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Maximum priority
It is not political and economic issues that are an urgent priority for the new prime minister. For a man to retain his crown prince position and assume the throne in the event that the position becomes vacant, as is the case with absolute monarchies, the first and most serious priorities require that he retain the trust of his father, the king.
Despite the well-known speech about the stability of the Crown Prince in his position without competition, “the world has no security”, provided that the constitution of the Kingdom of Bahrain gives the king the appointment of any of his sons as crown prince, not necessarily the eldest son. The Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, Mohammed bin Salman, is not the eldest son of King Salman, and the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, Mohammed bin Zayed, is not the eldest son of Sheikh Zayed after his brother Khalifa. And the Emir of Qatar, Tamim, is not the eldest son of former Emir Hamad. In addition to the above, Salman bin Hamad cannot forget the figure of the late King of Jordan, Hussein bin Talal, when he issued, in 1999, a few hours before his departure, the decision to dismiss his brother Hassan and name his son Abdullah as crown prince.
The King is the Head of Government
This means that any project of the Crown Prince, be it economic or political, must be absolutely in harmony with the will of the King, the master of militancy. For the past twenty years, Ibn Hamad was “faithful to his father’s approach”, also given that the king is the head of the executive branch, constitutionally speaking, and that the system in the country is based on the presidential system that is led by the palace, while the crown prince exclusively performs his father’s assignments. This does not exclude having a certain amount of space to manage military, security and non-political files.
The Mohammedan
However, having the king’s trust is not enough, bin Hamad must count on the continued support of the two men who can change the equation in Bahrain: Mohammed bin Zayed and Mohammed bin Salman. These two men constitute both a support and a threat to the Khilafid government in Bahrain. They restrict any alleged aspiration of the king or prime minister to create an independent political and economic path, internally and externally.
The military establishment
By excluding the late prime minister and his wings in the early years of King Hamad’s rule from decision-making circles, the two wings of the palace – the Khawalid wing and the crown prince wing – administered the various state archives, implementing what which I call the “Hamad Strategy”. With the army commander, Field Marshal Khalifa bin Ahmed, turning 74, thinking about alternatives is on the table. It is not possible to expect that the “Khawalid” will inherit the military establishment, which will necessarily remain the exclusive domain of the king’s sons or the descendants of Hamad bin Isa. The post of army commander is believed to pass to Nasser bin Hamad, in light of the assumption that the king adopts it by distributing power between the wings of “militancy” (the Khawalid) and “moderation” (the crown prince ), which are assumed inside the palace. As a result, militants are likely to be awarded, in the person of Nasser, the post of army commander, as a difficult figure in the equation, and this is a rationale for the prime minister to fall to Salman, in light of the desire we take on the king to distribute power among his sons.
The militants, in the person of Nasser bin Hamad, are more likely to obtain the command post of the army.
Crown prince and prime minister
Perhaps the prime minister’s office is a headache, or even a threat to the crown prince, in two ways. The first is to strengthen Nasser in the military in a way that allows him to win over loyalists and the military sector influencing the decision. The second is that the new prime minister has gained more popular anger over any expected government failure, in light of low oil prices, rising unemployment, and rampant political crisis, which necessarily restricts the achievement of any so-called economic reform. So entrusting the prime minister to the king’s eldest son is partly due to the sharing of power between the wings. However, this puts the crown prince in direct conflict with the public, who have long accused successive governments of failing. The problem now is that part of the public will face difficulties if they want to spare criticism of the crown prince who leads a failed government. Perhaps the loyalist party in general wanted the crown prince to avoid criticism because he used to revere the actions of the government. Perhaps some opposition parties want to avoid direct criticism of the crown prince because they seek to maintain friendly relations with the next king, whom they believe will now have more influence. However, it is believed that the man’s combination of the two positions puts everyone in front of a great dilemma and a cushioned tension, which must surface while he is not far away.
Driving skills
The current king, Hamad, trained in the army over a thirty-year period (1969-1999), far from any popular questioning, and in view of financial abundance with the army receiving a large percentage of the general budget. In the army, he built his militant squad, a militant led by his powerful cabinet minister, Khalid bin Ahmed, and in it he built theories that led the country to decline.
Thus, the purpose of proposing the Labor Market Project, in 2004, by the Crown Prince, was to achieve undeclared objectives, among which it stands out: to build a private bureaucracy for the Crown Prince in the form of organs, outside the framework of the government ministries and the Civil Service Office, in order to: First, Provide a large budget for the Crown Prince; Second, to allow it to move freely “without accountability” on the assumption that Parliament is capable of accountability; Third, allow you to train to drive; Fourth, train you to build your own template and charts that you trust, and it seems that the latter, at least, has not been achieved. This path weakened the crown prince’s presence in the military and consequently his ability to accomplish his various programs as prime minister.
Crown Prince of the team
When we make a comparison between the king’s poor men and the late prime minister’s men, who had political experience, it appears that the crown prince’s men are “light.” Yes, you may see them as technicians and graduates of Western universities, but they have weak political skills and communication skills, and they have little public presence. When evaluating the performance of this team during the two decades of handling of the economic file by the crown prince, and around seven years since he was appointed deputy prime minister in 2013, a notable failure can be registered, part of which is related to the general climate and power of the king, who is – constitutionally – Head of the Executive Authority.
Opposition
The opposition faces the question of dealing with the new situation. Its actors believe that the crown prince was a reformer in 2011, compared to other caliphs and regional parties, but they are not sure that the man continues to have the same aspirations. The opposition does not have a partner in government, and is counting on the crown prince to be that partner, in light of strained relations with the late prime minister, the king’s move toward unprecedented repression, and Nasser’s vision as a militant figure.
Some opposition parties are hoping that the crown prince will seek to turn a new page. But other parties don’t see this happening anytime soon. However, a third section considers that the crown prince may find in the current weakness and inability of the opposition to impose its conditions a means of entry to convince his father of the viability of seeking formulas that return them to the collapsed political process since 2011 The truth is that the hardline king will not easily accept that the water returns to its normal course.
Foreign policy
There is a common misconception in Bahrain that the Council of Ministers oversees the development of foreign policy. In fact, the Supreme Defense Council, headed by the king, is responsible for this, and this file will remain in the palace, so relations with Tehran, Doha and Sanaa may not improve, while relations with Tel Aviv they will grow. This does not mean that the new prime minister opposes such policies.
diplomacy
When examining the statements of the “new” prime minister, it is rare to find a statement offensive to Qatar, Iran, the Shiites, the opposition, the Islamists or any of the alleged opponents of the regime. Ibn Hamad can be said to enjoy supreme diplomacy, having maintained open relations with the various Bahraini and regional specters, and enjoying extensive international relations.
Responsibility of Ibn Hamad
The problem of combining the Crown Prince and Prime Minister positions rears its head internally and cannot be handled with public relations skills. Observers ask if “stability”, as in the government narrative, is undermined by the presence of a “holy” prime minister and is considered a red line, or if a figure is designated whose head can be “broken by. the parliament and the press “and the king can play with it as a political card and tear it down when popular disputes occur. It is offered as an offering to public opinion, as in Kuwait, Jordan and Morocco. According to this point of view, separating the prime minister’s office from the mandate of the crown aims to avoid a strong confrontation between the palace and the people, and since it seeks to protect the rights of citizens by placing an impious and responsible prime minister, it preserves the position of the crown prince and the next king, provided this is done in the context of a constitutional parliamentary system. .
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