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George Sand: “Jan Zieska: An Episode from the Manic War”. (2)
“Initially, we thought it would be possible for us to resist using the methods and experiences of other countries. We tried strikes, we tried demonstrations, but then we realized that all this would not work. ”
Amilcar Cabral. (3)
Do you know how and why they were first enslaved and then annihilated by the Arawak people? The importance of this question lies in the fact that the colonial settler model that developed in that region is closer to colonial Zionism than the South African model.
The direct and clear response that we heard (or read) from Christopher Columbus, responsible for this horrible genocide, marked the beginning of the era of genocide, slavery, looting and ruin in which Western hegemony was founded, and formed the foundation of the modern world. Describing the indigenous peoples of the Bahamas, Columbus wrote in a report he sent to Madrid: “They do not carry weapons, they do not even know him. I once showed them a sword, so they took it off the edge and were wounded by it. ignorance (of the weapon) .They have no iron, and their spears are made of reeds .For this, they can be good servants … and with only fifty men, we can subjugate them all and make them do what we want ” (4) .
The Arawak people, who inhabited what is now known as the Bahamas, were a people amazed at their generosity, morals and good hospitality, as they were amazed at their popularity and the extent of their belief in sharing everything, as reported by Howard. Zain, quoting European eyewitnesses. They lived in communal villages (comunas), such as Bertolome de las Casas, the owner of “A brief history of the destruction of the Andes”, which copied the diaries of Columbus, and lacked knowledge of the customs of commerce, either in the sale or purchase (in the modern European capitalist sense). On top of all that, they did not give or give any special value to gold, or to any of the other “precious” minerals that it conquered, and then enslaved and then exterminated, for the sake of the white European settlers, but based on their livelihood and exclusivity exclusively in their direct natural environment. However, despite their poverty and lack of what they had, they were very generous when it came to anything and everything they owned, as de la Casses claims, and so they expected their friends to return to the same degree of generosity. and willingness to participate.
But the most detailed description of the nature and characteristics of the Arawak is the comparative approach between them and the Spanish invaders who arrived in Bertolome de las Casas’s export to “a brief history of the Andean destruction”. “Among all human beings in this world,” says de la Casas, “these people (that is, the Arawak) were the least committed of all sins, the most devoid of evil, greed and hypocrisy, the most obedient and faithful to their original teachers in their villages, and later to the Spanish Christians that They serve them. Because of their humble, patient and peaceful nature, they did not hold a grudge at all, since they were far from conflicts, problems and disputes. qualities and ideas such as hatred, hatred or desire for revenge were completely foreign to them ”(5) (translation is made).
“The martyr Izz al-Din al-Qassam”, portrait of the late Syrian artist Burhan Karkutli (1980)
In exchange for all this, de la Casas tells us in the same text that he wrote forty years after the arrival of Columbus, that when “some Spaniards came to the land of these weak outcasts, they immediately acted as lepers, wolves, tigers or lions who were starving for days. . And for forty years (from the invasion) to the present day (when the text was written), Spanish behavior did not differ at all, but they still behave like hungry monsters, practicing murder, intimidation, torture and destruction against indigenous peoples, and Above all, they have committed all their crimes in strange, new and diverse ways. And extremely cruel, unprecedented, and even unpublished, to the extent that the island of Hispaniola (Haiti and the current Dominican Republic), which once had a population of over three million, is now (when the text was written forty years later) Just two hundred thousand »(De la Casas, p. 29. The translation is done).
As for Columbus, to whom the United States dedicates a day of the year to celebrate and celebrate, as evidenced by his report that he sent to Madrid following his arrival there, he saw the common assets of the Arak people, their morals, their generosity, their humility, their patience and their peaceful nature, in the eyes of the greedy European colonial eyes: “They are very naive. He said, and “completely liberated regarding their property, so whoever had not witnessed this firsthand would not have believed it at all. If you ask them anything, they will never tell you. On the contrary, they will offer to share all that they own with anyone. ” (6) And therefore, also because of this, Howard Zain, historian of “The Popular History of the United States”, decides that the Arawak people were, therefore, in complete contradiction of their specifications with the Europeans. Renaissance Europe “was (by then) dominated by the religion of the popes and the governments of the kings, and by the price of money that characterized western civilization and its first messenger from the Americas, Christopher Columbus.”
Extermination
As for the massacre, it began from the first moment of the arrival of Columbus. When some of the Arawak islanders went swimming to the three Spanish ships (Nina, Pinta and Santa María) to receive Columbus and those who were with him, and even brought them food and gifts, the first thing that caught his attention (is say Columbus) were the gold earrings that some of them wore. He immediately took them captive and began questioning them about the whereabouts of the gold (which he also did when he sailed to Cuba and the island of Hispaniola (now Haiti and the Dominican Republic)). When the indigenous people there also welcomed him and his gang, he immediately caught their attention to give them a mask made of gold, so he prepared their families for questioning. Therefore, Columbus’s imagination was diverted to imagine gold fields and mines in those countries: Columbus had convinced the King and Queen of Spain, and some wealthy Spaniards, to finance his campaign by exaggerating the existence of the precious yellow metal, and he had to fulfill this commitment quickly.
For this, Columbus built in Haiti the first European military base in the western part of the world, and called it “Christmas” or “Christmas”. From this base, Europeans began to administer the campaign to search for and collect gold to send to Europe, after the campaign was strengthened with seventeen new ships and more than 1,200 additional elements, who joined the campaign based on promises. of Colón’s gold mines. But the main dilemma was the lack of gold in the first place, but a little dust accumulated in the currents (Columbus thought he was in East Asia because he imagined a world much smaller than the real world). However, due to Columbus’ financial obligations to the financiers of his campaign, these “outcasts” from the barracks had to bring gold anyway. For this, they asked each person over the age of fourteen to collect a certain amount of gold in three months, and those who were successful as a minority survived for another three months by placing a copper mark on their neck, and those who failed, who they are the majority, they cut their hands and bled him out. To compensate for the absence of gold, Columbus filled his ships with thousands of inhabitants of these islands and sent them to Europe, and while thousands of them died on the way, those who survived were sold as slaves in the markets of Europe (see part one of this text).
The illusion of “counterinsurgency”
Karim Belkacem is “the most ingenious Arab army of past centuries,” wrote Iqbal Ahmed in his comment on the central role played by one of the most important heroes of the Algerian revolution (of course, we can add to that phrase now, and later from the Hezbollah experience in Lebanon, the two martyrs Imad Mughniyeh and Mustafa Badr al-Din as well.) (7) This revolutionary mentality (military, security and political) was, to a large extent, not only behind the liberation of Algeria in less than seven years (after the decision in favor of the option of the People’s War in November 1954), and even in the context of the fall of the Fourth French Republic. (8) The genius of Belkacem (the military commander for the third term) was not And, perhaps most importantly, in the war of liberation) for being one of the few revolutionary military leaders in modern history who trusted the beginning of his resistance, and even his long-term persistence, in the weapon that the revolutionaries seized from the enemy, and he was also among the few who deeply understood the psychology of war. People. The first lesson that the Algerian revolution taught us, of which Belkacem was one of its most important leaders, is that this enemy is imaginary and that its strength is fictitious. People’s war is not only enough to make colonized people realize the weakness of the enemy in a confrontation of this type of war, but it also loses its credibility and breaks its image, once the first drop of blood falls . And the flow of this blood is the one that can, and only he, can remove the fear, servitude and acceptance of the humiliation of the minds and hearts of the settlers and turn them into new human beings, after he deceived them with the illusion of the image of the colonizer with all the power of the servants. The colonizer, by himself and by himself and by his consciousness of himself, by the colonizer and by the world, is a product of the colonial state, and must be recreated and shaped by his soul in the form of a new human being, with a new subjectivity, a new awareness of the self, the world and the other, completely erased in the context of a violent and lasting struggle of anti-colonialism or we will never tire (we never will) One day, for the repetition of the philosophy of the great Franz Fanon, or Wadih Haddad and Imad Mughniyah, it is for us who believe in choosing the People’s War as a doctrine of life and a doctrine of victory.)
However, the French did not learn from their experience in Vietnam, as their performance later demonstrated in Algeria, just as the Americans did not learn from the French’s experience in Vietnam before they did. When the United States imitated France in Vietnam, it also lost the war (the American ambassador, Frank Wisner, worked as a representative of the United States State Department in Algeria at the end of the war with France, and before that, at the embassy of his country in Vietnam, and looked closely at the failed French performance in both cases. But when he later moved to Vietnam, he participated in using the same failed French style in Algeria, believing that he (and they) would add more troops and using more excessive violence would inevitably lead to victory. The colonial vision sees no resistance except as an exclusively technical issue (such as a case of conspiracy and sabotage), and its solution and dealing with it, therefore, is with more intelligence and more repression and violence.
Perhaps that is why people reading the literature and reports on the People’s War will be surprised, or what they call the “counter-insurgency” strategy, which is now familiar and fills the Pentagon shelves, and will also realize the precision of journalist Isdor Stone’s analogy to the results of studies on it: “The reader will feel For this literature), these writers resemble men who watch a person dance from outside, through heavy glass windows. They can see movement, but they can’t hear music. They can transfer the mechanical movements and gestures they see in front of them onto paper with great precision. But they rarely see hurt patriotic feelings, misery, extreme anguish, hatred, dedication, inspiration and despair. Therefore, they really don’t understand what drives any of the men to leave the wife, children, home, professional life and friends and go to the mon You and carry the gun and live like a hunter, despite the enormous military challenges and challenges you face, instead of continuing to complain about the humiliation, injustice and poverty. ”(9)
The few who realized the seriousness of the people’s war, and even the impossibility of defeating them militarily, because they may have realized their true spirit and essence that is far from technology, or not in the position of decision, or they were forced to remain silent for political reasons. Following the successful Vietnamese attack on the American “Holloway Camp” on February 7, 1965 (it occurred in response to a US response to a previous incident in which the Vietnamese attacked an American ship in what is known as the “Incident Tonkin Bay “on August 2, 1964). The then President of the United States, Hubert Humphrey, said that there is no military solution to the “Vietnamese problem”, or that it is not possible at least in a few years (during the Johnson government), and asked its president to will wait in response. But Johnson’s response punished Humphrey and removed him from the decision circle, until he retracted his position. (10) But it seems that Humphrey’s position was deeper than his boss could understand, which is why he spoke about the people’s war (or guerrilla warfare, as they prefer to call it). As a new, aggressive and aggressive form, we can classify (the importance of its appearance) the importance of discovering gunpowder and the great challenge it represents for our safety ”(11).
Humphrey was not the only one who realized the naivety and simplicity of the official vision (military and political) of the people’s war. In “self-destruction”, Cecil Curry, owner of a major trilogy on Vietnam, argued that the Americans had lost their losses in their attempts to keep the Republic of South Vietnam as an independent and non-communist country, due to the state of mind and behavior within the US military. They failed to understand and know their enemy and therefore were unable to tailor their tactics to the specific enemy they were facing. American military policy, according to Kury, was shamefully shallow and superficial. It relied heavily on technology and the excessive use of massive firepower, as if fighting an enemy unit of the Warsaw Pact on the plains of Central Europe. (12)
This does not mean, of course, that the counterinsurgency policy applied by the United States a century ago to specifically subjugate the peoples of the South (under different names), and used by the Zionist colony even before the usurpation of Palestine, did not produce many tragedies, ruins, murders and destruction. On the contrary, this policy has as its main objective, and includes, in a systematic way, inflicting great damage, ruins and murders, breaking the spirit of its enemies and subjugating them. It is precisely for this reason that the people’s war is the only possible and effective antidote.
Sociology of the People’s War in Palestine: How do we understand resistance and treason?
In his speech at the famous Havana conference to the leaders of the liberation movements in 1966, Amilcar Cabral described the revolutionary experience in Southern societies and summarized it as follows: “The dilemma of the bourgeoisie in the context of the fight for national liberation is the betrayal of the revolution or class suicide. ” The vision of Cabral, the revolutionary philosopher and field commander at the same time (13), forms the basis and essence of any serious attempt to theoretically establish the people’s war, and even to understand and understand the various and different situations of it and on it. Cabral’s vision works clearly to explain and classify the positions of the people’s war, and the resistance in general, by illuminating and emphasizing the class condition (suicide or treason of the bourgeoisie), and on the importance of understanding the social background and class interest, even in the position of the people’s war (with or against), and not just for sharing it. The debate about the people’s war in particular, and about revolutionary violence in general, then, is not about the effectiveness, or the possibility, of the success of the people’s war, or even its ability to win. This is a problem that has been solved by practical experience, for more than a century (for example, in Ireland), and has even become a science from the Chinese experience (with Mao Zedong) (14), Korean (with Kim Il Sung) (15) and Vietnamese (with Ho Chi Minh) (16), Algeria and Cuba, and, more recently, the outstanding Arab contribution to Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah. (17) The idea here, then, is not that he who argues that the colonial peoples did not liberate or obtain their independence by the people’s war, or that he rejects the fact that the colonized people, when armed, are victorious, they are simply ” imperfect “, stupid or even ignorant of history only. The problem in essence, as Cabral points out, is in the class circumstance that shapes the general context of wars, establishes a selection among social forces and even determines the position of the resistance and the people’s war, and the class is a objective state, and can be measured with high precision, and one of the fundamental indicators or measures on it in Our situation is the position of the people’s war.
In Palestine, the really serious question is not whether the choice of the Palestinian elite is treason or class suicide. After all we know about the policies, attitudes, and practices of the elite (declared and undeclared), and their class interests exposed, it cannot be argued that the choice of the Palestinian elite was truly a treason option. Again, the issue here is not a dispute over the implications or effectiveness of this option, as if we were at a conference specializing in discussing philosophical issues. In summary, the point is that the people’s war and the armament of people not only represent a threat to colonialism and imperialism, but also to the social strata linked to it in terms of interest. Arming people violates the balance of local powers, just as it does the balance of international powers.
Precisely for this reason, the debate on the resistance weapon in Lebanon continues, for example. The victories of May 2000 and July 2006, and the continued deterrence of the enemy are real, practical and current symbols of the immense effectiveness of this indisputable experience. However, the real danger of the May and July victories, seen by the Zionist entity and Western imperialism, in addition to some Lebanese and Arab segments, is in the possibility of generalizing this model, some of which try to smoke us by not declaring your categorical rejection of these practical models, and even declare your support for the resistance until the year 2000 or even 2006, and you can celebrate the anniversary of victory with us as well, but do not stop questioning any work of the resistance after 2006, in fact, he is in the ditch of traitors.
Despite the moral superiority of the resistance and the people’s war, with its anti-legacy and imperial interest, and with its hostility towards the main dynamics of capital, the price of treason in Palestine is my existence with distinction and beyond Palestine. While the people of Palestine face a colonial model of colonialism of a special kind based on genocide, not on ethnic discrimination, as some might think, the Arab nation faces (based on the experience of at least the past few years) a war of existence in the literal sense of the word. From Palestine to Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Bahrain and even Lebanon, our lands are being emptied of death, destruction, devastation and displacement, due to the enormous profits they make as one of the mechanisms of capital accumulation. Therefore, what is required, now more than ever, is to strive to generalize the paradigm and condition of people’s war.
Military Zionism: why only the people’s war?
In the Zionist vision of the state and the philosophy of establishing the army, as it emerged in a series of Ben-Gurion speeches (the most important of which was a speech in the Knesset on August 18, 1952), the Zionist army he hoped, like all other armies, not only to be an armed force to defend a country or a state, but rather one of the basic tools, if not the most important, to form and form a nonexistent nation, and as a tool to merging different Jewish and settler “ethnicities” from all over the earth in different and sometimes contradictory languages, cultures and customs, and overcoming profound differences and contradictions between them and between them. A few years after the catastrophe, the number of settlers from various parts of the world to Palestine doubled, and Ben Gurion and his gang faced the question of the nation they had to form.
The issue of the nation was very troubling to them from the start, which made the goals of all first and core projects (including army training) focus on their role (i.e. projects) in building the nation primarily, and not in apparent or stated dimension or goal (that is, not only in the defensive or offensive army). In the case of the army). For example, in the context of establishing what was called the “Qatar Water Network,” which links all of the entity’s settlers to a water network, it was an important and accurate understanding that isolated local water sources (like wells), as was the case with the settlements before the Nakba, contributed to the production of settlement consciousness My regional isolation is not adequate for a nation, or raised awareness before my country was deformed, not awareness of the citizens of a state and members of a nation. For this, the Qatar water network was the second very few “national” projects in which the Zionist Organization, the Jewish Agency and the Jewish National Fund participated, due to their maximum importance, despite the different activities of these institutions and not crossing them into joint projects, except very rarely (and the project was, later, in the context of the 1967 war.
في ذلك الخطاب أعلاه, بدا بن غوريون مدركا تماما أن عصابات المستوطنين لا تشكل أمة حقا, ويبدو أنه أدرك كذلك, باستحضاره مثل إنكلترا, أن تشكل الأمم هي عملية تاريخية طويلة جدا ومعقدة, تتشابك وتتداخل فيها الكثير من المتغيرات وقد تتطلب مئات السنين (هذا إن تجاهلنا حتى طبيعة المشروع الاستيطاني الصهيوني). لكن ، «نحن» ، يقول بن غوريون ، «لا نستطيع الانتظار مئات السنين ، وبدون أداة الجيش لا يمكننا أن نصبح لهذا ، علينا أن نعمل على قيادة التقدّم التاريخي وتسريعه وتوجيهه ، وهذا يتطلّب إطاراً من الانضباط الون طبعا, يمكن القول بكل ثقة, إن من يفهم التاريخ الإنساني والاجتماعي بهذه الطريقة, ويعمل ويخطط بمنطق “الهندسة الاجتماعية” ال “بنغوريونية” هذه, سينتهي حتما حيث انتهت النازية (وطريقة التفكير هذه ليست العامل المشترك الوحيد بين الصهيونية والنازية).
لهذا, واستتباعا لرؤيته تلك, درس بن غوريون نماذج جيش اليعاقبة في فرنسا (كل مواطن جندي وكل جندي مواطن) وجيش نابليون من بعدهم, تجربة الجيش البروسي (ثلاث سنوات من التجنيد تتبعها سنتان من الاحتياط ثم عضوية في الجيش الشعبي / الفيدرالي لإسناد الجيش), والجيش الirio نسي بن غوريون أنّ الكيان الصهيوني ليس فرنسا أو ألمانيا أو اليابان. فبإمكان كل هذه الأمم وغيرها أن تخطط, وأن تخطئ في التقدير والتخطيط والتنفيذ, لكن الفشل لن تكون له تبعات وجودية كما هي بالضرورة عند الكيان, كما أدرك بن غوريون ذاته. ففرنسا وألمانيا واليابان ، لا تزال موجودة رغم الفشل والهزائم القاسية التي واجهتها في تاريخها الحديأل أمّا الكيان الصهيوني فهو شاذ عن هذه القاعدة ، كما هو شاذ تقريباً في كل شيء ـــ فأن تَهزِم جيشهم يعنيي
Photos
ليست الفكرة هنا, فقط, أن “الصهيونية العسكرية» تؤكد لنا جانبا نعرفه جيدا عن هذا العدو, وعن طبيعته وبنيته العميقة ووظيفته المؤسسة على العدوان والقتل والدمار نيابة عن الإمبريالية الغربية وبشراكة معها, وبالتالي لا يمكن له أن يتغير أو يتحول ساذج, إذن, من يحلم بأن يصحو يوما ليجد هذا الكيان الاستيطاني قد قرر التخلي عن عدة وعقيدة القتل والخراب والحروب, وقرر التحول إلى العمل في التجارة والصناعة والسياحة. هذه الرؤية تتجاهل طبيعة الكيان الصهيوني, وتتجاهل أنه ليس في بنيته أو سبب وجوده أو وظيفته, أي إمكانية أن يتحول “للشغل” في التجارة أو السياحة, أو شيء آخر غير القتل والخراب والحرب. لهذا ، لا حلّ معه إلّا بحرب الشعب.
لكن الفكرة الأساسية من مختصر “الصهيونية العسكرية» أعلاه, حيث وظيفة ودور الجيش عندهم أكثر بكثير من كونه مجرد جيش تقليدي, بقدر ما يشكل الرحم الذي سيستولد “الأمة» والبوتقة التي ستصهرها, فإن دليل عمل إزالة هذا الكيان لأي مقاوم, يجب أن يتمثل أولا وقبل أي شيء بالعمل الدائم على كسر عموده الفقري ، عبر سحق هذا الجيش وقهره. وأهمية وعبقرية ومثالية خيار حرب الشعب في حالة فلسطين هي هنا بالذات: فحرب الشعب ليس بإمكانها فقط أن تهزم الجيش الصهيوني, بل يمكنها أيضا إزالة الكيان ذاته من الوجود.
خاتمة: الذين لديهم الحديد لديهم الخبز
لا نعرف العدد الدقيق لشعب الأرواك حين غزاهم الأوروبيون ، في عام ١٤٩٢. Photos . وفي عام ١٥٥٠ ، أي بعد ستة وخمسين عاماً لم يبقَ منهم سوى ٥٠٠ إنسان فقط على قيد الحياة. أما في عام ١٦٥٠ ، فيشير أحد التقارير الذي يقتبسه الكثير من المؤرّخين ، أنه لم يبقَ حينها من شعب الأرواك الول أبادوهم جميعاً.
لكن في هذه الإبادة عبرة، ربما على أهل فلسطين أن يتعلّموها أكثر من غيرهم، كونهم الشعب الأخير الذي يواجه البربرية الاستعمارية الاستيطانية: لم تكن مأساة شعب الأرواك أن إبادتهم تمت قبل تأسيس اليونسكو (وبالتالي، لم يكن بإمكانهم طلب تدخلها لإنقاذهم، كما طالب مسؤول فلسطيني اليونسكو بالتدخل لمنع الكيان الصهيوني من ضمّ باقي أراضي الضفة الغربية، في لحظة استحمار متميزة من المتحدثين باسم عصابة أوسلو)، ولم تكن مأساتهم في غياب «المجتمع الدولي» ليمنع المجزرة (كما يطالب صائب عريقات ذلك الكائن الخرافي، المجتمع الدولي، ليلاً ونهاراً بالتدخل). كانت مأساتهم الحقيقية هي التي رآها كولومبوس وفهمها جيداً وتصرف على أساسها وانتهت إلى إبادتهم جميعاً: «أنهم لا يحملون السلاح، ولا حتى يعرفونه. ليس عندهم حديد، ورماحهم مصنوعة من القصب». ربما كان شعب الأرواك سيتعلم كثيراً من قائد كومونة باريس، «أوغست بلانكي»، الذي فهم عالم الهيمنة الرأسمالية الغربية جيداً، وربما على شعب فلسطين، خصوصاً، أن يستمع إليه جيداً: «الذين لديهم الحديد، لديهم الخبز».
برغم التفوّق الأخلاقي للمقاومة ولحرب الشعب بما تتضمنّه من معاداة للإرث والمصلحة الإمبريالية، فإنّ ثمن الخيانة في فلسطين وجوديّ بامتياز
(1) الجزء الأوّل من هذا النص منشور في «الأخبار»، الأربعاء 10 تشرين الأوّل/ أكتوير 2018
(2) George Sand. (1843) 2008. “Jean Ziska: Épisode de La Guerre Des Hussites”. Moscow: Dodo Press. P. 3
(3) Quoted in David A. Andelman, “Profile: Amilcar Cabral”, in Africa Report (New York), May 1970, p. 19.
(4) Howard Zinn. 1994. “A People’s History of the United States”. NY: Longman.
(5) Bartolome de Las Casas. 1992. “A Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies”. NY: Penguin Books. Pp. 9-10
(6) إضافة لكونه قائد حملة الإبادة، كانت شخصية كولومبوس تتميز بالوضاعة أيضا. يذكر هوارد زين انه كان من المفروض ان يحصل أول من يرى اليابسة من البحارة على راتب سنوي مقداره عشرة آلاف مارافيد مدى الحياة، وكان أول من رأى الشمس تتلألأ على الرمال البيضاء بحار يدعى رودريغو، لكن كولومبوس ادعى لاحقا انه رأى اليابسة قبها بليلة وسرق المكافأة التي كان من المفروض ان يحصل عليها ذلك البحار.
(انظر هوارد زين. التاريخ الشعبي للولايات المتحدة. ص: ٢)
(7) Eqbal Ahmad. 2006. “The Selected Writings of Eqbal Ahmad”. NY: Columbia University Press. P. 96
(8) في الثالث والعشرين من حزيران ١٩٥٤ التقى في منزل المناضل الجزائري إلياس دريش في منطقة المدنية في الجزائر العاصمة اثنان وعشرون مناضلا جزائريا لمناقشة الازمة التي كانت تعصف بالحركة الوطنية الجزائرية والانقسام الكارثي بين جناحي حزب «حركة الحريات الديمقراطية»، بين مركزيين ومصاليين (اتباع مصالي الحاج). وبسبب الازمة المستفحلة التي واجهت مناضلي الجزائر في تلك الفترة، خصوصا مع إصرار القيادة (مصالي الحاج) على الخيار السياسي في مواجهة الاستعمار الفرنسي. وجاء في البيان الأول للجبهة: «وهكذا فإن حركتنا الوطنية قد وجدت نفسها محطمة، نتيجة لسنوات طويلة من الجمود والروتين، توجيهها سيئ، محرومة من سند الرأي العام الضروري، قد تجاوزتها الأحداث، الأمر الذي جعل الاستعمار يطير فرحا ظنا منه أنه قد أحرز أضخم انتصاراته في كفاحه ضد الطليعة الجزائرية. ان المرحلة خطيرة. أمام هذه الوضعية التي يخشى ان يصبح علاجها مستحيلا، رأت مجموعة من الشباب المسؤولين المناضلين الواعين التي جمعت حولها أغلب العناصر التي لا تزال سليمة ومصممة، ان الوقت قد حان لإخراج الحركة الوطنية من المأزق الذي أوقعها فيه صراع الأشخاص والتأثيرات لدفعها الى المعركة الحقيقية الثورية».
(9) I. F. Stone. 1968. “In Time of Torment”. NY: Vintage. Pp. 173-174.
(10) Townsend Hoopes. “The Limits of Intervention: An inside account of how the Johnson policy of escalation in Vietnam was reversed”. NY: W. W. Norton. P. 31
(11) “The Selected Writings of Eqbal Ahmad”. P. 13
(12) Cecil Currey. 1981. “Self-Destruction: The Disintegration and Decay of the United States Army During the Vietnam Era”. NY: Norton.
(13) Reiland Rabaka. 2014. “Concepts Of Cabralism: Amilcar Cabral and Africana Critical Theory.” London: Lexington Books.
(14) Mao Tse-tung. “Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung.”
(15) Kim Il Sung. 2012. “History of Revolutionary Activities of President Kim IL Sung”. Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House.
(16) Ho Chi Minh. “Ho Chi Minh on Revolution: Selected Writings 1920-1966.” NY: Signet Books.
(17) Nicholas Noe (Ed). 2007. “Voice of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah.” NY: Verso
