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In 440 pages, in his book published by the Center for Arab Studies of the Levant and the House of Rawafed in Beirut in 2017, the author traced the most prominent phenomena and controversies that the organization experienced in its different stages during more than 60 years of its creation, especially in the eighties. And ninety. The perpetrator’s tracking of the organization’s march drenched in the blood of its victims continued during the milestone in the fall of the post-Saddam Hussein regime in 2003, when the party became one of Iraq’s most prominent ruling parties. The author paused in the party’s historic turn at the meeting on August 13, 2014, which ended with the announcement of Nuri al-Maliki’s abdication of his legal right to run for prime minister in favor of his supporters, Haider al-Abadi, revealing some of his circumstances, the internal movement that made the decision and the parties that participated in its making: leadership The “Dawa Party”, the “Supreme Authority” in Najaf and the Iranian leadership.
The book is about the beginnings of the Dawa Party. In it, the author discussed the realistic reasons for the emergence of a Shiite Islamist movement, when the need for an organized action of change that sought a change in the cultural and political reality of the nation in the Shiite environment was more intense, because the community Sunni preceded him. Since the late 1920s, the author claims, large Sunni Islamic groups and organizations have emerged, such as the “Muslim Brotherhood” in Egypt, “Hizb ut-Tahrir” in the Levant, and Islamic groups in India, Pakistan, Turkey and others. . On the other hand, the main Shiite organizations, such as the Islamic Renaissance Society, the Najaf Party, the Islamic National Society and others, were immediate groupings that were formed for limited purposes and ended with their end. As for the Shiite Islamic societies that were established in the 1950s, such as the “Muslim Youth Movement” and the “Organization of Religious Muslims” and others, they were also limited and had modest capabilities in line with their goals, and their circumstances did not allow them to absorb the sand.
In this environment, the idea of establishing the Islamic “Dawa Party” arose, whose birth represented an unprecedented turn in the Shiite milieu at the level of organizational practice and the original vision of the modern establishment of the Islamic state according to the perspective of the Ahl al school. -Bayt. However, discussions about the establishment of the party continued between proponents of the idea and their peers until mid-1957, and during this period more than one preparatory meeting was held in Najaf, most of which were at home. of Mr. Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr.
The author reflected on the founding year and resolved the controversy about it, saying that the “Dawa Party” was established in Najaf in August 1957, and that the Najaf meeting at Al-Sadr House was the founding meeting, a the one attended by eight, and that the oath meeting in Karbala is at the house of religious authority. The supreme, Mr. Mohsen al-Hakim, is the first official meeting of the party, and seven attended, including six who attended the founding meeting in Najaf, and they are: Mr. Muhammad Baqir Al-Sadr, Mr. Muhammad Mahdi Al-Hakim, Abdul-Sahib Dakhil, Mr. Talib Al-Rifai, Mr. Murtado Al-Askari, Mr. Baqir Al-Hakim, Muhammad Sadiq Al-Qamousi, the lawyer, Mr. Hassan Shabar, Dr. Jaber Al -Atta and engineer Muhammad Saleh Al-Adeeb.
He spoke about the first generation of the party that participated in the completion of the founding process, then the first generation of preachers, playing the most prominent fundamental role of Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr in the establishment of the party and its leadership, and the demonstrations of this dominant leadership at the foundational level, intellectual theorizing and spiritual leadership. He also examined the obstacles to the religious and political encounter in the face of the expansion of the “da’wa”, and highlighted the leaders who emerged from the successive historical stages that the party went through in the face of the difficult and unfavorable conditions it represented: the tyranny of the power and its security risks, the complexities of the religious situation in Najaf and the ideological challenge to secular nationalist organizations (Hezbollah Ba’ath) and the leftist (Communist Party), and the implications of all this in the course of their experience
“The call” and the problem of the relationship with religious authority
The author also presents in the fourth chapter of the book a sensitive topic entitled “The relationship of the Dawa with the religious reference and the jurist’s wilayat”, examining the data of the Iraqi religious center opposed to the “Dawa Party”, the position of the supporters of the reference to the party, the position of the supporters of the jurist’s mandate towards him, and the reflection of these positions. His aim is to stir up the grounds for dissent among some “preachers”, then he examines the evidence of the adherence of the “Dawa Party” to the reference and presents evidence for it, refuting the notion of the supposed divergence and discrepancy between the “call” and the religious reference.
The Dawa today: the difficult legacy and the hybrid reality
The sixth and last chapter is characterized by special tests, since the author introduces a series of topics related to the political present in Iraq and the position of the “da`wa” in the debate of the solution, highlighting the importance of a reading scientist of the Iraqi crises, since it is the only one that can implement realistic treatments for the new Iraq. Among the most prominent issues discussed in the chapter is the issue of national coexistence. He pauses for a long time in the saying “the failure of political Islam and the dream of the secular alternative”, establishing a historical framework for the sectarian problem in Iraq and trying to understand its foundations in the structure of the governmental institution.
The believer says: “The crises in Iraq are closely related to its erroneous formation after the Sykes-Picot Treaty, which bequeathed Iraq to all the sectarian misfortunes of the Ottoman Sultanate, and then to the rise of what became known as the Iraqi state in 1921 , and the compound of racist sectarian power that grew out of it, bearing the Ottoman and Umayyad legacy in its content. And the color of British occupation and colonialism in its form, and ruled by imported kings from abroad, and with the secretions of what became known as the ideas of the Arab revolution … The crises crystallized in their most vicious colors with the establishment of the Iraqi Baath regime after the 1968 coup, and its call for all the evils of the sectarian racial heritage, starting with the heritage of thought and Umayyad, the Minister of Education of the royal era, Sati ‘al-Husri, the racism and sectarianism of the government of Abd al-Salam Aref, and the ideology of the founder of the Baath Party, M ichel Aflaq. All of this resulted in a community culture of crisis, an oppressive authoritarian culture and political and legal systems that generate crises, accumulate them, disintegrate the structure of society and the state. And exciting wars and internal conflicts between the components of the Iraqi people. “(Page 292). It is the legacy of the crisis and is concerned about the crises, which were reproduced and generated by the” Baath “regime, and which invested in their destructive potential to impose its tyranny and tyranny on all segments of Iraqi society and crush its opponents.
Bahraini researcher and academic
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