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“Political Maronism” and “Political Shiism” are two terms that lack precision. They do not say which Maronites and which Shiites are the intended ones, nor do they warn about differences and differences between Maronites and Maronites, or between Shiites and Shiites, nor do they stop the change of times and social conditions and the reflection of this change in all of them.
However, and just to facilitate discussion, we use the two terms to denote the Lebanese “Maronite” government between 1943 and 1975, and the “Shiite” government, that is, the final decision-making, partly since the Taif Agreement. in 1989, and especially since the withdrawal from Syria in 2005, and especially since the presidency of Michel Aoun. In 2016.
There is a tendency to chronicle modern Lebanon with these two periods, the periods of “Maronite rule” and “Shiite rule”, noting that one of us, of course, preferred to define periods and regimes by their social representation and ideological choices.
And the current situation is that “the Shiite rule”, behind the most important facades of which are Emile Lahoud and Michel Aoun, the first injustice fell on the Shiites. The latter, in the period before the rise of “Hezbollah”, were the most dynamic sect due to their relationship with the administration, education, immigration, and consequently the production of modern cadres. Thus, the Shiites could be trusted, even theoretically, to complete the Lebanese national project after the Maronites and Christians had been exhausted and no longer had much to give. This wear was evidenced by his election of Suleiman Franjieh, in 1970, to head the republic, and his cultural production under the weight of rhetoric, rural romanticism and nostalgia.
This confidence was not out of place, accompanied by the possibility of following a path that would end up reducing the level of sectarianism and limiting the centralization of Mount Lebanon, in favor of a more modern and democratic state at the same time.
The Shiites at that time had a very strong link to the state and its administration, and their weight bloc had shifted from rural to urban. And they appeared to be superior to the Maronites and Sunnis on two sides: less than Maronite romanticism and a tendency to the old rural concept of patriotism, and less than Sunnis vulnerable to the damage of Arab nationalism and its implications. And although his association with Najaf, and to a lesser extent with Qom and Ms. Zainab, breaks his isolation and introversion, limiting this connection to a cultural and spiritual dimension was not a weakening element of his Lebanese patriotism.
Musa al-Sadr expressed these tendencies in his Lebanese beginnings, which continued until Suleiman Franjieh, the closed one, rejected him for every reform and change. And when al-Sadr leapt into the lion’s embrace and the Palestinian training grounds, the downward spiral of the series was set that later culminated in Hezbollah and Iran. Thus, the Shiites were expropriated as a party that would retake the Lebanese national project, and most of them became a tool to overthrow the project. In another language: instead of the possibility of continuity and continuity in the history of the republic, the reality of severe and radical discontinuity has been resolved.
In a historical review, the equality between the two sects, just because they are sectarian, does not seem fair. There are at least three reasons for such discrimination: the first, and according to his version of himself, is that the “Maronite policy” is the daughter of the fear that motivated the request for protection, before independence in 1943, and the request for As for “political Shiism”, it is offensive in nature and, according to its version of itself, is the product of a resistance action that reaches politics with a locomotive of rifles and missiles. But the second reason may be more important, and that is that “political Maronism” arose through the establishment of a state and through it, while “political Shiism” flourished through the dismantling of the state and the establishment of a state. parallel whose backbone would be the weapons. Finally, “political Maronism” imitated the West, or at least affirmed it, while “political Shiism” was woven along the lines of Khomeinist Iran.
Therefore, the “Maronite government” was not simply a military or security checkpoint, as it traditionally involved a position in institution building, education, economy and money, resulting in the rise of the broader middle class in The middle east. The “Shiite rule”, on the other hand, remains a mere rule with arms that dictate to others a will that is not convinced of them, but unanimously intuit its dangers. The administrative, university and political life that was built in the first phase was dismantled in the second phase. The country, as the first phase put it on the world map, was eliminated from the second phase.
The international environment also differed: the first phase coincided with the Cold War and the main ideologies. It has become common in society, though not in power, ashamed of smaller identities in the interest of a country. The second phase coincided with the explosion of lesser identities and their proud publicity. At that time, what was required was a city in which the merchant, the tourist, and the banker, as well as the educated, boasted. After that, the wanted person became a suburb ruled and glorified by the gunman.
In contrast, Aouni’s “political Maronite” degenerated, a degeneration that Christians may have begun to shed after the port crime, but what is feared is that it is too late for Christians and with them all Lebanese.
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