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Three years ago, the impact of the “sibling rivalry” was evident in the relationship between Amman and Doha and the decline in diplomatic representation between them at the time, in parallel with the continued criticism of the monarchy in the mainstream media. Qatar, and what followed when “Al-Jazeera” offices in the Kingdom were closed. Following the change of faces since the Abdullah era, be it in Saudi Arabia and the leaders of Qatar, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, direct financial support has waned, plus Jordan has not invested the generous rewards of the Gulf to establish real development projects, save for the great state of corruption within. Hence, the Gulf’s interest in direct supervision of foreign exchange issues is understood, in addition to keeping the Jordanian economy in a constant state of tension, which facilitates the conclusion of agreements in exchange for conditional support. This was evident in the grueling pressures on Amman in 2018, before the announcement of the “Deal of the Century” last year.
The change in support methodology had a significant impact on the Jordanian budget, especially with the burden of Syrian refugees and the disagreement of supporters with their promises in this regard, although Amman received a large number of refugees in a political context that soon he found himself defenseless against his humanitarian rights. In the context of the Gulf support in the Syria file, the Cooperation Council countries used to communicate directly with the refugees without the mediation of the host country. In fact, some grants did not support the state treasury, and it was noted that Riyadh, Kuwait and Abu Dhabi transferred their pledges worth $ 1.25 billion each, while Doha was absent from this commitment.
The change in the Gulf support methodology had a major impact on Jordan’s budget
All that is past. And now, after the Gulf normalization premonitions with Tel Aviv caused Amman to reestablish its regional accounts and limit it to a narrow room for maneuver, the Saudi-Bahraini opening came as a gesture by Faraj, after a year of Jordan’s decision to open up to Qataris and elevate diplomatic representation to what is “extraordinary.” Jordan’s regime believes that having a regionally inclusive issue is a priority for the White House, allowing it to emerge as a major player in the region, especially in light of Jordan’s rapprochement with the Democratic Party. Therefore, the focus is on Iranian hostility. On the one hand, it joins forces, reduces differences and increases the material and moral gains of those who join its banner. On the other hand, it allows Amman to evade the consequences of its insistence on the two-state solution, and perhaps the Gulf, from the Jordanian point of view, can find a suitable solution to the “Trump deal” that Amman sees. Detrimental to what would be acceptable to the Jordanian and the Palestinian Authority.
So everyone’s waiting for Biden and Jordan is ready to play an acceptable role in the post-Donald Trump era. As long as there is some consensus in the Gulf and the water returns to its course, the ferocity of the warring parties will diminish, and this guarantees a comfortable space for Amman, which has little economic weight, but a large and trained army, is in harmony with the performance of US forces in the region. Finally, internally, there are no effective centers of power capable of imposing another vision of foreign policy. With the epidemic situation and its economic consequences, there is no tangible opposition effect on state policy. And if the “Muslim Brotherhood” was the most prominent actor in recent years, it seems that with the Gulf reconciliation, additional restrictions will follow on what the deep state has done to it since the collapse of the group’s project in Egypt.
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