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The fact that the French Foreign Ministry has denied US information about Hezbollah’s stockpiling of explosives in several European countries, including France, confirms the continued courtship of the French with Iran and its party in Lebanon. This confirms once again that Paris will not abandon its initiative.
Bury the french game
The initiative can change and be modified, as has happened more than once in which conditions have changed and changed. But Paris cannot shake hands with the current Lebanese crisis. It will not be easy for French President Emmanuel Macron to sacrifice a prime minister appointed at his request and seek another figure. However, the high ceiling raised by Hezbollah put the French initiative in front of three options: either write in its terms, or prolong the mandate or the apology of Mustafa Adib.
All three possibilities affect the French initiative at its core. Accepting the conditions of the Shiite duo in front of him is a major obstacle, which is the personality of the prime minister, who was not elected on the basis of partisan forces that elect their ministers and interfere in the government formation process. If Adeeb apologized and the negotiations returned to the search for a new prime minister, the negotiations with him would start from what the Shiite duo imposed. The basis will be to change the “profile” of this president.
In all cases, French entrepreneurship was buried. The Shiite insistence on the Ministry of Finance signifies, unequivocally, the dedication of the Triangle and the third signature. And when Hezbollah resorts to that option, it is preparing and preparing for what is to come in the future, and it must be strengthened politically and constitutionally.
The Shiite Consensus Solidifies
On tightening the rotation principle, the Shiite duo responded that they wanted a rotation in government from the Banque du Liban, the army leadership and even the presidencies. This simulates what was proposed by the excellent Jaafari Mufti Ahmed Qabalan weeks ago, and reaffirmed it a few days ago, highlighting the need for any future Lebanese dialogue to include changes to the Lebanese balance of power.
As for President Berri’s proposal for a civil state, the implication is to enshrine these new rules, relying on the Shiite popular power, built military, organizational and elective. That is, the Shiite sect overwhelmingly outperforms, with its compact consensus, the other sectarian components in Lebanon, while the divisions between Sunnis and Christians are rampant.
Dialogues on a “New Lebanon”?
If Adeeb apologizes, Lebanon will enter a new unknown, until the results of the US presidential elections appear. In the coming months of waiting, time will pass with successive meetings and dialogue sessions between Lebanese forces, in the style of the 2007 Saint Cloud Conference.
Many visions about the “new Lebanon” are raised in these dialogues. There are many works produced by various parties, especially some Christian forces, who consider that the failure of the French initiative to form a government exhausts the confidence to bring Lebanon out of the impasse and completely overthrows the Lebanese system. Therefore, it is necessary to find an alternative system and a new formula. Until now, Christians have called this formula “expanded fiscal and administrative decentralization.” This proposal establishes a new founding conference. Research in it began to produce many theories about the need for partition, or foreign patronage for each sect and class, with the formation of self-governing regions on federal grounds.
Waiting for a new balance of power
All of this proves the failure of the Lebanese in building a citizenship state, following the example of the decline of the experience of the national state in the neighboring region, towards the project of establishing sectarian and sectarian islands. This will not be far from the contexts that motivated the deal of the century.
Until now, this formula, its type and shape cannot be determined. The balance of power is still unclear in the region. This means that the conflicts will drag on in time, waiting for the battle to anchor with clear political results, according to which the balance of power is determined. It will not begin to take shape before the results of the American elections and what follows in the line of the relationship between the United States and Iran.
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