Demarcation agreement with the enemy: the fate of the next day

The rounds of negotiations on the demarcation of the maritime borders between Lebanon and “Israel” have started and have caught fire, as intense negotiations and weekly sessions have been announced. Negotiations may or may not be lengthy, but in the end, the Lebanese and “Israeli” / American parties will come to an agreement whereby Lebanon will get what it can, taking into account the objective circumstances that are not in favor of Lebanon at all. Lebanon will take and give. Regardless of where Lebanon’s maritime borders become as a result of those negotiations, the sun will rise the next day on “Israel” authorized to carry out the multicolored Lebanese seal with drilling and development to the last cup of its new maritime borders. What are the implications for the future of exploration, development and production on both sides of the border? This article attempts to extrapolate the possible scenarios in this regard and their implications for Lebanon. This article aims to illuminate one aspect of the technical aspects that the Lebanese negotiator may overlook, thus helping to overcome some pitfalls that have a significant and long-term impact. However, this does not warn of the possibility that the negotiations that have started were of a formal nature and the possibility that the agreement is already cooked and it is only expected that it will be shown to the media with some graduation.

To begin with, it is worth delving into the “coordinated oil activities and fragmentation of production” aspect of the Exploration and Production Contract signed with the Total-Eni-Novatek consortium in relation to Lot 4 and 9, Article 21. What stated the production contract regarding the “case in which a reservoir crosses the limits of the line? The separator of the continental shelf or territorial waters subject to the laws of another country ”? In other words, how will Total (the operating company) act in the event of a discovery that stretches across the watery border with occupied Palestine? Since there is no other “state” that can support the text other than the “state” of the occupying entity … In this case, the agreement provides for the elaboration of a production plan related to retail trade (Unitization) that guarantee the rights of “both parties” based on international standards and include what includes “the commitment of each of the parties.” Coordinate effectively with each other for the better development of the fragmented reservoir. “However,” the state is responsible for any negotiations between governments and the rights holders negotiate with any operator or rights holder in the private sector of the other country. Any agreement for to develop this reservoir or to build or use transboundary facilities, or any other measure between the right holders and any other entity with respect to coordination between transboundary oil activities, or any decision to develop this reservoir without such agreement or arrangement, is subject to the prior approval of the Council of Ministers. “.
What are the technical possibilities in case the negotiations reach an agreement and the maritime borders are drawn? We see three possibilities (the hardest bitter):
1 – That Total, with the green light of the Lebanese government, draw up a retail development and production plan with the operator at the other end (Energy, Chevron or any other operator) on the basis of which the fields are developed and produced on both sides of border. This possibility, whether we like it or not, requires technical coordination at various levels with the enemy in order to preserve Lebanon’s share of the gas from erosion. Normalize it or not? It is left to the decision makers.
2 – That it be agreed within the agreement in these negotiations that Total will develop gas fields on both sides of the border, which is in the common economic interest of both parties. This result, like the first, requires the same degree of coordination with “Israel”, and what may apply to the first possibility of standardization ratifications definitely applies to the second.
3- Avoid hostility to “Israel” of any type of agreement that may encapsulate standardization in their content and content, even if the title of standardization is the preservation of the “national interest.” Israel will focus on accelerating exploration and development in the commons, especially in the absence of any legal obstacles or threats that prevent companies from exploring these promising reservoirs. Here, “Israel” can adopt, for example, a method to accelerate production, linking the wells that can be drilled in it with the Floating Production Vessel (FPSO) in the Karish field, whose absorption capacity can be increased, with a “Israeli” technical interest in accelerating the production of common reservoirs. In this case, the Lebanese state must work by various means, with Total giving top priority to work on the shared reservoirs in terms of initiating exploration and accelerating development. It should be noted that production in unknown quantities on the other side, in the case of reservoirs that stretch across the border, doubles the technical challenges in terms of estimating oil or gas reserves on the Lebanese side. Of course, we cannot rely on a third party to determine the Lebanese stake and the most appropriate way to invest it. For example, but not limited to, Lebanon cannot and must not in this case leave the assessment of its participation in a joint field between Lebanon and occupied Palestine to Total or others negotiating with the company operating in occupied Palestine, while we are left watching from afar and leaving ourselves with the power to agree or The rejection … Lebanon must participate in the details of the technical studies and the (indirect) technical negotiations on these fields, so that Lebanon does not lose any of its rights under no name or ignorance of the options available that can maximize the economic value of Lebanon.
In conclusion, we are faced with three possibilities the day after signing: the first and second lead to the normalization of the nature of things, and the third gives a clear and wide probability for “Israel” by virtue of its primacy in field. The negotiations, however we conduct them, are in the interest of “Israel.” And since there is no going back on the demarcation dossier, the Lebanese negotiator must focus, not only on the new demarcation points, but also, more importantly, on themselves, on the route and schedule of production and development. of cross-border gas fields. Any agreement that does not prevent “Israel” from developing and producing from those potential reservoirs before Lebanon, and any agreement that does not require simultaneous development and production is considered an (additional) distraction from the national interest. As for the supposed and only strengths in the hands of the Lebanese negotiator to impose this synchronization, they are none other than those that have so far prevented “Israel” from approaching those areas. That is, if these strengths were used in negotiations … they could be used!

* University professor and expert in oil and gas field development.

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