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Motivated by other reasons, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, criminally accused of corruption, fraud and bribery, considered that what is happening is “Israel’s greatest victory”, since “force brings peace” and “allies” . Thus, literally, it is as if we were before a comic spectacle of supposed peace. To what extent can gambling on this kind of peace proceed by denying any rights to the Palestinian people, even if their cause was hardly ever mentioned at the White House celebration? This is the most fundamental question in one of the most dangerous unions of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
In other words, to what extent can the Egyptian experience of resisting normalization, which resulted in the imposition of the so-called “cold peace”, be inspired? Circumstances differ and vary from state to state, but deactivated silence does not justify it, and proceeding with normalization at the expense of the Palestinian victim is not acceptable.
In Egypt, the scenarios of rejection of normalization dominated currents and parties that were difficult to fulfill. Generations, unions and civil societies participated, and everything that was moving with vitality in the country.
One of the most prominent faces facing “Camp David” was the late Bar Chairman Abdulaziz Al-Shorbagi, if not the most prominent at all. Because of his political baggage, he is “my delegation” who is against the experience of Gamal Abdel Nasser, but at the time of “Camp David” and the danger it represents for Egyptian nationalism, he said, according to his text, in the report of his interrogations, before the Prosecutor’s Office: “By God, if I received something from my command I turned to one of his men and fought behind him. Over time, the events of the counterproject stabilized. The dismantling of the national economy in the name of economic openness has established a new class whose function is to support a certain kind of peace. Likewise, he established the dismantling of the theory of national security in the name of peace with Israel, due to the decline of the Egyptian position in its environment, its continent and its third world.
With the national project fractured, it was not possible to build a strong economy, despite the promises of prosperity, nor to establish a true democracy based on pluralism and partisan competition, in accordance with the principles of civil status and recourse to the rules. modern constitutional laws. When visiting Jerusalem, Sadat’s actions contradicted what Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy believed. He couldn’t ignore the “method” and the “approach” … nor would he close his eyes to the expected “dire results” … so he quit.
Although Dr. Boutros Ghali, who rose to the top of the Egyptian foreign apparatus, following the resignations of his minister, Ismail Fahmy, and the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mohamed Riyadh, was convinced of what Sadat had done, he became in a member of what he used to call the “foreign gang”, or “mechanical”, in relation to the famous English expression “mechanical” or “mechanism”, which was used at that time on a large scale among intellectuals and diplomats. This sarcastic expression was a reflection of Sadat’s lack of diplomatic resistance to the new policies and alliances. Thus, the military results of the October War were wasted by saying: “70% of the conflict with Israel is myself” and “99% of the cards in the game are in the hands of the United States.” The consequences were disastrous for the Egyptian regional role, entering into a unilateral reconciliation with Israel and abandoning the Arab-Israeli conflict.
When Sadat went to Jerusalem in 1977, Pope Shenouda III prevented him from going with him and quickly settled his matter by rejecting the Camp David (1978) agreement and the consequences thereof. The pope’s calculations, political rather than religious, were that keeping pace with the presidency in its new policies could push large sectors of Arab public opinion, especially in Egypt, to regard Egypt’s Copts as traitors to the Arab nation. . When he had to choose between the presidency of the state and public opinion in him, he chose without hesitation to clash with Sadat, realizing that if he accompanied him in normalization, the Copts would suffer more and irreversible damage and cracks that could not be restored in the national fabric. In the same dialogue between us, he raised his head proud of his role, saying: “I am the last of the great popes who said no to the foreign occupier.” Noticing a man with an exceptional sense of history, he turned off the recorder with another dialogue. He asked me: “Do you think all Arab and Islamic countries will recognize Israel?” I immediately replied, “No.” He said, “Then I’ll never go to Jerusalem.”
This was a stricter degree of rejecting normalization with Israel, visiting it, or allowing the Copts to make the pilgrimage to Jerusalem. At first, he said: “I will only visit Jerusalem with the Sheikh of Al-Azhar.” Then he thought about the possibility that the Sheikh of Al-Azhar was visiting the holy city and that the Arab public was angry and out of place. He saw that Al-Awwq would not visit him even if the Sheikh of Al-Azhar were to see him. This position earned Pope Shenouda great popularity, and in the mid-1990s he was called “the Arab Pope.” This was not done in isolation from the general movement of society, since popular confrontations with any tendency to normalization were frequent. The intellectuals took the lead in the angry scenes of the Cairo International Book Fair, demonstrating in front of the Israeli pavilion, until it was forced to close its doors. Professional and commercial unions have competed to prohibit any standardization of their members. The National Committee for the Defense of National Culture was created to raise public awareness about the danger of normalization for the future of the country. The spirit of rejection extended to the state apparatus itself. With the exception of a limited number of businessmen who used to visit Israel in secret, or some ministries such as the Ministry of Agriculture during Yusef Wali’s reign, the rejection of normalization was almost universal.
On the Egyptian scene, the tragedy of a generation that postponed its ambitions and life until after the end of the war, which took place in 1973, was revealed, but when they returned from the battlefields they found that what they had fought for was it had dissipated, and it had to pay the price of the policies of economic opening that were inaugurated in the year. 1974, from its social and human future. Then, a few years after the end of the war, he would see the normalization policies with the enemy that he had waited a long time in the trenches to face. Israel is no longer our historical enemy.
“This is a lie… I don’t know who you are or where you come from… What I know very well is that this house is my house, and that I faced it completely fifty meters ago, and if I didn’t think about measuring it again a long time ago, this is my confidence that the earth You cannot atrophy over time. “This was one of the first prophecies of the mid-seventies of the last century, included in Mahmoud Diab’s work,” Strangers do not drink coffee, “about the magnitude of what will happen in terms of sweeping away whatever meaning Egypt fought for. In a second prophecy, he anticipated normalization with Israel by declaring it impossible in the play “A Land That Does Not Grow Flowers.” in the hearts of people when marrying a king with a queen … Take it as the wisdom of men and do not forget, that in a land that is watered with blood does not grow a flower of love. It is a bet on break the thorn of normalization for free and peace by force.
* Egyptian writer and journalist
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