Turkey’s Preventive War

Since the Tovuz battles on July 12 between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which took place near the area through which the famous Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkish pipeline passes Baku-Ceyhan, Ankara and Baku may have realized the seriousness of these battles. and its oil implications. Since that time, reports of a joint Azerbaijani-Turkish mobilization to confront the Russian-backed Armenian threat have been circulating. So ground and air maneuvers were repeated in Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan between the Turkish and Azerbaijani armies. And Azerbaijani military units recently participated in Turkish naval exercises in the eastern Mediterranean.

And there were many reports that hundreds, perhaps thousands of Syrians, in Idlib and Afrin, belonging to the “Sultan Murad Brigades” and others, went to Azerbaijan for salaries ranging from $ 500 to $ 2,000. In fact, photographs, recordings and videos of them were published while they were in Azerbaijan. They have become what appears to be a “parallel army” of the Turkish army using pent-up demand where Ankara needs it, from Syria to Libya, and today in the Caucasus. But the irony is that these “jihadists” do not like to fight, according to the records attributed to them and that were published in Turkish media, along with the Azeri “infidel Shiites”. But the use of these undoubtedly arouses the displeasure of Russia, which makes them accept the task.
Top military meetings between Turkish and Azerbaijani officials continued. In the immediate aftermath of the Tovuz battles, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan may have been in the process of adding a new “achievement” to it after he established himself in the presence of his forces in Syria and after his advance into the Libyan front, and then raised the voice and control of the European Union in Greece and Greek Cyprus, and in a movement to transform “Hagia Sophia” to a mosque. But apparently, the Turkish plan did not match al-Baydar’s account. Instead of racking up achievements, Turkey found itself on the defensive:
1- Russian pressure on Turkey to remove some Turkish observation points in Idlib and the Russian-Syrian incursions into terrorist sites in Idlib, with the Turkish willingness to comply with the Russian request in exchange for handing over the Manbij and Tal areas to Turkey Rifaat and its surroundings, which Russia rejected.
2- The situation in Libya changed after the warning of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi and the cessation of Turkish progress on the Sirte-Jafra line, and then the start of discussions between the Libyan parties according to the Egyptian perception, and most Important is the announcement by the Prime Minister of Tripoli, Fayez al-Sarraj, that he would resign from office at the end of October. Next October, and what this represents in terms of Turkey losing its first man there, and what the upcoming developments can bear in terms of a further decline in Turkey’s role.

The Azerbaijani-Turkish desire to move the situation was evident in their complete readiness

3- Tensions in the eastern Mediterranean have reached an unprecedented level with Turkey’s insistence on exploration and work in marine areas that Greece considers its subordinate. Turkey followed the tension with the “Mediterranean storm” maneuvers with Turkish Cyprus and others in which Azerbaijan participated, with great significance, for the first time. However, the European reaction was strong and threatened to impose tough sanctions on Turkey at the Brussels summit, which was scheduled for September 24 and 25, but was postponed until next Thursday. The threat of sanctions was followed by a Turkish tactical move to remove the exploration vessel “Yavuz” from the Greek island of Mejis, which is very close to the Turkish coast. The move was seen as a tension freeze and opened the door for communication between Turkish and French Presidents Emmanuel Macron.

What does Turkey want?
1- The Azerbaijani-Turkish preparations have gone from looking for a new achievement that accumulates the precedent, to an attempt to compensate for the above, and to preparing for an attack that would float the image of a “strong Turkey”, without diminishing. The acceleration was to open the current battle with Armenia in the southern regions of Karabakh (Artsakh) and near the Iranian borders. What supports this thinking is that the relatively stable status quo does not harm the situation in Armenia or its entrenchment, and they are not interested in changing it, except in the direction of gaining international recognition of the right to entrenched self-determination, and this is not currently about table. The restoration of Turkey’s strong image was accompanied by Erdogan’s media, calling for Yerevan to be bombarded “by mistake” with a missile and declaring that war is the only way to radically solve the problem.
2- Likewise, the Azerbaijani-Turkish desire to move the situation was evident in the full and planned disposition of the Azerbaijani army, which moved immediately and from the first moment to announce the start of the battles, to attack and control many villages and hills important, as well as roads in areas of Karabakh, before the Armenian army regains part of it, according to news agencies. The Azerbaijani army also bombarded the capital of Artsakh Stepanakrd with various missiles.
3- In addition to restoring Turkey’s strong image, any tension in the Caucasus situation confuses Russia, which for centuries considers the region as its backyard and has excellent relations with the two parties in conflict; Azerbaijan and Armenia. Turkey wants to put pressure on Russia, first in response to Russian pressure on Turkey in Syria, and second to Turkey’s dissatisfaction with Russia’s neutral position regarding the Turkish conflict with Greece and in the eastern Mediterranean.
4- In the same way, the high Turkish threats, yesterday Monday, from Erdogan against Armenia, and the call to return Karabakh to Azerbaijan, that is, to return to the roots of the problem, and the threat also to join Azerbaijan in the battle, it is also an anticipation for the meeting of the European Union the day after tomorrow Thursday and the prevention of any emission. Sanctions against Turkey, based on the end of sanctions in exchange for the end of the tension in the Caucasus.
5. Turkish observers also indicate that Turkey has become a strong competitor to Israel to sell weapons to Azerbaijan, especially surveillance aircraft from afar and drones that have proven effective in Libya. The new emerging tension is pushing Azerbaijan to go ahead with the purchase of Turkish weapons, which explains part of raising the Turkish voice on the side of Azerbaijan and repeating the slogan “one nation in two states”, with Turkey’s prior knowledge of that entering the war directly is an internationally unacceptable adventure and opens up great risks for the country. Turkey itself and its relations with Russia and the European Union.

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