[ad_1]
According to their sources, the “multitude of shrines” see themselves as the “true representative” of the “fatwa of the jihadist struggle” that was issued by the religious authority Ali al-Sistani on June 13, 2014, after that the city of Mosul fell to the organization of “ISIS”. It is a vision that was clearly evident in the theme that the conference carried, which the four groups wanted to promote as widely as possible. Sources say that the disagreement between the “loyal mobilization” (the forces that make up the “mass committee”) and the “mobilization of sanctuaries” (attributed to the reference) is old and ingrained, summarizing it in two main points:
1- The marginalization of the “mobilization of thresholds” and its exclusion from the decision-making circle within the “commission”, which is marginalized by its repeated demands on its part of positions and financing.
2- Adherence to “belonging to the State and consolidating the concept of loyalty to it” and commitment to subordination to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, which Abdul Mahdi confirmed in his decision issued in April 2019, while the “Wali al- Faqih “(based on their belief in the idea of the” Wali al-Faqih “)” do not comply with state orders, and have their own agendas. “
The sources point out that the reasons for holding the conference are many, including -for example- the repetition of a certain pattern of security incidents that hit, according to them, “the image and prestige of the State”, alluding to what made by the “Barrio de Dios” movement (groups fly the flag to deter abusers). To the “Popular Mobilization Forces”). Although the representative of the “reference” in Lebanon, Hamid Al-Khafaf, had previously confirmed that “the thresholds are not from the institutions and bodies affiliated with the reference”, the sources of “the mobilization of thresholds” state that “the authority of Najaf is concerned about the inability of the government to control these transgressions, and therefore wants That gives the crowd a new legitimacy as it was in 2014 “, noting that” the motto indicates it, and the conference is considered a called to restructure the crowd with a reliable and disciplined force that supports the state and acts as a spearhead to strip the factions of their authority. “
The “Sanctuaries Mobilization” seeks to confirm “the Iraqi character of the crowd,” announcing its exclusive affiliation with the “Najaf landmark”
In turn, the commander of the “Ali Al-Akbar Brigade”, Ali Al-Hamdani, noted that “the conference is devoid of representation from the crowd. Our formations are not part of the corps formations. Rather, they are linked to the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, and await his decision to resolve the form of his association with him, administratively and financially. ” He added: “Currently, there is only a financial and administrative link with the Authority, but we aspire to fully untangle it and work with the Joint Operations Command in the part related to operations and maintain the partitions”, considering that “the fatwa of the supreme authority was for everyone, but not everyone adhered to it … There are those who exploited it. They are now within the body and this is what motivated the establishment of our conference.
As for Baghdad, the government’s position is still unclear, especially in the absence of comments from Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kazemi on the activities of the conference. Some people, in the absence of official representation, have read an attempt by the government to walk away from any debate that reinforces the division of state institutions. Note that Al-Kazemi did not proceed with Abdul Mahdi’s decision, nor did he delay it at the same time. This led the two conferences to ask Al-Kazemi to “complete the compromise steps as soon as possible”, in which the man could respond by “exchange of services” with the upcoming date of the early legislative elections (June 2021 ).
In a parallel line, and despite the refusal of the Hashd Authority to comment on the conference and its activities, an informed source clarifies some facts of the disagreement between it and the “Atabat”, including the following:
1 – The real leader of the four formations is Maytham al-Zaidi, and the reasons for the disagreement are many and not born of the moment. Al-Zaidi was not in perfect harmony with the engineer, and he repeatedly tried to defect from the “commission” during the Haider al-Abadi government (2014-2018), with the latter promising that he would be installed as vice president in replacement of the engineer.
2- After the martyrdom of the engineer and Soleimani, Al-Zaidi wanted to win the post of Chief of Staff of the “crowd”. However, the head of the “commission”, Faleh al-Fayyad, in consultation with the leaders of the combat formations, wanted to entrust the mission to Haji “Abu Fadak” (Abdul Aziz al-Muhammadawi), and this decision provoked a great tension within the military security system (see “Al-Akhbar”, number 3988). ).
3- The “Mobilization of Sanctuaries” seeks to confirm “the Iraqi character of the crowd”, declaring their exclusive affiliation (commanders and associates) with the “Najaf reference”, which also indicates the depth of the dispute between Najaf and Qom (the headquarters of the religious seminary in Iran). It is not only about a religious dispute, but also about the political position and the mechanisms to assume it.
4- There is a disagreement between the “commission” and the “mobilization of thresholds” regarding the tasks entrusted to the institution, the limits of responsibility, and the approach to the military-security scenario from its multiple angles, from the tactics of combat, up to the strategies that govern the confrontation and its limits, and not an end to the sponsoring and sponsoring parties.
5- There are economic losses in excess of 220 million dollars, and both the “commission” and the “mobilization of thresholds” exchange accusations in this regard.
Subscribe to «News» on YouTube here
