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The misty deal
In a hint of the real and imagined complications surrounding the Gulf families’ struggle, Kushner’s visit, which included Doha and Riyadh, was not capped off by the announcement of the return of water to their streams among enemy brothers in the eastern shore of the Gulf, but by loose and loaded statements from some of the parts of the Gulf (Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia) exclusively, which raises the question about the positioning of the UAE and Egypt, and about the terms of the agreement whose contours are still unclear, and for which Kushner did not say a word about it and about the future of the Gulf Cooperation Council, which is feared will not come out of his coma. We do not know if the Emir of Qatar, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, will attend the periodic “Gulf Summit”, which is expected in Manama, or perhaps it will be held in Riyadh, but even the best optimists do not expect a solid return to relations. between fights, after public insults that broke all taboos. Faced with the desire of some of the besiegers to extend the tension in relations with Doha until 2022, hoping to stab the Qatari peninsula in its heart, thwarting the “World Cup 2022”.
Media challenge
Despite the statements issued by the Emir of Kuwait and his Foreign Minister, and the “positive” response from the Foreign Ministers of Riyadh and Doha, not from the King of Saudi Arabia and the Emir of Qatar, the severe reduction Of the media continued to prevail everywhere, including Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya. This raises questions about the authenticity of the hadiths that indicate a comprehensive and comprehensive solution to the escalating crisis. The challenge, if a conciliatory outcome is reached, will also remain related to the future of the editorial policies of the Qatari-supported media, which generally maintained an offensive pattern against Saudi Arabia and Iran, while the Saudi media maintained a pejorative pattern towards Iran, Qatar, the “Brotherhood” and Turkey. On the other hand, Al-Jazeera has adopted generally positive editorial policies in favor of Tehran since the summer of 2017, which were evident this year when the military commander, Qassem Soleimani, and the nuclear scientist Fakhrizadeh were attacked.
Shake up Saudi-Emirati coordination
Despite former Qatari reservations, from harboring the Americans at the Al Udeid base to developing its relations with Turkey, Doha did not expect the “2017 invasion” to be so fierce. It was confirmed to him once again that the threat that the threat could turn into an imminent danger if the will of the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia meet. Qatar hopes to dismantle the Emirati-Saudi convergence, and some of its decision makers believe that Saudi politics has always been characterized by emotion, myopia and the prevalence of the tactical over the strategic, and this characterizes Riyadh’s relations with its allies in the region, from Morocco to Iraq and Pakistan. Consequently, the chances of undermining Emirati-Saudi coordination can be achieved with more “strategic patience.”
Saudi Arabia first
Except for Riyadh, Doha is not enthusiastic about returning to its former state. In my opinion, Qatar wants to achieve the restoration of relations with Saudi Arabia, with the population weight of the latter, which could fill the stadiums of the World Cup, restore vitality to the first markets, give the Qataris easy access their families in the vicinity and allow them to visit the holy sites. Doha sees an opportunity to reshape Saudi public opinion, which is stereotyped, if it changes the tone of Riyadh. Simply opening Saudi air and ground airspace to Qatar will not be comfortable or sufficient. However, there is nothing wrong with the government of Tamim bin Hamad in establishing formal and protocol relations with Egypt. Qatar can maintain its relations with the “Muslim Brotherhood” opposed to the regime of Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, and that relations remain cold with Abu Dhabi and Manama, on the other hand. An internal balance for the “wounded” Qataris from what they heard from the media of the besieged.
Abu Dhabi Armed Superiority
Is Saudi Arabia concerned about the expected military superiority of the Emiratis? Yes, without a doubt. This is a point of convergence between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, without the need to exaggerate the expectation that the disparities between the Emirates and Saudi Arabia will grow like wildfire, as we hear in some “propaganda” media; With the $ 23 billion deal and its initial approval from the United States to buy F-35 jets, Abu Dhabi is launching an arms race not only with Doha, but also with Riyadh and Kuwait. We must hope that these Gulf states will demand the purchase of more expensive and advanced weapons systems and increase their close ties with the “Pentagon.” This can apply even to Oman, which does not have the financial capacity to keep up with Emirati weaponry without restrictions.
Normalization … and the gap
Repeated analyzes of Riyadh’s caution not to go to normalization for fear of sensitivity related to the Palestinian question are not supported by the facts, experiences and information available.
Saudi Arabia is using the two-state solution, for the time being, as Othman’s shirt temporarily, while its demands are settled in exchange for normalization. Riyadh, in my opinion, is ready to conclude an agreement with Israel, as long as it acquires F-35 jets, advanced drones and precision missiles, as the UAE is not “more fragile” than them! However, this is a long and complex process, and it cannot be achieved for the remainder of the Trump era, as the “Trump” administration must convince Congress with this deal, which will surely be huge and in return provide a sustainable military advantage to Israel, and there is also concern about a change in the prevailing situation in Najd, and this is a point that decision makers in Washington cannot ignore, as they are eager to ensure that advanced American weapons do not fall into “hostile hands”. Even assuming solutions can be found for these complications, there is no time for that. Note that Abu Dhabi was able to conduct lengthy negotiations on normalization, which allowed it to achieve arms and political “breakthroughs” in its relations with Zionist lobbies, and that it continued away from Saudi eyes until near completion.
Axis leadership
Who is the party that leads the axis? Is it Saudi Arabia, gushing out of anger in the West, increasing its losses, and receiving only Sanaa missiles? The mother of the Emirates, whose trail is being tracked by Egypt in more than one file, and received the terrible award for the normalization of armaments and almost excluded by the “Ansar Allah” missiles? Riyadh cannot close its eyes to Abu Dhabi’s growing supremacy at its expense, in terms of the normalization that Saudi Arabia desires, weaponry, Yemeni history, and Iran’s commercial gains. The weak voices in Riyadh see that it seems more appropriate for us to do it, the first to diversify their relationships, and not be harsh and monolithic. And if Mohammed bin Salman cannot turn his back on the madmen against his supposed ally, Mohammed bin Zayed, this does not stop Riyadh from paving a cautious little path of its own with Qatar, which is something Doha will welcome with enthusiasm, and that Abu Dhabi , which also opens, you can understand. The doors are not small in trade relations with Tehran and other Riyadh opponents.
The American Given
President-elect Joe Biden has shown no enthusiasm for the controversial Gulf issue, while repeatedly declaring the Iranian nuclear issue. Multiple estimates believe normalization and the release of Saudi female prisoners may take two steps until Biden is sworn in as the 46th president of the United States. As for Qatar, it will not choose to proceed with standardization, as this removes its taste and urgency, but it will not launch a campaign against standardization, and it will not encourage Emirates Airlines boycott campaigns, and it will support Biden in other files.
The Iranian dimension: a gift for Saudi Arabia
Qatar will maintain close ties with Turkey and slow but continuing relations with Tehran. However, Doha will likely support a campaign to discuss Iranian missile weaponry. You can explain your position as outdated, and it predates the signing of the nuclear deal in 2015, and you can also sell it as a gift to Riyadh. This is a point that deserves attention in the Saudi review, along the lines of the “U-turn”. As for Tehran, it will continue to call for an unconditional return to the nuclear deal and the opening of a regional debate on weapons and collective security issues in the Gulf.
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