from the one promoted, that the more the elements of strategic strength are weakened, the greater the need for specific military capabilities that try to close the gap with the enemies that lurk, to prevent – or limit – exploitation of the enemies of Lebanon.
In light of this concept, which Baram drew up, the background for the explanations he gave about the reluctance of the enemy army, according to the Israeli version, to kill a group of Hezbollah members in Shebaa, becomes clearer. He specified that the “dilemma” of targeting the group “occupied the political and security leadership for hours.” This means that this matter was the subject of evaluations and interactions and presented scenarios that finally concluded, as expressed literally in their language, to “the assessment that if (the group) was liquidated, Hezbollah will have to respond vigorously, including the launch of rockets in Galilee and the Golan, which was “could deteriorate rapidly in days of combat, and perhaps even in war.”
Hezbollah established itself in the leadership of the enemy aware that the internal situation in Lebanon would not deter resistance from a tough response.
Thus, Baram explicitly reveals that Hezbollah has succeeded in establishing the awareness of senior Israeli leaders that developments in the internal situation in Lebanon will not deter resistance from a tough response, leading to an ongoing response that includes, in Baram’s expression, “Galilee and the Golan.”
It is also observed that the commander of the northern region distinguishes between facing “days of combat” and war. This must be present when addressing the prospects of any existing situation. But the bigger question is what prompts Israeli military leaders to threaten to go to “combat days” instead of war? Any roof that separates the two stages? What are the restrictions that are present with the two parties and that push each of them to strive to avoid war? And what role does understanding these limitations play in understanding the strategic equations between Hezbollah and the enemy? What messages do these restrictions indicate to anticipate the horizons of this open conflict at the regional level?
As a result of these restrictions imposed by Hezbollah on the political and security decision-making institutions in Tel Aviv, the enemy army leadership is forced to choose between narrow and specific options, on the basis of the least damaging to the image of the Israeli army and national security. On the one hand, his reluctance to attack the Hezbollah group at the time, according to the Israeli narrative, drew criticism within the military, public opinion, and political and media institutions, as this clearly demonstrated the deterrent power of Hezbollah and the army’s acquiescence to that. On the other hand, the occupation army leadership realizes that if it initiates the assassination of the Hezbollah group, the decision makers in Tel Aviv will receive additional and harsh criticism as a result of the confrontation that will take place. In Baram’s expression, “On the fifth day of a war that could break out as a result of an accident, everyone will come to me, including everyone who is now criticizing me for not killing this cell, and they will ask me who it was that had the protective head and they worked hard, not with their brains. “
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