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Of course, current American policy continued to be directed against anti-hegemonic forces in the world and in our region, regardless of their ideological and intellectual backgrounds, and at the forefront in our region are Iran and Syria, and resistance movements in Lebanon and Palestine. However, the globalized nature of the Salafi jihadist movement, and its transformation into an increasingly widespread ideology thanks to the communications revolution, posed an unprecedented challenge for American and Western leaders. The latter was aware that the real reason for such proliferation was due to the concerted American and Israeli wars of aggression throughout the Arab-Islamic space, with the devastation that resided in their societies and resulted from the policies of the regimes. of dependency, tyranny and corruption, a general feeling of humiliation and a strong desire for revenge. What aggravated the anxiety of the aforementioned leaders was the ability of globalized jihadism to attract youth circles, the majority of Arab and Islamic origin, in the West itself, and push them to carry out attacks in their capitals, such as those that occurred in Madrid, London, Paris, and dozens more who failed.
The challenge of confronting globalized jihadism, through a more accurate understanding of it as a phenomenon, and the elaboration of adequate policies to besiege and isolate it among ordinary Muslims, especially the wing that considers the fight against the United States a priority, and contain the Wings that advance the war against other enemies inside or outside their country, all this has ended with successive American administrations and governments. Many Western countries to allocate huge financial resources and recruit armies of experts and advisers to achieve these ends. Since that period, so-called “anti-extremism” programs targeting Muslims have flourished and have become a source of livelihood for some of their “enlightened” elites. However, the notable decline in the strength and popularity of the jihadists with their various organizations, especially after the defeat of ISIS and the decline of al-Qaeda on the one hand, and the intensification of the hybrid war between the axis of resistance, with Iran at its core, and the American-Israeli alliance on the other hand, whose risks and costs were exceeded many times over. First, many Americans concerned about the affairs of the region woke up from their slumber, and their condition today is: Damn, we have forgotten about the Shiites!
One of them, Andrew Beck, a former deputy assistant secretary of state for Iraq and Iran affairs between 2017 and 2019, wrote a remarkable article on the Atlantic Council, titled “Shiites are a black hole for US policy in the Middle East.” Beck points out that, in his opinion, the fundamental difference between what he calls Sunni and Shiite radicalism is the extreme centralization that prevails in the latter, due to Iran’s leadership role governing the movement of parties and organizations affiliated with it. He believes that the main positive aspect of Donald Trump’s policy towards the region is the shift in focus from Sunni jihadism to Iran and its allies. However, this focus on the political level did not translate into an openness to the multiple Shiite reality. “In the event that Trump wins a second presidency, one of the main goals of our Middle East policy is to complete the shift in focus to the Shiite rather than the Sunni case,” says Beck. Opening up to some of their environments and the messages directed at them must be accompanied by raids and sanctions against others … the goal is not for the Shiites to love America. This may be fine, but it is not necessary. What is needed for the Shiite political gathering in countries where there is a plurality of Shiite representation is to begin to pressure and restrict radical parties, not only through confrontations and arrests, but also by imposing political costs on the parties that represent them. In a sense, we have seen a translation on the ground of this in Iraq in the last 18 months. Spreading this experience in other countries should be an American goal. ”
It goes without saying that Lebanon tops the list of these countries, and that what is being discussed is, in addition to revitalizing the role of the “Shiites of the embassy”, an opening to the Shiite environments that the United States classifies as affected by the line of resistance and its high prices. The most significant response to the US strategy of trying to rally the resistance into one part of a sect may be to work to build a broad and intersectarian national front that includes the majority affected by US-Israeli hegemony and the dying sectarian system.
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